shorter logic-第15部分

快捷操作: 按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页 按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页 按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部! 如果本书没有阅读完，想下次继续接着阅读，可使用上方 "收藏到我的浏览器" 功能 和 "加入书签" 功能！


try　to　do　so　was　the　defect　of　the　old　metaphysic。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§29

Predicates　of　this　kind；　taken　individually；　have　but　a　limited　range　of　meaning；
and　no　one　can　fail　to　perceive　how　inadequate　they　are；　and　how　far　they　fall
below　the　fullness　of　detail　which　our　imaginative　thought　gives；　in　the　case；　for
example；　of　God；　Mind；　or　Nature。　Besides；　though　the　fact　of　their　being　all
predicates　of　one　subject　supplies　them　with　a　certain　connection；　their　several
meanings　keep　them　apart：　and　consequently　each　is　brought　in　as　a　stranger　in
relation　to　the　others。　

（1）　The　first　of　these　defects　the　Orientals　sought　to　remedy；　when；　for　example；
they　defined　God　by　attributing　to　Him　many　names；　but　still　they　felt　that　the
number　of　names　would　have　had　to　be　infinite。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§30

（2）　In　the　second　place；　the　metaphysical　systems　adopted　a　wrong　criterion。
Their　objects　were　no　doubt　totalities　which　in　their　own　proper　selves　belong　to
reason　that　is；　to　the　organised　and　systematically　developed　universe　of　thought。
But　these　totalities　…God；　the　Soul；　the　World…were　taken　by　the　metaphysician　as
subjects　made　and　ready；　to　form　the　basis　for　an　application　of　the　categories　of
the　understanding。　They　were　assumed　from　popular　conception。　Accordingly
popular　conception　was　the　only　canon　for　settling　whether　or　not　the　predicates
were　suitable　and　sufficient。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§31

The　common　conceptions　of　God；　the　Soul；　the　World；　may　be　supposed　to
afford　thought　a　firm　and　fast　footing。　They　do　not　really　do　so。　Besides　having　a
particular　and　subjective　character　clinging　to　them；　and　thus　leaving　room　for
great　variety　of　interpretation；　they　themselves　first　of　all　require　a　firm　and　fast
definition　by　thought。　This　may　be　seen　in　any　of　these　propositions　where　the
predicate；　or　in　philosophy　the　category；　is　needed　to　indicate　what　the　subject；　or
the　conception　we　start　with；　is。　

In　such　a　sentence　as　'God　is　eternal'；　we　begin　with　the　conception　of　God；　not
knowing　as　yet　what　he　is：　to　tell　us　that；　is　the　business　of　the　predicate。　In　the
principles　of　logic；　accordingly；　where　the　terms　formulating　the　subject…matter
are　those　of　thought　only；　it　is　not　merely　superfluous　to　make　these　categories
predicates　to　propositions　in　which　God；　or；　still　vaguer；　the　Absolute；　is　the
subject；　but　it　would　also　have　the　disadvantage　of　suggesting　another　canon　than
the　nature　of　thought。　Besides；　the　propositional　form　（and　for　proposition；　it
would　be　more　correct　to　substitute　judgement）　is　not　suited　to　express　the
concrete　…　and　the　true　is　always　concrete　…　or　the　speculative。　Every　judgement　is
by　its　form　one…sided　and；　to　that　extent；　false。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§31n

This　metaphysic　was　not　free　or　objective　thinking。　Instead　of　letting　the　object　freely　and
spontaneously　expound　its　own　characteristics；　metaphysic　presupposed　it　ready…made。　If　anyone
wishes　to　know　what　free　thought　means；　he　must　go　to　Greek　philosophy：　for　Scholasticism；　like
these　metaphysical　systems；　accepted　its　facts；　and　accepted　them　as　a　dogma　from　the　authority
of　the　Church。　We　moderns；　too；　by　our　whole　upbringing；　have　been　initiated　into　ideas　which　it
is　extremely　difficult　to　overstep；　on　account　of　their　far…reaching　significance。　But　the　ancient
philosophers　were　in　a　different　position。　They　were　men　who　lived　wholly　in　the　perceptions　of
the　senses；　and　who；　after　their　rejection　of　mythology　and　its　fancies；　presupposed　nothing　but　the
heaven　above　and　the　earth　around。　In　these　material；　non…metaphysical　surroundings；　thought　is
free　and　enjoys　its　own　privacy　…　cleared　of　everything　material　and　thoroughly　at　home。　This
feeling　that　we　are　all　our　own　is　characteristic　of　free　thought　…　of　that　voyage　into　the　open；
where　nothing　is　below　us　or　above　us；　and　we　stand　in　solitude　with　ourselves　alone。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§32

（3）　In　the　third　place；　this　system　of　metaphysic　turned　into　Dogmatism。　When
our　thoughts　never　ranges　beyond　narrow　and　rigid　terms；　we　are　forced　to
assume　that　of　two　opposite　assertions；　such　as　were　the　above　propositions；　the
one　must　be　true　and　the　other　false。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§32n

Dogmatism　may　be　most　simply　described　as　the　contrary　of　Scepticism。　The　ancient　Sceptics
gave　the　name　of　Dogmatism　to　every　philosophy　whatever　holding　a　system　of　definite　doctrine。
In　this　large　sense　Scepticism　may　apply　the　name　even　to　philosophy　which　is　properly
Speculative。　But　in　the　narrower　sense；　Dogmatism　consists　in　the　tenacity　which　draws　a　hard
and　fast　line　between　certain　terms　and　others　opposite　to　them。　We　may　see　this　clearly　in　the
strict　'either　…　or'：　for　instance；　The　world　is　either　finite　or　infinite；　but　one　of　these　two　it　must　be。
The　contrary　of　this　rigidity　is　the　characteristic　of　all　Speculative　truth。　There　no　such　inadequate
formulae　are　allowed；　nor　can　they　possibly　exhaust　it。　These　formulae　Speculative　truth　holds　in
union　as　a　totality；　whereas　Dogmatism　invests　them　in　their　isolation　with　a　title　to　fixity　and　truth。　

It　often　happens　in　philosophy　that　the　half…truth　takes　its　place　beside　the　whole　truth　and
assumes　on　its　own　account　the　position　of　something　permanent。　But　the　fact　is　that　the　half…truth；
instead　of　being　a　fixed　or　self…subsistent　principle；　is　a　mere　element　absolved　and　included　in　the
whole。　The　metaphysic　of　understanding　is　dogmatic；　because　it　maintains　half…truths　in　their
isolation：　whereas　the　idealism　of　speculative　philosophy　carries　out　the　principle　of　totality　and
shows　that　it　can　reach　beyond　the　inadequate　formularies　of　abstract　thought。　Thus　idealism
would　say：　The　soul　is　neither　finite　only；　nor　infinite　only；　it　is　really　the　one　just　as　much　as　the
other；　and　in　that　way　neither　the　one　nor　the　other。　In　other　words；　such　formularies　in　their
isolation　are　inadmissible；　and　only　come　into　account　as　formative　elements　in　a　larger　notion。
Such　idealism　we　see　even　in　the　ordinary　phases　of　consciousness。　Thus　we　say　of　sensible
things；　that　they　are　changeable：　that　is；　they　are；　but　it　is　equally　true　that　they　are　not。　We　show
more　obstinacy　in　dealing　with　the　categories　of　the　understanding。　These　are　terms　which　we
believe　to　be　somewhat　firmer　…　or　even　absolutely　firm　and　fast。　We　look　upon　them　as　separated
from　each　other　by　an　infinite　chasm；　so　that　opposite　categories　can　never　get　at　each　other。　The
battle　of　reason　is　the　struggle　to　break　up　the　rigidity　to　which　the　understanding　has　reduced
everything。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§33

The　first　part　of　this　metaphysic　in　its　systematic　form　is　Ontology；　or　the
doctrine　of　the　abstract　characteristics　of　Being。　The　multitude　of　these
characteristics；　and　the　limits　set　to　their　applicability；　are　not　founded　upon　any
principle。　They　have　in　consequence　to　be　enumerated　as　experience　and
circumstances　direct；　and　the　import　ascribed　to　them　is　founded　only　upon
common　sensualised　conceptions；　upon　assertions　that　particular　words　are　used
in　a　particular　sense；　and　even　perhaps　upon　etymology。　If　experience　pronounces
the　list　to　be　complete；　and　if　the　usage　of　language；　by　its　agreement；　shows　the
analysis　to　be　correct；　the　metaphysician　is　satisfied；　and　the　intrinsic　and
independent　truth　and　necessity　of　such　characteristics　is　never　made　a　matter　of
：investigation　at　all。　

To　ask　if　being；　existence；　finitude；　simplicity；　complexity；　etc。　are　notions
intrinsically　and　independently　true；　must　surprise　those　who　believe　that　a
question　about　truth　can　only　concern　propositions　（as　to　whether　a　notion　is　or　is
not　with　truth　to　be　attributed；　as　the　phrase　is；　to　a　subject）；　and　that　falsehood
lies　in　the　contradiction　existing　between　the　subject　in　our　ideas；　and　the　notion
to　be　predicated　of　it。　Now　as　the　notion　is　concrete；　it　and　every　character　of　it
in　general　is　essentially　a　self…contained　unity　of　distinct　characteristics。　If　truth
then　were　nothing　more　than　the　absence　of　contradiction；　it　would　be　first　of　all
necessary　in　the　case　of　every　notion　to　examine　whether　it；　taken　individually；
did　not　contain　this　sort　of　intrinsic　contradiction。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§34

The　second　branch　of　the　metaphysical　system　was　Rational　Psychology　or
Pneumatology。　It　dealt　with　the　metaphysical　nature　of　the　soul　…　that　is；　of　the
Mind　regarded　as　a　thing。　It　expected　to　find　immortality　in　a　sphere　dominated
by　the　laws　of　composition；　time；　qualitative　change；　and　quantitative　increase　or
decrease。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§34n

The　name　'rational'；　given　to　this　species　of　psychology；　served　to　contrast　it　with　empirical　modes
of　observing　the　phenomena　of　the　soul　Rational　psychology　viewed　the　soul　in　its　metaphysical
nature；　and　through　the　categories　supplied　by　abstract　thought。　The　rationalists　endeavoured　to
ascertain　the　inner　nature　of　the　soul　as　it　is　in　itself　and　as　it　is　for　thought。　In　philosophy　at　present
we　hear　little　of　the　soul：　the　favourite　term　is　now　mind　（spirit）。　The　two　are　distinct；　soul　being　as
it　were　the　middle　term　between　body　and　spirit；　or　the　bond　between　the　two。　The　mind；　as　soul；
is　immersed　in　corporeity；　and　the　soul　is　the　animating　principle　of　the　body。　

The　pre…Kantian　metaphysic；　we　say；　viewed　the　soul　as　a　thing。　'Thing'　is　a　very　ambiguous
word。　By　a　thing；　we　mean；　firstly；　an　immediate　existence；　something　we　represent　in　sensuous
form：　and　in　this　meaning　the　term　has　been　applied　to　the　soul。　Hence　the　question　regarding　the
seat　of　the　soul。　Of　course；　if　the　soul　have　a　seat；　it　is　in　space　and　sensuously　envisaged。　So；　too；
if　the　soul　be　viewed　as　a　thing　we　can　ask　whether　the　soul　is　simple　or　composite。　The　question
is　important　as　bearing　on　the　immortality　of　the　soul；　which　is　supposed　to　depend　on　the　absence
of　composition。　But　the　fact　is；　that　in　abstract　simplicity　we　have　a　category；　which　as　little
corresponds　to　the　nature　of　the　sou