the advancement of learning-第28部分

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may　overweigh　Aristotle's　opinion；　that　would　have　us　change　a　rich　wardrobe　for　a　pair　of　shears。

8。　But　the　nature　of　the　collection　of　this　provision　or　preparatory　store；　though　it　be　common　both　to　Logic　and　Rhetoric；　yet　having　made　an　entry　to　it　here；　where　it　came　first　to　be　spoken　of；　I　think　fit　to　refer　over　the　further　handling　of　it　to　Rhetoric。

9。　The　other　part　of　invention；　which　I　term　suggestion；　doth　assign　and　direct　us　to　certain　marks；　or　places；　which　may　excite　our　mind　to　return　and　produce　such　knowledge　as　it　hath　formerly　collected；　to　the　end　we　may　make　use　thereof。　Neither　is　this　use；　truly　taken；　only　to　furnish　argument　to　dispute　probably　with　others；　but　likewise　to　minister　unto　our　judgment　to　conclude　aright　within　ourselves。　Neither　may　these　Places　serve　only　to　apprompt　our　invention；　but　also　to　direct　our　inquiry。　For　a　faculty　of　wise　interrogating　is　half　a　knowledge。　For　as　Plato　saith；　WHOSOEVER　SEEKETH；　KNOWETH　THAT　WHICH　HE　SEEKETH　FOR　IN　A　GENERAL　NOTION：　ELSE　HOW　SHALL　HE　KNOW　IT　WHEN　HE　HATH　FOUND　IT？　　and　therefore　the　larger　your　anticipation　is；　the　more　direct　and　compendious　is　your　search。　But　the　same　Places　which　will　help　us　what　to　produce　of　that　which　we　know　already；　will　also　help　us；　if　a　man　of　experience　were　before　us；　what　questions　to　ask；　or；　if　we　have　books　and　authors　to　instruct　us；　what　points　to　search　and　revolve；　so　as　I　cannot　report　that　this　part　of　invention；　which　is　that　which　the　schools　call　Topics；　is　deficient。'

10。　Nevertheless；　Topics　are　of　two　sorts；　general　and　special。　The　general　we　have　spoken　to；　but　the　particular　hath　been　touched　by　some；　but　rejected　generally　as　inartificial　and　variable。　But　leaving　the　humour　which　hath　reigned　too　much　in　the　schools；　which　is；　to　be　vainly　subtle　in　a　few　things　which　are　within　their　command；　and　to　reject　the　rest；　I　do　receive　particular　Topics；　（that　is；　places　or　directions　of　invention　and　inquiry　in　every　particular　knowledge；）　as　things　of　great　use；　being　mixtures　of　Logic　with　the　matter　of　sciences；　for　in　these　it　holdeth；　ARS　INVENIENDI　ADOLESCIT　CUM　INVENTIS；　　for　as　in　going　of　a　way；　we　do　not　only　gain　that　part　of　the　way　which　is　passed；　but　we　gain　the　better　sight　of　that　part　of　the　way　which　remaineth：　so　every　degree　of　proceeding　in　a　science　giveth　a　light　to　that　which　followeth；　which　light　if　we　strengthen　by　drawing　it　forth　into　questions　or　places　of　inquiry；　we　do　greatly　advance　our　pursuit。

XIV。　1。　Now　we　pass　unto　the　arts　of　Judgment；　which　handle　the　natures　of　Proofs　and　Demonstrations；　which　as　to　Induction　hath　a　coincidence　with　Invention。　For　in　all　inductions；　whether　in　good　or　vicious　form；　the　same　action　of　the　mind　which　inventeth；　judgeth；　all　one　as　in　the　sense。　But　otherwise　it　is　in　proof　by　syllogism；　for　the　proof　being　not　immediate；　but　by　mean；　the　invention　of　the　mean　is　one　thing；　and　the　judgment　of　the　consequence　is　another；　the　one　exciting　only；　the　other　examining。　Therefore　for　the　real　and　exact　form　of　judgment；　we　refer　ourselves　to　that　which　we　have　spoken　of　interpretation　of　nature。

2。　For　the　other　judgment　by　Syllogism；　as　it　is　a　thing　most　agreeable　to　the　mind　of　man；　so　it　hath　been　vehemently　and　excellently　laboured；　for　the　nature　of　man　doth　extremely　covet　to　have　somewhat　in　his　understanding　fixed　and　immovable；　and　as　a　rest　and　support　of　the　mind。　And　therefore　as　Aristotle　endeavoureth　to　prove；　that　in　all　＇49＇　motion　there　is　some　point　quiescent；　and　as　he　elegantly　expoundeth　the　ancient　fable　of　Atlas；　that　stood　fixed；　and　bare　up　the　heaven　from　falling；　to　be　meant　of　the　poles　or　axle…tree　of　heaven；　whereupon　the　conversion　is　accomplished；　so　assuredly　men　have　a　desire　to　have　an　ATLAS　or　axle…tree　within　to　keep　them　from　fluctuation；　which　is　like　to　a　perpetual　peril　of　falling；　therefore　men　did　hasten　to　set　down　some　principles　about　which　the　variety　of　their　disputations　might　turn。

3。　So　then　this　art　of　Judgment　is　but　the　reduction　of　propositions　to　principles　in　a　middle　term：　the　principles　to　be　agreed　by　all　and　exempted　from　argument；　the　middle　term　to　be　elected　at　the　liberty　of　every　man's　invention；　the　reduction　to　be　of　two　kinds；　direct　and　inverted；　the　one　when　the　proposition　is　reduced　to　the　principle；　which　they　term　a　PROBATION　OSTENSIVE；　the　other；　when　the　contradictory　of　the　proposition　is　reduced　to　the　contradictory　of　the　principle；　which　is　that　which　they　call　PER　INCOMMODUM；　or　PRESSING　AN　ABSURDITY；　the　number　of　middle　terms　to　be　as　the　proposition　standeth　degrees　more　or　less　removed　from　the　principle。

4。　But　this　art　hath　two　several　methods　of　doctrine；　the　one　by　way　of　direction；　the　other　by　way　of　caution：　the　former　frameth　and　setteth　down　a　true　form　of　consequence；　by　the　variations　and　deflections　from　which　errors　and　inconsequences　may　be　exactly　judged。　Toward　the　composition　and　structure　of　which　form；　it　is　incident　to　handle　the　parts　thereof；　which　are　propositions；　and　the　parts　of　propositions；　which　are　simple　words：　and　this　is　that　part　of　Logic　which　is　comprehended　in　the　ANALYTICS。

5。　The　second　method　of　doctrine　was　introduced　for　expedite　use　and　assurance　sake；　discovering　the　more　subtle　forms　of　sophisms　and　illaqueations　with　their　redargutions；　which　is　that　which　is　termed　ELENCHES。　For　although　in　the　more　gross　sorts　of　fallacies　it　happeneth；　as　Seneca　maketh　the　comparison　well；　as　in　juggling　feats；　which；　though　we　know　not　how　they　are　done；　yet　we　know　well　it　is　not　as　it　seemeth　to　be；　　yet　the　more　subtle　sort　of　them　doth　not　only　put　a　man　beside　his　answer；　but　doth　many　times　abuse　his　judgment。

6。　This　part　concerning　ELENCHES　is　excellently　handled　by　Aristotle　in　precept；　but　more　excellently　by　Plato　in　example；　not　only　in　the　persons　of　the　Sophists；　but　even　in　Socrates　himself；　who；　professing　to　affirm　nothing；　but　to　infirm　that　which　was　affirmed　by　another；　hath　exactly　expressed　all　the　forms　of　objection；　fallacy；　and　regardution。　And　although　we　have　said　that　the　use　of　this　doctrine　is　for　redargution；　yet　it　is　manifest　the　degenerate　and　corrupt　use　is　for　caption　and　contradiction；　which　passeth　for　a　great　faculty；　and　no　doubt　is　of　very　great　advantage：　though　the　difference　be　good　which　was　made　between　orators　and　sophisters；　that　the　one　is　as　the　greyhound　which　hath　his　advantage　in　the　race；　and　the　other　as　the　hare　which　hath　her　advantage　in　the　turn；　so　as　it　is　the　advantage　of　the　weaker　creature。

7。　But　yet　further；　this　doctrine　of　ELENCHES　hath　a　more　ample　latitude　and　extent　than　is　perceived；　namely；　unto　divers　parts　of　knowledge；　whereof　some　are　laboured　and　others　omitted。　For　first；　I　conceive；　though　it　may　seem　at　first　somewhat　strange；　that　that　part　which　is　variably　referred；　sometimes　to　logic；　sometimes　to　metaphysics；　touching　the　common　adjuncts　of　essences；　is　but　an　ELENCH；　for　the　great　sophism　of　all　sophisms　being　equivocation；　or　ambiguity　of　words　and　phrase；　（especially　of　such　words　as　are　most　general；　and　intervene　in　every　inquiry；）　it　seemeth　to　me　that　the　true　and　fruitful　use；　leaving　vain　subtilties　and　speculations；　of　the　inquiry　of　majority；　minority；　priority；　posteriority；　identity；　diversity；　possibility；　act；　totality；　parts；　existence；　privation；　and　the　like；　are　but　wise　cautions　against　the　ambiguities　of　speech。　So　again　the　distribution　of　things　into　certain　tribes；　which　we　call　categories　or　predicaments；　are　but　cautions　against　the　confusion　of　definitions　and　divisions。

8。　Secondly；　there　is　a　seducement　that　worketh　by　the　strength　of　the　impression；　and　not　by　the　subtilty　of　the　illaqueation；　not　so　much　perplexing　the　reason；　as　overruling　it　by　power　of　the　imagination。　But　this　part　I　think　more　proper　to　handle　when　I　shall　speak　of　rhetoric。

9。　But　lastly；　there　is　yet　a　much　more　important　and　profound　kind　of　fallacies　in　the　mind　of　man；　which　I　find　not　observed　or　inquired　at　all；　and　think　good　to　place　here；　as　that　which　of　all　others　appertaineth　most　to　rectify　judgment：　the　force　whereof　is　such；　as　it　doth　not　dazzle　or　snare　the　understanding　in　some　particulars；　but　doth　more　generally　and　inwardly　infect　and　corrupt　the　state　thereof。　For　the　mind　of　man　is　far　from　the　nature　of　a　clear　and　equal　glass；　wherein　the　beams　of　things　should　reflect　according　to　their　true　incidence；　nay；　it　is　rather　like　an　enchanted　glass；　full　of　superstition　and　imposture；　if　it　be　not　delivered　and　reduced。　For　this　purpose；　let　us　consider　the　false　appearances　that　are　imposed　upon　us　by　the　general　nature　of　the　mind；　beholding　them　in　an　example　or　two；　as　first；　in　that　instance　which　is　the　root　of　a　superstition；　namely；　THAT　TO　THE　NATURE　OF　THE　MIND　OF　ALL　MEN　IT　IS　CONSONANT　FOR　THE　AFFIRMATIVE　OR　ACTIVE　TO　EFFECT　MORE　THAN　THE　NEGATIVE　OR　PRIVATIVE。　So　that　a　few　times　hitting；　or　presence；　countervails　oft…times　failing　or　absence；　as　was　well　answered　by　Diagoras　to　him　that　showed　him　in　Neptune's　temple　the　great　number　of　pictures　of　such　as　had　escaped　shipwreck；　and　had　paid　their　vows　to　Neptune；　saying；　ADVISE　NOW；　YOU　THAT　THINK　IT　FOLLY　TO　INVOCATE　NEPTUNE　IN　TEMPEST：　YEA；　BUT；　saith　Diagoras；　WHERE　ARE　THEY　PAINTED　THAT　ARE　DROWNED　？　Let　us　behold　it　in　another　instance；　namely；　THAT　THE　SPIRIT　OF　MAN；　BEING　OF　AN　EQUAL　AND　UNIFORM　SUBSTANCE；　DOTH　USUALLY　SUPPOSE　AND　FEIGN　IN　NATURE　A　GREATER　EQUALITY　AND　UNIFORMITY　THAN　IS　IN　TRUTH。　Hence　it　cometh；　that　the　mathematicians　cannot　satisfy　themselves　except　they　reduce　the　motions　of　the　celestial　bodies　to　perfect　circles；　rejecting　spiral　lines；　and　labouring　to　be　discharged　of　＇50＇　eccentrics。　Hence　it　cometh；　that　whereas　there　are　many　things　in　nature　as　it　were　MONODICA；　SUI　JURIS；　　yet　the　cogitations　of　man　do　feign　unto　them　relatives；　parallels；　and　conjugates；　whereas　no　such　thing　is；　as　they　have　feigned　an　element　of　fire；　to　keep　square　with　earth；　water；　and　air；　and　the　like：　nay；　it　is　not　credible；　till　it　be　opened；　what　a　number　of　fictions　and　fancies　the　similitude　of　human　actions　and　arts；　together　with　the　making　of　man　COMMUNIS　MENSURA；　have　brought　into　natural　p