shorter logic-第22部分

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argument。　Employing　what　has　subsequently　become　a　favourite　fashion；　he
simply　put　the　object　under　a　rubric　otherwise　ready　to　hand；　instead　of　deducing
its　characteristics　from　its　notion。　Further　deficiencies　in　the　treatment　of　the
Antinomies　I　have　pointed　out；　as　occasion　offered；　in　my　Science　of　Logic。　Here
it　will　be　sufficient　to　say　that　the　Antinomies　are　not　confined　to　the　four　special
objects　taken　from　Cosmology：　they　appear　in　all　objects　of　every　kind；　in　all
conceptions；　notions；　and　Ideas。　To　be　aware　of　this　and　to　know　objects　in　this
property　of　theirs　makes　a　vital　part　in　a　philosophical　theory。　For　the　property
thus　indicated　is　what　we　shall　afterwards　describe　as　the　Dialectical　influence　in
Logic。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§48n

The　principles　of　the　metaphysical　philosophy　gave　rise　to　the　belief　that；　when　cognition　lapsed
into　contradictions；　it　was　a　mere　accidental　aberration；　due　to　some　subjective　mistake　in
argument　and　inference。　According　to　Kant；　however；　thought　has　a　natural　tendency　to　issue　in
contradictions　or　antinomies；　whenever　it　seeks　to　apprehend　the　infinite。　We　have　in　the　latter
part　of　the　above　paragraph　referred　to　the　philosophical　importance　of　the　antinomies　of　reason；
and　shown　how　the　recognition　of　their　existence　helped　largely　to　get　rid　of　the　rigid　dogmatism　of
the　metaphysic　of　understanding；　and　to　direct　attention　to　the　Dialectical　movement　of　thought。
But　here　too　Kant；　as　we　must　add；　never　got　beyond　the　negative　result　that　the　thing…in…itself　is
unknowable；　and　never　penetrated　to　the　discovery　of　what　the　antinomies　really　and　positively
mean。　That　true　and　positive　meaning　of　the　antinomies　is　this：　that　every　actual　thing　involves　a
coexistence　of　opposed　elements。　Consequently　to　know；　or；　in　other　words；　to　comprehend　an
object　is　equivalent　to　being　conscious　of　it　as　a　concrete　unity　of　opposed　determinations。　The
old　metaphysic；　as　we　have　already　seen；　when　it　studied　the　objects　of　which　it　sought　a
metaphysical　knowledge；　went　to　work　by　applying　categories　abstractly　and　to　the　exclusion　of
their　opposites。　

Kant；　on　the　other　hand；　tried　to　prove　that　the　statements　issuing　through　this　method　could　be
met　by　other　statements　of　contrary　import　with　equal　warrant　and　equal　necessity。　In　the
enumeration　of　these　antinomies　he　narrowed　his　ground　to　the　cosmology　of　the　old　metaphysical
system；　and　in　his　discussion　made　out　four　antinomies；　a　number　which　rests　upon　the　list　of　the
categories。　The　first　antinomy　is　on　the　question：　Whether　we　are　or　are　not　to　think　the　world
limited　in　space　and　time。　In　the　second　antinomy　we　have　a　discussion　of　the　dilemma：　Matter
must　be　conceived　either　as　endlessly　divisible；　or　as　consisting　of　atoms。　The　third　antinomy　bears
upon　the　antithesis　of　freedom　and　necessity；　to　such　extent　as　it　is　embraced　in　the　question；
Whether　everything　in　the　world　must　be　supposed　subject　to　the　condition　of　causality；　or　if　we
can　also　assume　free　beings；　in　other　words　absolute　initial　points　of　action；　in　the　world。　Finally；
the　fourth　antinomy　is　the　dilemma：　Either　the　world　as　a　whole　has　a　cause　or　it　is　uncaused。　

The　method　which　Kant　follows　in　discussing　these　antinomies　is　as　follows。　He　puts　the　two
propositions　implied　in　the　dilemma　over　against　each　other　as　thesis　and　antithesis；　and　seeks　to
prove　both：　that　is　to　say　he　tries　to　exhibit　them　as　inevitably　issuing　from　reflection　on　the
question。　He　particularly　protests　against　the　charge　of　being　a　special　pleader　and　of　grounding
his　reasoning　on　illusions。　Speaking　honestly；　however；　the　arguments　which　Kant　offers　for　his
thesis　and　antithesis　are　mere　shams　of　demonstration。　The　thing　to　be　proved　is　invariably　implied
in　the　assumption　he　starts　from；　and　the　speciousness　of　his　proofs　is　only　due　to　his　prolix　and
apagogic　mode　of　procedure。　Yet　it　was；　and　still　is；　a　great　achievement　for　the　Critical
Philosophy　when　it　exhibited　these　antinomies：　for　in　this　way　it　gave　some　expression　（at　first
certainly　subjective　and　unexplained）　to　the　actual　unity　of　those　categories　which　are　kept
persistently　separate　by　the　understanding。　The　first　of　the　cosmological　antinomies；　for　example；
implies　a　recognition　of　the　doctrine　that　space　and　time　present　a　discrete　as　well　as　a　continuous
aspect：　whereas　the　old　metaphysic；　laying　exclusive　emphasis　on　the　continuity；　had　been　led　to
treat　the　world　as　unlimited　in　space　and　time。　It　is　quite　correct　to　say　that　we　can　go　beyond
every　definite　space　and　beyond　every　definite　time：　but　it　is　no　less　correct　that　space　and　time
are　real　and　actual　only　when　they　are　defined　or　specialised　into　'here'　and　'now'　…　a　specialisation
which　is　involved　in　the　very　notion　of　them。　The　same　observations　apply　to　the　rest　of　the
antinomies。　Take；　for　example；　the　antinomy　of　freedom　and　necessity。　The　main　gist　of　it　is　that
freedom　and　necessity　as　understood　by　abstract　thinkers　are　not　independently　real；　as　these
thinkers　suppose；　but　merely　ideal　factors　（moments）　of　the　true　freedom　and　the　true　necessity；
and　that　to　abstract　and　isolate　either　conception　is　to　make　it　false。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　49

＇c＇　The　third　object　of　the　Reason　is　God　（§　36）：　he　also　must　be　known　and
defined　in　terms　of　thought。　But　in　comparison　with　an　unalloyed　identity；　every
defining　term　as　such　seems　to　the　understanding　to　be　only　a　limit　and　a
negation：　every　reality　accordingly　must　be　taken　as　limitless；　i。e。　undefined。
Accordingly　God；　when　he　is　defined　to　be　the　sum　of　all　realities；　the　most　real
of　beings；　turns　into　a　mere　abstract。　And　the　only　term　under　which　that　most
real　of　real　things　can　be　defined　is　that　of　Being　itself　the　height　of　abstraction。
These　are　two　elements；　abstract　identity；　on　one　hand；　which　is　spoken　of　in　this
place　as　the　notion；　and　Being　on　the　other　which　Reason　seeks　to　unify。　And
their　union　is　the　Ideal　of　Reason。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　50

。。。　The　organic　structures；　and　the　evidence　they　afford　of　mutual　adaptation；
belong　to　a　higher　province；　the　province　of　animated　nature。　But　even　without
taking　into　consideration　the　possible　blemish　which　the　study　of　animated　nature
and　of　the　other　teleological　aspects　of　existing　things　may　contract　from　the
pettiness　of　the　final　causes；　and　from　puerile　instances　of　them　and　their
bearings；　merely　animated　nature　is；　at　the　best；　incapable　of　supplying　the
material　for　a　truthful　expression　to　the　idea　to　God。　God　is　more　than　life：　he　is
Spirit。　And　therefore　if　the　thought　of　the　Absolute　takes　a　starting…point　for　its
rise；　and　desires　to　take　the　nearest；　the　most　true　and　adequate　starting…point　will
be　found　in　the　nature　of　spirit　alone。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　51

The　other　way　of　unification　by　which　to　realise　the　Ideal　of　Reason　is　to　set　out
from　the　abstractum　of　Thought　and　seek　to　characterise　it：　for　which　purpose
Being　is　the　only　available　term。　This　is　the　method　of　the　Ontological　proof。　The
opposition；　here　presented　from　a　merely　subjective　point　of　view；　lies　between
Thought　and　Being；　whereas　in　the　first　way　of　junction；　being　is　common　to　the
two　sides　of　the　antithesis；　and　the　contrast　lies　only　between　its　individualisation
and　universality。　Understanding　meets　this　second　way　with　what　is　implicitly　the
same　objection　as　it　made　to　the　first。　It　denied　that　the　empirical　involves　the
universal；　so　it　denies　that　the　universal　involves　the　specialisation；　which
specialisation　in　this　instance　is　being。　In　other　words　it　says：　Being　cannot　be
deduced　from　the　notion　by　any　analysis。　

The　uniformly　favourable　reception　and　acceptance　which　attended　Kant's
criticism　of　the　Ontological　proof　was　undoubtedly　due　to　the　illustration　which　he
made　use　of。　To　explain　the　difference　between　thought　and　being；　he　took　the
instance　of　a　hundred　sovereigns；　which；　for　anything　it　matters　to　the　notion；　are
the　same　hundred　whether　they　are　real　or　only　possible；　though　the　difference　of
the　two　cases　is　very　perceptible　in　their　effect　on　a　man's　purse。　Nothing　can　be
more　obvious　than　that　anything　we　only　think　or　conceive　is　not　on　that　account
actual；　that　mental　representation；　and　even　notional　comprehension；　always　falls
short　of　being。　Still　it　may　not　unfairly　be　styled　a　barbarism　in　language；　when
the　name　of　notion　is　given　to　things　like　a　hundred　sovereigns。　And；　putting　that
mistake　aside；　those　who　perpetually　urge　against　the　philosophic　Idea　the
difference　between　Being　and　Thought　might　have　admitted　that　philosophers
were　not　wholly　ignorant　of　the　fact。　Can　there　be　any　proposition　more　trite　than
this　？　But　after　all；　it　is　well　to　remember；　when　we　speak　of　God；　that　we　have
an　object　of　another　kind　than　any　hundred　sovereigns；　and　unlike　any　one
particular　notion；　representation；　or　however　else　it　may　be　styled。　It　is　in　fact　this
and　this　alone　which　marks　everything　finite：　its　being　in　time　and　space　is
discrepant　from　its　notion。　God；　on　the　contrary；　expressly　has　to　be　what　can
only　be　'thought　as　existing'；　his　notion　involves　being。　It　is　this　unity　of　the　notion
and　being　that　constitutes　the　notion　of　God。　

If　this　were　all；　we　should　have　only　a　formal　expression　of　the　divine　nature
which　would　not　really　go　beyond　a　statement　of　the　nature　of　the　notion　itself。
And　that　the　notion；　in　its　most　abstract　terms；　involves　being　is　plain。　For　the
notion；　whatever　other　determination　it　may　receive；　is　at　least　reference　back　on
itself；　which　results　by　abolishing　the　intermediation；　and　thus　is　immediate。　And
what　is　that　reference　to　self；　but　being？　Certainly　it　would　be　strange　if　the
notion；　the　very　inmost　of　mind；　if　even　the　'Ego'；　or　above　all　the　concrete
totality　we　call　God；　were　not　rich　enough　to　include　so　poor　a　category　as　being；
the　very　poorest　and　most　abstract　of　all。　For；　if　we　look　at　the　thought　it　holds；
nothing　can　be　more　insignificant　than　being。　And　yet　there　may　be　something　still
more　insignificant　than　being　that　which　at　first　sight　is　perhaps