shorter logic-第25部分

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spontaneous　and　self…determining。　Into　details　of　the　manner　and　the　extent　of　this
self…determination　of　thought；　Kant　never　went。　It　was　Fichte　who　first　noticed　the　omission；　and
who；　after　he　had　called　attention　to　the　want　of　a　deduction　for　the　categories；　endeavoured　really
to　supply　something　of　the　kind。　With　Fichte；　the　'Ego'　is　the　starting…point　in　the　philosophical
development：　and　the　outcome　of　its　action　is　supposed　to　be　visible　in　the　categories。　But　in
Fichte　the　'Ego'　is　not　really　presented　as　a　free；　spontaneous　energy；　it　is　supposed　to　receive　its
first　excitation　by　a　shock　or　impulse　from　without。　Against　this　shock　the　'Ego'　will；　it　is　assumed；
react；　and　only　through　this　reaction　does　it　first　become　conscious　of　itself。　Meanwhile；　the　nature
of　the　impulse　remains　a　stranger　beyond　our　pale：　and　the　'Ego'；　with　something　else　always
confronting　it；　is　weighted　with　a　condition。　Fichte；　in　consequence；　never　advanced　beyond
Kant's　conclusion；　that　the　finite　only　is　knowable；　while　the　infinite　transcends　the　range　of
thought。　What　Kant　calls　the　thing…by…itself；　Fichte　calls　the　impulse　from　without　…　that　abstraction
of　something　else　than　'I'；　not　otherwise　describable　or　definable　than　as　the　negative　or　non…Ego
in　general。　The　'I'　is　thus　looked　at　as　standing　in　essential　relation　with　the　not…I；　through　which　its
act　of　self…determination　is　first　awakened。　And　in　this　manner　the　'I'　is　but　the　continuous　act　of
self…liberation　from　this　impulse；　never　gaining　a　real　freedom；　because　with　the　surcease　of　the
impulse　the　'I'；　whose　being　is　its　action；　would　also　cease　to　be。　Nor　is　the　content　produced　by
the　action　of　the　'　I'　at　all　different　from　the　ordinary　content　of　experience；　except　by　the
supplementary　remark；　that　this　content　is　mere　appearance。　




III。　Third　Attitude　of　Thought　to　Objectivity
　　　　　　　IMMEDIATE　OR　INTUITIVE　KNOWLEDGE


　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　61

If　we　are　to　believe　the　Critical　philosophy；　thought　is　subjective；　and　its　ultimate
and　invincible　mode　is　abstract　universality　or　formal　identity。　Thought　is　thus
set　in　opposition　to　Truth；　which　is　no　abstraction；　but　concrete　universality。　In
this　highest　mode　of　thought；　which　is　entitled　Reason；　the　Categories　are　left　out
of　account。　The　extreme　theory　on　the　opposite　side　holds　thought　to　be　an　act　of
the　particular　only；　and　on　that　ground　declares　it　incapable　of　apprehending　the
Truth。　This　is　the　Intuitional　theory。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§62

According　to　this　theory；　thinking；　a　private　and　particular　operation；　has　its　whole
scope　and　product　in　the　Categories。　But　these　Categories；　as　arrested　by　the
understanding；　are　limited　vehicles　of　thought；　forms　of　the　conditioned；　of　the
dependent　and　derivative。　A　thought　limited　to　these　modes　has　no　sense　of　the
Infinite　and　the　True；　and　cannot　bridge　over　the　gulf　that　separates　it　from　them。
（This　stricture　refers　to　the　proofs　of　God's　existence。）　These　inadequate　modes
or　categories　are　also　spoken　of　as　notions：　and　to　get　a　notion　of　an　object
therefore　can　only　mean；　in　this　language；　to　grasp　it　under　the　form　of　being
conditioned　and　derivative。　Consequently；　if　the　object　in　question　be　the　True；
the　Infinite；　the　Unconditioned；　we　change　it　by　our　notions　into　a　finite　and
conditioned；　whereby；　instead　of　apprehending　the　truth　by　thought；　we　have
perverted　it　into　untruth。　

Such　is　the　one　simple　line　of　argument　advanced　for　the　thesis　that　the
knowledge　of　God　and　of　truth　must　be　immediate；　or　intuitive。　At　an　earlier
period　all　sort　of　anthropomorphic　conceptions；　as　they　are　termed；　were
banished　from　God；　as　being　finite　and　therefore　unworthy　of　the　infinite；　and　in
this　way　God　had　been　reduced　to　a　tolerably　blank　being。　But　in　those　days　the
thought…forms　were　in　general　not　supposed　to　come　under　the　head　of
anthropomorphism。　Thought　was　believed　rather　to　strip　finitude　from　the
conceptions　of　the　Absolute…in　agreement　with　the　above…mentioned　conviction　of
all　ages；　that　reflection　is　the　only　road　to　truth。　But　now；　at　length；　even　the
thought…forms　are　pronounced　anthropomorphic；　and　thought　itself　is　described　as
a　mere　faculty　of　Unitisation。　

Jacobi　has　stated　this　charge　most　distinctly　in　the　seventh　supplement　to　his
Letters　on　Spinoza　…　borrowing　his　line　of　argument　from　the　works　of　Spinoza
himself；　and　applying　it　as　a　weapon　against　knowledge　in　general。　In　his　attack
knowledge　is　taken　to　mean　knowledge　of　the　finite　only；　a　process　of　thought
from　one　condition　in　a　series　to　another；　each　of　which　is　at　once　conditioning
and　conditioned。　According　to　such　a　view；　to　explain　and　to　get　the　notion　of
anything；　is　the　same　as　to　show　it　to　be　derived　from　something　else。　Whatever
such　knowledge　embraces；　consequently；　is　partial；　dependent；　and　finite；　while
the　infinite　or　true；　i。e。　God；　lies　outside　of　the　mechanical　interconnection　to
which　knowledge　is　said　to　be　confined。　It　is　important　to　observe　that；　while
Kant　makes　the　finite　nature　of　the　Categories　consist　mainly　in　the　formal
circumstance　that　they　are　subjective；　Jacobi　discusses　the　Categories　in　their　own
proper　character；　and　pronounces　them　to　be　in　their　very　import　finite。　What
Jacobi　chiefly　had　before　his　eyes；　when　he　thus　described　science；　was　the
brilliant　successes　of　the　physical　or　'exact'　sciences　in　ascertaining　natural　forces
and　laws。　It　is　certainly　not　on　the　finite　ground　occupied　by　these　sciences　that
we　can　expect　to　meet　the　in…dwelling　presence　of　the　infinite。　Lalande　was　right
when　he　said　he　had　swept　the　whole　heaven　with　his　glass；　and　seen　no　God。
（See　§　60n。）　In　the　field　of　physical　science；　the　universal；　which　is　the　final
result　of　analysis；　is　only　the　indeterminate　aggregate…of　the　external　finite…in　one
word；　Matter：　and　Jacobi　well　perceived　that　there　was　no　other　issue　obtainable
in　the　way　of　a　mere　advance　from　one　explanatory　clause　or　law　to　another。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§63

All　the　while　the　doctrine　that　truth　exists　for　the　mind　was　so　strongly　maintained
by　Jacobi；　that　Reason　alone　is　declared　to　be　that　by　which　man　lives。　This
Reason　is　the　knowledge　of　God。　But；　seeing　that　derivative　knowledge　is
restricted　to　the　compass　of　finite　facts；　Reason　is　knowledge　underivative；　or
Faith。　

Knowledge；　Faith；　Thought；　Intuition　are　the　categories　that　we　meet　with　on　this
line　of　reflection。　These　terms；　as　presumably　familiar　to　every　one；　are　only　too
frequently　subjected　to　an　arbitrary　use；　under　no　better　guidance　than　the
conceptions　and　distinctions　of　psychology；　without　any　investigation　into　their
nature　and　notion；　which　is　the　main　question　after　all。　Thus；　we　often　find
knowledge　contrasted　with　faith；　and　faith　at　the　same　time　explained　to　be　an
underivative　or　intuitive　knowledge　—　so　that　it　must　be　at　least　some　sort　of
knowledge。　And；　besides；　it　is　unquestionably　a　fact　of　experience；　firstly；　that
what　we　believe　is　in　our　consciousness…which　implies　that　we　know　about　it；　and
secondly；　that　this　belief　is　a　certainty　in　our　consciousness　…　which　implies　that
we　know　it。　Again；　and　especially；　we　find　thought　opposed　to　immediate
knowledge　and　faith；　and；　in　particular；　to　intuition。　But　if　this　intuition　be
qualified　as　intellectual；　we　must　really　mean　intuition　which　thinks；　unless；　in　a
question　about　the　nature　of　God；　we　are　willing　to　interpret　intellect　to　mean
images　and　representations　of　imagination。　The　word　faith　or　belief；　in　the　dialect
of　this　system；　comes　to　be　employed　even　with　reference　to　common　objects
that　are　present　to　the　senses。　We　believe；　says　Jacobi；　that　we　have　a　body…we
believe　in　the　existence　of　the　things　of　sense。　But　if　we　are　speaking　of　faith　in
the　True　and　Eternal；　and　saying　that　God　is　given　and　revealed　to　us　in
immediate　knowledge　or　intuition；　we　are　concerned　not　with　the　things　of　sense；
but　with　objects　special　to　our　thinking　mind；　with　truths　of　inherently　universal
significance。　And　when　the　individuals；　or　in　other　words　personality；　is　under
discussion…not　the　'I'　of　experience；　or　a　single　private　person　—　above　all；　when
the　personality　of　God　is　before　us'；　we　are　speaking　of　personality　unalloyed　—
of　a　personality　in　its　own　nature　universal。　Such　personality　is　a　thought；　and
falls　within　the　province　of　thought　only。　More　than　this。　Pure　and　simple
intuition　is　completely　the　same　as　pure　and　simple　thought。　Intuition　and　belief；
in　the　first　instance；　denote　the　definite　conceptions　we　attach　to　these　words　in
our　ordinary　employment　of　them：　and　to　this　extent　they　differ　from　thought　in
certain　points　which　nearly　every　one　can　understand。　But　here　they　are　taken　in
a　higher　sense；　and　must　be　interpreted　to　mean　a　belief　in　God；　or　an　intellectual
intuition　of　God；　in　short；　we　must　put　aside　all　that　especially　distinguishes
thought　on　the　one　side　from　belief　and　intuition　on　the　other。　How　belief　and
intuition；　when　transferred　to　these　higher　regions；　differ　from　thought；　it　is
impossible　for　any　one　to　say。　And　yet；　such　are　the　barren　distinctions　of　words；
with　which　men　fancy　that　they　assert　an　important　truth；　even　while　the
formulae　they　maintain　are　identical　with　those　which　they　impugn。　

The　term　Faith　brings　with　it　the　special　advantage　of　suggesting　the　faith　of　the
Christian　religion；　it　seems　to　include　Christian　faith；　or　perhaps　even　to　coincide
with　it；　and　thus　the　Philosophy　of　Faith　has　a　thoroughly　orthodox　and　Christian
look；　on　the　strength　of　which　it　takes　the　liberty　of　uttering　its　arbitrary　dicta　with
greater　pretension　and　authority。　But　we　must　not　let　ourselves　be　deceived　by
the　semblance　surreptitiously　secured　by　a　merely　verbal　similarity。　The　two
things　are　radically　distinct。　Firstly；　the　Christian　faith　comprises　in　it　an　authority
of　the　Church：　but　the　faith　of　Jacobi's　philosophy　has　no　other　authority　than
that　of　a　personal　revelation。　And；　secondly；　the　Christian　faith　is　a　copious　body
of　objective　truth；　a　system　of　knowledge　and　doctrine：　while　the　scope　of　the
philosophic　fait