shorter logic-第29部分

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method　and　thus；　as　it　knows　no　other；　it　rejects　all　methods。　It　abandons　itself　to
wild　vagaries　of　imagination　and　assertion；　to　a　moral　priggishness　and　sentimental
arrogance；　or　to　a　reckless　dogmatising　and　lust　of　argument；　which　is　loudest
against　philosophy　and　philosophic　doctrines。　Philosophy　of　course　tolerates　no
mere　assertions　or　conceits；　and　checks　the　free　play　of　argumentative　see…saw。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§78

We　must　then　reject　the　opposition　between　an　independent　immediacy　in　the
contents　or　facts　of　consciousness　and　an　equally　independent　mediation；
supposed　incompatible　with　the　former。　The　incompatibility　is　a　mere　assumption；
an　arbitrary　assertion。　All　other　assumptions　and　postulates　must　in　like　manner
be　left　behind　at　the　entrance　to　philosophy；　whether　they　are　derived　from　the
intellect　or　the　imagination。　For　philosophy　is　the　science　in　which　every　such
proposition　must　first　be　scrutinised　and　its　meaning　and　oppositions　be
ascertained。　

Scepticism；　made　a　negative　science　and　systematically　applied　to　all　forms　of
knowledge；　might　seem　a　suitable　introduction；　as　pointing　out　the　nullity　of　such
assumptions。　But　a　sceptical　introduction　would　be　not　only　an　ungrateful　but　also
a　useless　course；　and　that　because　Dialectic；　as　we　shall　soon　make　appear；　is
itself　an　essential　element　of　affirmative　science。　

Scepticism；　besides；　could　only　get　hold　of　the　finite　forms　as　they　were
suggested　by　experience；　taking　them　as　given；　instead　of　deducing　them
scientifically。　To　require　such　a　scepticism　accomplished　is　the　same　as　to　insist
on　science　being　preceded　by　universal　doubt；　or　a　total　absence　of
presupposition。　Strictly　speaking；　in　the　resolve　that　wills　pure　thought；　this
requirement　is　accomplished　by　freedom　which；　abstracting　from　everything；
grasps　its　pure　abstraction；　the　simplicity　of　thought。　




VI。　Logic　further　Defined　&　Divided


　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§79

In　point　of　form　Logical　doctrine　has　three　sides：　＇a＇　the　Abstract　side；　or　that　of
understanding；　＇b＇　the　Dialectical；　or　that　of　negative　reason；　＇c＇　the　Speculative；
or　that　of　positive　reason。　

These　three　sides　do　not　make　three　parts　of　logic；　but　are　stages　or　'moments'　in
every　logical　entity；　that　is；　of　every　notion　and　truth　whatever。　They　may　all　be
put　under　the　first　stage；　that　of　understanding；　and　so　kept　isolated　from　each
other；　but　this　would　give　an　inadequate　conception　of　them。　The　statement　of
the　dividing　lines　and　the　characteristic　aspects　of　logic　is　at　this　point　no　more
than　historical　and　anticipatory。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§80

＇a＇　Thought；　as　Understanding；　sticks　to　fixity　of　characters　and　their
distinctness　from　one　another：　every　such　limited　abstract　it　treats　as　having　a
subsistence　and　being　of　its　own。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§80n

In　our　ordinary　usage　of　the　term　thought　and　even　notion；　we　often　have　before　our　eyes　nothing
more　than　the　operation　of　Understanding。　And　no　doubt　thought　is　primarily　an　exercise　of
Understanding；　only　it　goes　further；　and　the　notion　is　not　a　function　of　Understanding　merely。　The
action　of　Understanding　may　be　in　general　described　as　investing　its　subject…matter　with　the　form
of　universality。　But　this　universal　is　an　abstract　universal：　that　is　to　say；　its　opposition　to　the
particular　is　so　rigorously　maintained；　that　it　is　at　the　same　time　also　reduced　to　the　character　of　a
particular　again。　In　this　separating　and　abstracting　attitude　towards　its　objects；　Understanding　is
the　reverse　of　immediate　perception　and　sensation；　which；　as　such；　keep　completely　to　their　native
sphere　of　action　in　the　concrete。　

It　is　by　referring　to　this　opposition　of　Understanding　to　sensation　or　feeling　that　we　must　explain
the　frequent　attacks　made　upon　thought　for　being　hard　and　narrow；　and　for　leading；　if　consistently
developed；　to　ruinous　and　pernicious　results。　The　answer　to　these　charges；　in　so　far　as　they　are
warranted　by　the　facts；　is　that　they　do　not　touch　thinking　in　general；　certainly　not　the　thinking　of
Reason；　but　only　the　exercise　of　Understanding。　It　must　be　added；　however；　that　the　merit　and
rights　of　the　mere　Understanding　should　unhesitatingly　be　admitted。　And　that　merit　lies　in　the　fact
that　apart　from　Understanding　there　is　no　fixity　or　accuracy　in　the　region　of　theory　or　of　practice。　

Thus；　in　theory；　knowledge　begins　by　apprehending　existing　objects　in　their　specific　differences。　In
the　study　of　nature；　for　example；　we　distinguish　matters；　forces；　genera；　and　the　like；　and
stereotype　each　in　its　isolation。　Thought　is　here　acting　in　its　analytic　capacity；　where　its　canon　is
identity；　a　simple　reference　of　each　attribute　to　itself。　It　is　under　the　guidance　of　the　same　identity
that　the　process　in　knowledge　is　effected　from　one　scientific　truth　to　another。　Thus；　for　example；　in
mathematics　magnitude　is　the　feature　which；　to　the　neglect　of　any　other；　determines　our　advance。
Hence　in　geometry　we　compare　one　figure　with　another；　so　as　to　bring　out　their　identity。　Similarly
in　other　fields　of　knowledge；　such　as　jurisprudence；　the　advance　is　primarily　regulated　by　identity。
In　it　we　argue　from　one　specific　law　or　precedent　to　another：　and　what　is　this　but　to　proceed　on
the　principle　of　identity？　

But　Understanding　is　as　indispensable　in　practice　as　it　is　in　theory。　Character　is　an　essential　in
conduct；　and　a　man　of　character　is　an　understanding　man；　who　in　that　capacity　has　definite　ends　in
view　and　undeviatingly　pursues　them。　The　man　who　will　do　something　great　must　learn；　as　Goethe
says；　to　limit　himself。　The　man　who；　on　the　contrary；　would　do　everything；　really　would　do　nothing；
and　fails。　There　is　a　host　of　interesting　things　in　the　world：　Spanish　poetry；　chemistry；　politics；　and
music　are　all　very　interesting；　and　if　any　one　takes　an　interest　in　them　we　need　not　find　fault。　But
for　a　person　in　a　given　situation　to　accomplish　anything；　he　must　stick　to　one　definite　point；　and　not
dissipate　his　forces　in　many　directions。　In　every　calling；　too；　the　great　thing　is　to　pursue　it　with
understanding。　Thus　the　judge　must　stick　to　the　law；　and　give　his　verdict　in　accordance　with　it；
undeterred　by　one　motive　or　another；　allowing　no　excuses；　and　looking　neither　left　nor　right。
Understanding；　too；　is　always　an　element　in　thorough　training。　The　trained　intellect　is　not　satisfied
with　cloudy　and　indefinite　impressions；　but　grasps　the　objects　in　their　fixed　character：　whereas　the
uncultivated　man　wavers　unsettled；　and　it　often　costs　a　deal　of　trouble　to　come　to　an　understanding
with　him　on　the　matter　under　discussion；　and　to　bring　him　to　fix　his　eye　on　the　definite　point　in
question。　

It　has　been　already　explained　that　the　Logical　principle　in　general；　far　from　being　merely　a
subjective　action　in　our　minds；　is　rather　the　very　universal；　which　as　such　is　also　objective。　This
doctrine　is　illustrated　in　the　case　of　understanding；　the　first　form　of　logical　truths。　Understanding　in
this　larger　sense　corresponds　to　what　we　call　the　goodness　of　God；　so　far　as　that　means　that　finite
things　are　and　subsist。　In　nature；　for　example；　we　recognise　the　goodness　of　God　in　the　fact　that
the　various　classes　or　species　of　animals　and　plants　are　provided　with　whatever　they　need　for　their
preservation　and　welfare。　Nor　is　man　excepted；　who；　both　as　an　individual　and　as　a　nation；
possesses　partly　in　the　given　circumstances　of　climate；　or　quality　and　products　of　soil；　and　partly　in
his　natural　parts　or　talents；　all　that　is　required　for　his　maintenance　and　development。　Under　this
shape　Understanding　is　visible　in　every　department　of　the　objective　world；　and　no　object　in　that
world　can　ever　be　wholly　perfect　which　does　not　give　full　satisfaction　to　the　canons　of
understanding。　A　state；　for　example；　is　imperfect；　so　long　as　it　has　not　reached　a　clear
differentiation　of　orders　and　callings；　and　so　long　as　those　functions　of　politics　and　government；
which　are　different　in　principle；　have　not　evolved　for　themselves　special　organs；　in　the　same　way　as
we　see；　for　example；　the　developed　animal　organism　provided　with　separate　organs　for　the
functions　of　sensation；　motion；　digestion；　&c。　

The　previous　course　of　the　discussion　may　serve　to　show　that　understanding　is　indispensable　even
in　those　spheres　and　regions　of　action　which　the　popular　fancy　would　deem　furthest　from　it；　and
that　in　proportion　as　understanding　is　absent　from　them；　imperfection　is　the　result。　This　particularly
holds　good　of　Art；　Religion；　and　Philosophy。　In　Art；　for　example；　understanding　is　visible　where
the　forms　of　beauty；　which　differ　in　principle；　are　kept　distinct　and　exhibited　in　their　purity。　The
same　thing　holds　good　also　of　single　works　of　art。　It　is　part　of　the　beauty　and　perfection　of　a
dramatic　poem　that　the　characters　of　the　several　persons　should　be　closely　and　faithfully
maintained；　and　that　the　different　aims　and　interests　involved　should　be　plainly　and　decidedly
exhibited。　Or　again；　take　the　province　of　Religion。　The　superiority　of　Greek　over　Northern
mythology　（apart　from　other　differences　of　subject…matter　and　conception）　mainly　consists　in　this：
that　in　the　former　the　individual　gods　are　fashioned　into　forms　of　sculpture…like　distinctness　of
outline；　while　in　the　latter　the　figures　fade　away　vaguely　and　hazily　into　one　another。　Lastly　comes
Philosophy。　That　Philosophy　never　can　get　on　without　the　understanding　hardly　calls　for　special
remark　after　what　has　been　said。　Its　foremost　requirement　is　that　every　thought　shall　be　grasped　in
its　full　precision；　and　nothing　allowed　to　remain　vague　and　indefinite。　

It　is　usually　added　that　understanding　must　not　go　too　far。　Which　is　so　far　correct；　that
understanding　is　not　an　ultimate；　but　on　the　contrary　finite；　and　so　constituted　that　when　carried　to
extremes　it　veers　round　to　its　opposite。　It　is　the　fashion　of　youth　to　dash　about　in　abstractions　—
but　the　man　who　has　learnt　to　know　life　steers　clear　of　the　abstract　'either　—　or'；　and　keeps　to　the
concrete。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　81

＇b＇　In　the　Dialectical　stage　these　finite　characterisations　or　for