shorter logic-第14部分

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there　is　thus　at　the　same　time　included　the　development　of　the　matter　or　of　the
objects　discussed　in　the　special　branches　of　philosophy。　But　the　latter　process
must；　so　to　speak；　go　on　behind　consciousness；　since　those　facts　are　the　essential
nucleus　which　is　raised　into　consciousness。　The　exposition　accordingly　is　rendered
more　intricate；　because　so　much　that　properly　belongs　to　the　concrete　branches　is
prematurely　dragged　into　the　introduction。　The　survey　which　follows　in　the
present　work　has　even　more　the　inconvenience　of　being　only　historical　and
inferential　in　its　method。　But　it　tries　especially　to　show　how　the　questions　men
have　proposed；　outside　the　school；　on　the　nature　of　Knowledge；　Faith；　and　the
like…questions　which　they　imagine　to　have　no　connection　with　abstract　thoughts　…
are　really　reducible　to　the　simple　categories；　which　first　get　cleared　up　in　Logic。　




III。　First　Attitude　of　Thought　to　Objectivity


　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§26

The　first　of　these　attitudes　of　thought　is　seen　in　the　method　which　has　no　doubts
and　no　sense　of　the　contradiction　in　thought；　or　of　the　hostility　of　thought　against
itself。　It　entertains　an　unquestioning　belief　that　reflection　is　the　means　of
ascertaining　the　truth；　and　of　bringing　the　objects　before　the　mind　as　they　really
are。　And　in　this　belief　it　advances　straight　upon　its　objects；　takes　the　materials
furnished　by　sense　and　perception；　and　reproduces　them　from　itself　as　facts　of
thought；　and　then；　believing　this　result　to　be　the　truth；　the　method　is　content。
Philosophy　in　its　earliest　stages；　all　the　sciences；　and　even　the　daily　action　and
movement　of　consciousness；　live　in　this　faith。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§27

This　method　of　thought　has　never　become　aware　of　the　antithesis　of　subjective
and　objective：　and　to　that　extent　there　is　nothing　to　prevent　its　statements　from
possessing　a　genuinely　philosophical　and　speculative　character；　though　it　is　just　as
possible　that　they　may　never　get　beyond　finite　categories；　or　the　stage　where　the
antithesis　is　still　unresolved。　In　the　present　introduction　the　main　question　for　us　is
to　observe　this　attitude　of　thought　in　its　extreme　form；　and　we　shall　accordingly
first　of　all　examine　its　second　and　inferior　aspect　as　a　philosophic　system。　One　of
the　clearest　instances　of　it；　and　one　lying　nearest　to　ourselves；　may　be　found　in
the　Metaphysic　of　the　Past　as　it　subsisted　among　us　previous　to　the　philosophy　of
Kant。　It　is　however　only　in　reference　to　the　history　of　philosophy　that　this
Metaphysic　can　be　said　to　belong　to　the　past：　the　thing　is　always　and　at　all　places
to　be　found；　as　the　view　which　the　abstract　understanding　takes　of　the　objects　of
reason。　And　it　is　in　this　point　that　the　real　and　immediate　good　lies　in　a　closer
examination　of　its　main　scope　and　its　modis　operandi。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§28

This　metaphysical　system　took　the　laws　and　forms　of　thought　to　be　the
fundamental　laws　and　forms　of　things。　It　assumed　that　to　think　a　thing　was　the
means　of　finding　its　very　self　and　nature：　and　to　that　extent　it　occupied　higher
ground　than　the　Critical　Philosophy　which　succeeded　it。　But　in　the　first　instance
（1）　these　terms　of　thought　were　cut　off　from　their　connection；　their　solidarity；
each　was　believed　valid　by　itself　and　capable　of　serving　as　a　predicate　of　the
truth。　It　was　the　general　assumption　of　this　metaphysic　that　a　knowledge　of　the
Absolute　was　gained　by　assigning　predicates　to　it。　It　neither　inquired　what　the
terms　of　the　understanding　specially　meant　or　what　they　were　worth；　no…r　did　it
test　the　method　which　characterises　the　Absolute　by　the　assignment　of　predicates。

As　an　example　of　such　predicates　may　be　taken：　Existence；　in　the　proposition；
'God　has　existence'；　Finitude　or　Infinity；　as　in　the　question；　'Is　the　world　finite　or
infinite？'；　Simple　and　Complex；　in　the　proposition；　'The　Soul　is　simple'　or　again；
'The　thing　is　a　unity；　a　whole'；　etc。　Nobody　asked　whether　such　predicates　had
any　intrinsic　and　independent　truth；　or　if　the　propositional　form　could　be　a　form
of　truth。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§28n

The　Metaphysic　of　the　past　assumed；　as　unsophisticated　belief　always　does；　that　thought
apprehends　the　very　self　of　things；　and　that　things；　to　become　what　they　truly　are；　require　to　be
thought。　For　Nature　and　the　human　soul　are　a　very　Proteus　in　their　perpetual　transformations；　and
it　soon　occurs　to　the　observer　that　the　first　crude　impression　of　things　is　not　their　essential　being。
This　is　a　point　of　view　the　very　reverse　of　the　result　arrived　at　by　the　Critical　Philosophy；　a　result；
of　which　it　may　be　said；　that　it　bade　man　go　and　feed　on　mere　husks　and　chaff。　

We　must　look　more　closely　into　the　procedure　of　that　old　metaphysic。　In　the　first　place　it　never
went　beyond　the　province　of　the　analytic　understanding。　Without　preliminary　inquiry　it　adopted　the
abstract　categories　of　thought　and　let　them　rank　as　predicates　of　truth。　But　in　using　the　term
thought　we　must　not　forget　the　difference　between　finite　or　discursive　thinking　and　the　thinking
which　is　infinite　and　rational。　The　categories；　as　they　meet　us　prima　facie　and　in　isolation；　are　finite
forms。　But　truth　is　always　infinite；　and　cannot　be　expressed　or　presented　to　consciousness　in　finite
terms。　The　phrase　infinite　thought　may　excite　surprise；　if　we　adhere　to　the　modern　conception
that　thought　is　always　limited。　But　it　is；　speaking　rightly；　the　very　essence　of　thought　to　be　infinite。
The　nominal　explanation　of　calling　a　thing　finite　is　that　it　has　an　end；　that　it　exists　up　to　a　certain
point　only；　where　it　comes　into　contact　with；　and　is　limited　by；　its　other。　The　finite　therefore
subsists　in　reference　to　its　other；　which　is　its　negation　and　presents　itself　as　its　limit。　Now　thought　is
always　in　its　own　sphere　its　relations　are　with　itself；　and　it　is　its　own　object。　In　having　a　thought　for
object；　I　am　at　home　with　myself。　The　thinking　power；　the　'I'；　is　therefore　infinite；　because；　when　it
thinks；　it　is　in　relation　to　an　object　which　is　itself。　Generally　speaking；　an　object　means　a　something
else；　a　negative　confronting　me。　But　in　the　case　where　thought　thinks　itself；　it　has　an　object　which　is
at　the　same　time　no　object：　in　other　words；　its　objectivity　is　suppressed　and　transformed　into　an
idea。　Thought；　as　thought；　therefore　in　its　unmixed　nature　involves　no　limits；　it　is　finite　only　when　it
keeps　to　limited　categories；　which　it　believes　to　be　ultimate。　Infinite　or　speculative　thought；　on　the
contrary；　while　it　no　less　defines；　does　in　the　very　act　of　limiting　and　defining　make　that　defect
vanish。　And　so　infinity　is　not；　as　most　frequently　happens；　to　be　conceived　as　an　abstract　away
and　away　for　ever　and　ever；　but　in　the　simple　manner　previously　indicated。　

The　thinking　of　the　old　metaphysical　system　was　finite。　Its　whole　mode　of　action　was　regulated　by
categories；　the　limits　of　which　it　believed　to　be　permanently　fixed　and　not　subject　to　any　further
negation。　Thus；　one　of　its　questions　was：　Has　God　existence？　The　question　supposes　that
existence　is　an　altogether　positive　term；　a　sort　of　ne　plus　ultra。　We　shall　see　however　at　a　later
point　that　existence　is　by　no　means　a　merely　positive　term；　but　one　which　is　too　low　for　the
Absolute　Idea；　and　unworthy　of　God。　A　second　question　in　these　metaphysical　systems　was：　Is
the　world　finite　or　infinite　？　The　very　terms　of　the　question　assume　that　the　finite　is　a　permanent
contradictory　to　the　infinite：　and　one　can　easily　see　that；　when　they　are　so　opposed；　the　infinite；
which　of　course　ought　to　be　the　whole；　only　appears　as　a　single　aspect　and　suffers　restriction　from
the　finite。　But　a　restricted　infinity　is　itself　only　a　finite。　In　the　same　way　it　was　asked　whether　the
soul　was　simple　or　composite。　Simpleness　was；　in　other　words；　taken　to　be　an　ultimate
characteristic；　giving　expression　to　a　whole　truth。　Far　from　being　so；　simpleness　is　the　expression
of　a　half…truth；　as　one…sided　and　abstract　as　existence　…　a　term　of　thought；　which；　as　we　shall
hereafter　see；　is　itself　untrue　and　hence　unable　to　hold　truth。　If　the　soul　be　viewed　as　merely　and
abstractly　simple；　it　is　characterised　in　an　inadequate　and　finite　way。　

It　was　therefore　the　main　question　of　the　pre…Kantian　metaphysic　to　discover　whether　predicates
of　the　kind　mentioned　were　to　be　ascribed　to　its　objects。　Now　these　predicates　are　after　all　only
limited　formulae　of　the　understanding　which；　instead　of　expressing　the　truth；　merely　impose　a　limit。
More　than　this；　it　should　be　noted　that　the　chief　feature　of　the　method　lay　in　'assigning'　or
'attributing'　predicates　to　the　object　that　was　to　be　cognised；　for　example；　to　God。　But　attribution
is　no　more　than　an　external　reflection　about　the　object：　the　predicates　by　which　the　object　is　to　be
determined　are　supplied　from　the　resources　of　picture…thought；　and　are　applied　in　a　mechanical
way。　Whereas；　if　we　are　to　have　genuine　cognition；　the　object　must　characterise　its　own　self　and
not　derive　its　predicates　from　without。　Even　supposing　we　follow　the　method　of　predicating；　the
mind　cannot　help　feeling　that　predicates　of　this　sort　fail　to　exhaust　the　object。　From　the　same　point
of　view　the　Orientals　are　quite　correct　in　calling　God　the　many…named　or　the　myriad…named　One。
One　after　another　of　these　finite　categories　leaves　the　soul　unsatisfied；　and　the　Oriental　sage　is
compelled　unceasingly　to　seek　for　more　and　more　of　such　predicates。　In　finite　things　it　is　no　doubt
the　case　that　they　have　to　be　characterised　through　finite　predicates：　and　with　these　things　the
understanding　finds　proper　scope　for　its　special　action。　Itself　finite；　it　knows　only　the　nature　of　the
finite。　Thus；　when　I　call　some　action　a　theft；　I　have　characterised　the　action　in　its　essential　facts；
and　such　a　knowledge　is　sufficient　for　the　judge。　Similarly；　finite　things　stand　to　each　other　as　cause
and　effect；　force　and　exercise；　and　when　they　are　apprehended　in　these　categories；　they　are
known　in　their　finitude。　But　the　objects　of　reason　cannot　be　defined　by　these　finite　predicates。　To
try　to　do　so　was　the　defect　of　the　old　metaphysic。