the advancement of learning-第37部分

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tion。　And　here　again　I　find　strange；　as　before；　that　Aristotle　should　have　written　divers　volumes　of　ethics；　and　never　handled　the　affections；　which　is　the　principal　subject　thereof；　and　yet　in　his　Rhetorics；　where　they　are　considered　but　collaterally；　and　in　a　second　degree；　as　they　may　be　moved　by　speech；　he　findeth　place　for　them；　and　handleth　them　well　for　the　quantity；　but　where　their　true　place　is；　he　pretermitteth　them。　For　it　is　not　his　disputations　about　pleasure　and　pain　that　can　satisfy　this　inquiry；　no　more　than　he　that　should　generally　handle　the　nature　of　light　can　be　said　to　handle　the　nature　of　colours；　for　pleasure　and　pain　are　to　the　particular　affections　as　light　is　to　particular　colours。

Better　travails；　I　suppose；　had　the　Stoics　taken　in　this　argument；　as　far　as　I　can　gather　by　that　which　we　have　at　second　hand。　But　yet；　it　is　like；　it　was　after　their　manner；　rather　in　subtilty　of　definitions；　（which　in　a　subject　of　this　nature　are　but　curiosities；）　than　in　active　and　ample　descriptions　and　observations。　So　likewise　I　find　some　particular　writings　of　an　elegant　nature；　touching　some　of　the　affections；　as　of　anger；　of　comfort　upon　adverse　accidents；　of　tenderness　of　countenance；　and　other。

But　the　poets　and　writers　of　histories　are　the　best　doctors　of　this　knowledge；　where　we　may　find　painted　forth　with　great　life；　how　affections　are　kindled　and　incited；　and　how　pacified　and　refrained；　and　how　again　contained　from　act　and　further　degree；　how　they　disclose　themselves；　how　they　work；　how　they　vary；　how　they　gather　and　fortify；　how　they　are　inwrapped　one　within　another；　and　how　they　do　fight　and　encounter　one　with　another；　and　other　the　like　particularities：　amongst　the　which　this　last　is　of　special　use　in　moral　and　civil　matters；　how；　I　say；　to　set　affection　against　affection；　and　to　master　one　by　another；　even　as　we　use　to　hunt　beast　with　beast；　and　fly　bird　with　bird；　which　otherwise　percase　we　could　not　so　easily　recover：　upon　which　foundation　is　erected　that　excellent　use　of　PRAEMIUM　and　POENA；　whereby　civil　states　consist：　employing　the　predominant　affections　of　fear　and　hope；　for　the　suppressing　and　bridling　the　rest。　For　as　in　the　government　of　states　it　is　sometimes　necessary　to　bridle　one　faction　with　another；　so　it　is　in　the　government　within。

7。　Now　come　we　to　those　points　which　are　within　our　own　command；　and　have　force　and　operation　upon　the　mind；　to　affect　the　will　and　appetite；　and　to　alter　manners：　wherein　they　ought　to　have　handled　custom；　exercise；　habit；　education；　example；　imitation；　emulation；　company；　friends；　praise；　reproof；　exhortation；　fame；　laws；　books；　studies：　these　as　they　have　determinate　use　in　moralities；　from　these　the　mind　suffereth；　and　of　these　are　such　receipts　and　regiments　compounded　and　described；　as　may　seem　to　recover　or　preserve　the　health　and　good　estate　of　the　mind；　as　far　as　pertaineth　to　human　medicine：　of　which　number　we　will　insist　upon　some　one　or　two；　as　an　example　of　the　rest；　because　it　were　too　long　to　prosecute　all；　and　therefore　we　do　resume　custom　and　habit　to　speak　of。

8。　The　opinion　of　Aristotle　seemeth　to　me　a　negligent　opinion；　that　of　those　things　which　consist　by　nature　nothing　can　be　changed　by　custom；　using　for　example；　that　if　a　stone　be　thrown　ten　thousand　times　up；　it　will　not　learn　to　ascend；　and　that　by　often　seeing　or　hearing；　we　do　not　learn　to　see　or　hear　the　better。　For　though　this　principle　be　true　in　things　wherein　nature　is　peremptory　（the　reason　whereof　we　cannot　now　stand　to　discuss）；　yet　it　is　otherwise　in　things　wherein　nature　admitteth　a　latitude。　For　he　might　see　that　a　strait　glove　will　come　more　easily　on　with　use；　and　that　a　wand　will　by　use　bend　otherwise　than　it　grew；　and　that　by　use　of　the　voice　we　speak　louder　and　stronger；　and　that　by　use　of　enduring　heat　or　cold；　we　endure　it　the　better；　and　the　like：　which　latter　sort　have　a　nearer　resemblance　unto　that　subject　of　manners　he　handleth；　than　those　instances　which　he　allegeth。　But　allowing　his　conclusion；　that　virtues　and　vices　consist　in　habit；　he　ought　so　much　the　more　to　have　taught　the　manner　of　superinducing　that　habit：　for　there　be　many　precepts　of　the　wise　ordering　the　exercises　of　the　mind；　as　there　is　of　ordering　the　exercises　of　the　body；　whereof　we　will　recite　a　few。

9。　The　first　shall　be；　that　we　beware　we　take　not　at　the　first　either　too　high　a　strain；　or　too　weak：　for　if　too　high；　in　a　diffident　nature　you　discourage；　in　a　confident　nature　you　breed　an　opinion　of　facility；　and　so　a　sloth；　and　in　all　natures　you　breed　a　further　expectation　than　can　hold　out；　and　so　an　insatisfaction　in　the　end：　if　too　weak　on　the　other　side；　you　may　not　look　to　perform　and　overcome　any　great　task。

10。　Another　precept　is；　to　practise　all　things　chiefly　at　two　several　times；　the　one　when　the　mind　is　best　disposed；　the　other　when　it　is　worst　disposed；　that　by　the　one　you　may　gain　a　great　step；　by　the　other　you　may　work　out　the　knots　and　stonds　of　the　mind；　and　make　the　middle　times　the　more　easy　and　pleasant。

11。　Another　precept　is；　that　which　Aristotle　mentioneth　by　the　way；　which　is　to　bear　ever　towards　the　contrary　extreme　of　that　whereunto　we　are　by　nature　inclined；　like　unto　the　rowing　against　the　＇64＇　stream；　or　making　a　wand　straight　by　bending　　him　contrary　to　his　natural　crookedness。

12。　Another　precept　is；　that　the　mind　is　brought　to　anything　better；　and　with　more　sweetness　and　happiness；　if　that　whereunto　you　pretend　be　not　first　in　the　intention；　but　TANQUAM　ALIUD　AGENDO；　because　of　the　natural　hatred　of　the　mind　against　necessity　and　constraint。　Many　other　axioms　there　are　touching　the　managing　of　exercise　and　custom；　which　being　so　conducted　doth　prove　indeed　another　nature；　but　being　governed　by　chance　doth　commonly　prove　but　an　ape　of　nature；　and　bringing　forth　that　which　is　lame　and　counterfeit。

13。　So　if　we　should　handle　books　and　studies；　and　what　influence　and　operation　they　have　upon　manners；　are　there　not　divers　precepts　of　great　caution　and　direction　appertaining　thereunto？　Did　not　one　of　the　fathers　　in　great　indignation　call　poesy；　VINUM　DAEMONUM；　because　it　increaseth　temptations；　perturbations；　and　vain　opinions？　Is　not　the　opinion　of　Aristotle　worthy　to　be　regarded；　wherein　he　saith；　THAT　YOUNG　MEN　ARE　NO　FIT　AUDITORS　OF　MORAL　PHILOSOPHY；　BECAUSE　THEY　ARE　NOT　SETTLED　FROM　THE　BOILING　HEAT　OF　THEIR　AFFECTIONS；　NOR　ATTEMPERED　WITH　TIME　AND　EXPERIENCE。　And　doth　it　not　hereof　come；　that　those　excellent　books　and　discourses　of　the　ancient　writers；　（whereby　they　have　persuaded　unto　virtue　most　effectually；　by　representing　her　in　state　and　majesty；　and　popular　opinions　against　virtue　in　their　parasites'　coats　fit　to　be　scorned　and　derided；）　are　of　so　little　effect　towards　honesty　of　life；　because　they　are　not　read　and　revolved　by　men　in　their　mature　and　settled　years；　but　confined　almost　to　boys　and　beginners？　But　is　it　not　true　also；　that　much　less　young　men　are　fit　auditors　of　matters　of　policy；　till　they　have　been　thoroughly　seasoned　in　religion　and　morality；　lest　their　judgments　be　corrupted；　and　made　apt　to　think　that　there　are　no　true　differences　of　things；　but　according　to　utility　and　fortune；　as　the　verse　describes　it；

Prosperum　et　felix　scelus　virtus　vocatur；

and　again；

Ille　crucem　pretium　sceleris　tulit；　hic　diadema：

which　the　poets　do　speak　satirically；　and　in　indignation　on　virtue's　behalf；　but　books　of　policy　do　speak　it　seriously　and　positively；　for　so　it　pleaseth　Machiavel　to　say；　THAT　IF　CAESAR　HAD　BEEN　OVERTHROWN；　HE　WOULD　HAVE　BEEN　MORE　ODIOUS　THAN　EVER　WAS　CATILINE；　as　if　there　had　been　no　difference　but　in　fortune；　between　a　very　fury　of　lust　and　blood；　and　the　most　excellent　spirit　（his　ambition　reserved）　of　the　world？　Again；　is　there　not　a　caution　likewise　to　be　given　of　the　doctrines　of　moralities　themselves；　（some　kinds　of　them；）　lest　they　make　men　too　precise；　arrogant；　incompatible；　as　Cicero　saith　of　Cato；　IN　MARCO　CATONE　HAEC　BONA　QUAE　VIDEMUS　DIVINA　ET　EGREGIA；　IPSIUS　SCITOTE　ESSE　PROPRIA；　QUAE　NONNUNQUAM　REQUIRIMUS；　EA　SUNT　OMNIA　NON　A　NATUR？　SED　A　MAGISTRO　？　　Many　other　axioms　and　advices　there　are　touching　those　proprieties　and　effects　which　studies　do　infuse　and　instil　into　manners。　And　so　likewise　is　there　touching　the　use　of　all　those　other　points；　of　company；　fame；　laws；　and　the　rest；　which　we　recited　in　the　beginning　in　the　doctrine　of　morality。

14。　But　there　is　a　kind　of　culture　of　the　mind　that　seemeth　yet　more　accurate　and　elaborate　than　the　rest；　and　is　built　upon　this　ground；　that　the　minds　of　all　men　are　at　some　times　in　a　state　more　perfect；　and　at　other　times　in　a　state　more　depraved。　The　purpose　therefore　of　this　practice　is　to　fix　and　cherish　the　good　hours　of　the　mind；　and　to　obliterate　and　take　forth　the　evil。　The　fixing　of　the　good　hath　been　practised　by　two　means；　vows　or　constant　resolutions；　and　observances　or　exercises；　which　are　not　to　be　regarded　so　much　in　themselves；　as　because　they　keep　the　mind　in　continual　obedience。　The　obliteration　of　the　evil　hath　been　practised　by　two　means；　some　kind　of　redemption　or　expiation　of　that　which　is　past；　and　an　inception　or　account　DE　NOVO；　for　the　time　to　come。　But　this　part　seemeth　sacred　and　religious；　and　justly；　for　all　good　moral　philosophy；　as　was　said；　is　but　a　handmaid　to　religion。

15。　Wherefore　we　will　conclude　with　that　last　point；　which　is　of　all　other　means　the　most　compendious　and　summary；　and　again；　the　most　noble　and　effectual　to　the　reducing　of　the　mind　unto　virtue　and　good　estate；　which　is　the　electing　and　propounding　unto　a　man's　self　good　and　virtuous　ends　of　his　life；　such　as　may　be　in　a　reasonable　sort　within　his　compass　to　attain。　For　if　these　two　things　be　supposed；　that　a　man　set　before　him　honest　and　good　ends；　and　again；　that　he　be　resolute；　constant；　and　true　unto　them；　it　will　follow　that　he　shall　mould　himself　into　all　virtue　at　once。　And　this　indeed　is　like　the　work　of　nature；　whereas　the　other　course　is　like　the　work　of　the　hand。　For　as　when　a　carver　makes　an　image；　he　shapes　only　that　part　whereupon　he　worketh；　（as　if　he　be　upon　the　face；　that　part　which　shall　be　the　body　is　but　a　rude　stone　still；　till　such　time　as　he　comes　to　it；）　but；　contrariwise；　when　nature　makes　a　flower　or　living　creature；　she