shorter logic-第3部分

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§　230。　b：　Division
…n。　In　Division；　the　principle　must　be　borrowed　from　the　nature　of　the　object
§　231。　c：　Theorem；　Construction；　Demonstration
§　232。　The　Idea　of　Will
…n。　The　necessity　which　cognition　reaches　is　the　reverse　of　what　formed　its　starting…point
§　233。　＇b＇　Volition
§　234。　The　Action　of　the　Will　is　finite
…n。　Intelligence　takes　the　world　as　it　is；　Will　takes　steps　to　make　it　what　it　ought　to　be
§　235。　The　Unity　of　the　Practical　and　Theoretical　Idea　

（c）　The　Absolute　Idea

§　236。　The　Unity　of　Subjective　and　Objective　Idea
…n。　The　Absolute　Idea　is　the　unity　of　the　theoretical　and　practical　idea
§　237。　There　is　no　transition；　no　presupposition
…n。　The　absolute　is　like　the　old　man　who　utters　the　same　creed　as　the　child；　but　pregnant　with
significance　of　a　lifetime
§　238。　＇a＇　The　Beginning　of　the　Speculative　Method
…n。　Philosophical　method　is　analytical　as　well　as　synthetic
§　239。　＇b＇　The　Judgment　implicit　in　the　Idea
…n。　In　the　advance　of　the　idea；　the　beginning　exhibits　itself　as　what　it　is　implicitly
§　240。　The　distinction　of　Individual　and　Universal　is　an　identity
§　241。　The　Development　becomes　a　regress　into　the　first
§　242。　The　contradiction　in　its　own　nature
§　243。　The　method　is　the　notion　of　the　content
§　244。　The　Idea　is　Nature
…n。　This　Idea　which　has　Being　is　Nature　





I。　Introduction


　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§1

Philosophy　misses　an　advantage　enjoyed　by　the　other　sciences。　It　cannot　like
them　rest　the　existence　of　its　objects　on　the　natural　admissions　of　consciousness；
nor　can　it　assume　that　its　method　of　cognition；　either　for　starting　or　for
continuing；　is　one　already　accepted。　The　objects　of　philosophy；　it　is　true；　are　upon
the　whole　the　same　as　those　of　religion。　In　both　the　object　is　Truth；　in　that
supreme　sense　in　which　God　and　God　only　is　the　Truth。　Both　in　like　manner　go
on　to　treat　of　the　finite　worlds　of　Nature　and　the　human　Mind；　with　their　relation
to　each　other　and　to　their　truth　in　God。　Some　acquaintance　with　its　objects；
therefore；　philosophy　may　and　even　must　presume；　that　and　a　certain　interest　in
them　to　boot；　were　it　for　no　other　reason　than　this：　that　in　point　of　time　the　mind
makes　general　images　of　objects；　long　before　it　makes　notions　of　them；　and　that
it　is　only　through　these　mental　images；　and　by　recourse　to　them；　that　the　thinking
mind　rises　to　know　and　comprehend　thinkingly。　

But　with　the　rise　of　this　thinking　study　of　things；　it　soon　becomes　evident　that
thought　will　be　satisfied　with　nothing　short　of　showing　the　necessity　of　its　facts；
of　demonstrating　the　existence　of　its　objects；　as　well　as　their　nature　and　qualities。
Our　original　acquaintance　with　them　is　thus　discovered　to　be　inadequate。　We　can
assume　nothing　and　assert　nothing　dogmatically；　nor　can　we　accept　the　assertions
and　assumptions　of　others。　And　yet　we　must　make　a　beginning：　and　a　beginning；
as　primary　and　underived；　makes　an　assumption；　or　rather　is　an　assumption。　It
seems　as　if　it　were　impossible　to　make　a　beginning　at　all。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§2

This　thinking　study　of　things　may　serve；　in　a　general　way；　as　a　description　of
philosophy。　But　the　description　is　too　wide。　If　it　be　correct　to　say；　that　thought
makes　the　distinction　between　man　and　the　lower　animals；　then　everything　human
is　human；　for　the　sole　and　simple　reason　that　it　is　due　to　the　operation　of　thought。
Philosophy；　on　the　other　hand；　is　a　peculiar　mode　of　thinking　…　a　mode　in　which
thinking　becomes　knowledge；　and　knowledge　through　notions。　However　great
therefore　may　be　the　identity　and　essential　unity　of　the　two　modes　of　thought；　the
philosophic　mode　gets　to　be　different　from　the　more　general　thought　which　acts　in
all　that　is　human；　in　all　that　gives　humanity　its　distinctive　character。　And　this
difference　connects　itself　with　the　fact　that　the　strictly　human　and
thought…induced　phenomena　of　consciousness　do　not　originally　appear　in　the　form
of　a　thought；　but　as　a　feeling；　a　perception；　or　mental　image　…　all　of　which　aspects
must　be　distinguished　from　the　form　of　thought　proper。　

According　to　an　old　preconceived　idea；　which　has　passed　into　a　trivial　proposition；
it　is　thought　which　marks　the　man　off　from　the　animals。　Yet　trivial　as　this　old
belief　may　seem；　it　must；　strangely　enough；　be　recalled　to　mind　in　presence　of
certain　preconceived　ideas　of　the　present　day。　These　ideas　would　put　feeling　and
thought　so　far　apart　as　to　make　them　opposites；　and　would　represent　them　as　so
antagonistic；　that　feeling；　particularly　religious　feeling；　is　supposed　to　be
contaminated；　perverted；　and　even　annihilated　by　thought。　They　also　emphatically
hold　that　religion　and　piety　grow　out　of；　and　rest　upon　something　else；　and　not　on
thought。　But　those　who　make　this　separation　forget　meanwhile　that　only　man　has
the　capacity　for　religion；　and　that　animals　no　more　have　religion　than　they　have
law　and　morality。　

Those　who　insist　on　this　separation　of　religion　from　thinking　usually　have　before
their　minds　the　sort　of　thought　that　may　be　styled　after…thought。　They　mean
'reflective'　thinking；　which　has　to　deal　with　thoughts　as　thoughts；　and　brings　them
into　consciousness。　Slackness　to　perceive　and　keep　in　view　this　distinction　which
philosophy　definitely　draws　in　respect　of　thinking　is　the　source　of　the　crudest
objections　and　reproaches　against　philosophy。　Man　…　and　that　just　because　it　is　his
nature　to　think　…　is　the　only　being　that　possesses　law；　religion；　and　morality。　In
these　spheres　of　human　life；　therefore；　thinking；　under　the　guise　of　feeling；　faith；
or　generalised　image；　has　not　been　inactive：　its　action　and　its　productions　are　there
present　and　therein　contained。　But　it　is　one　thing　to　have　such　feelings　and
generalised　images　that　have　been　moulded　and　permeated　by　thought；　and
another　thing　to　have　thoughts　about　them。　The　thoughts；　to　which　after…thought
upon　those　modes　of　consciousness　gives　rise；　are　what　is　comprised　under
reflection；　general　reasoning；　and　the　like；　as　well　as　under　philosophy　itself。　

The　neglect　of　this　distinction　between　thought　in　general　and　the　reflective
thought　of　philosophy　has　also　led　to　another　and　more　frequent
misunderstanding。　Reflection　of　this　kind　has　been　often　maintained　to　be　the
condition；　or　even　the　only　way；　of　attaining　a　consciousness　and　certitude　of　the
Eternal　and　True。　The　（now　somewhat　antiquated）　metaphysical　proofs　of　God's
existence；　for　example；　have　been　treated；　as　if　a　knowledge　of　them　and　a
conviction　of　their　truth　were　the　only　and　essential　means　of　producing　a　belief
and　conviction　that　there　is　a　God。　Such　a　doctrine　would　find　its　parallel；　if　we
said　that　eating　was　impossible　before　we　had　acquired　a　knowledge　of　the
chemical；　botanical；　and　zoological　characters　of　our　food；　and　that　we　must
delay　digestion　till　we　had　finished　the　study　of　anatomy　and　physiology。　Were　it
so；　these　sciences　in　their　field；　like　philosophy　in　its；　would　gain　greatly　in　point
of　utility；　in　fact；　their　utility　would　rise　to　the　height　of　absolute　and　universal
indispensableness。　Or　rather；　instead　of　being　indispensable；　they　would　not　exist
at　all。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§3

The　Content；　of　whatever　kind　it　be；　with　which　our　consciousness　is　taken　up；　is
what　constitutes　the　qualitative　character　of　our　feelings；　perceptions；　fancies；　and
ideas；　of　our　aims　and　duties；　and　of　our　thoughts　and　notions。　From　this　point　of
view；　feeling；　perception；　etc。；　are　the　forms　assumed　by　these　contents。　The
contents　remain　one　and　the　same；　whether　they　are　felt；　seen；　represented；　or
willed；　and　whether　they　are　merely　felt；　or　felt　with　an　admixture　of　thoughts；　or
merely　and　simply　thought。　In　any　one　of　these　forms；　or　in　the　admixture　of
several；　the　contents　confront　consciousness；　or　are　its　object。　But　when　they　are
thus　objects　of　consciousness；　the　modes　of　the　several　forms　ally　themselves
with　the　contents；　and　each　form　of　them　appears　in　consequence　to　give　rise　to　a
special　object。　Thus　what　is　the　same　at　bottom　may　look　like　a　different　sort　of
fact。　

The　several　modes　of　feeling；　perception；　desire；　and　will；　so　far　as　we　are　aware
of　them；　are　in　general　called　ideas　（mental　representations）：　and　it　may　be
roughly　said　that　philosophy　puts　thoughts；　categories；　or；　in　more　precise
language；　adequate　notions；　in　the　place　of　the　generalised　images　we　ordinarily
call　ideas。　Mental　impressions　such　as　these　may　be　regarded　as　the　metaphors　of
thoughts　and　notions。　But　to　have　these　figurate　conceptions　does　not　imply　that
we　appreciate　their　intellectual　significance；　the　thoughts　and　rational　notions　to
which　they　correspond。　Conversely；　it　is　one　thing　to　have　thoughts　and　intelligent
notions；　and　another　to　know　what　impressions；　perceptions；　and　feelings
correspond　to　them。　

This　difference　will　to　some　extent　explain　what　people　call　the　unintelligibility　of
philosophy。　Their　difficulty　lies　partly　in　an　incapacity　…　which　in　itself　is　nothing
but　want　of　habit　…　for　abstract　thinking；　i。e。　in　an　inability　to　get　hold　of　pure
thoughts　and　move　about　in　them。　In　our　ordinary　state　of　mind；　the　thoughts　are
clothed　upon　and　made　one　with　the　sensuous　or　spiritual　material　of　the　hour；
and　in　reflection；　meditation；　and　general　reasoning；　we　introduce　a　blend　of
thoughts　into　feelings；　percepts；　and　mental　images。　（Thus；　in　propositions　where
the　subject…matter　is　due　to　the　senses　…　e。g。　'This　leaf　is　green'　…　we　have　such
categories　introduced；　as　being　and　individuality。）　But　it　is　a　very　different　thing　to
make　the　thoughts　pure　and　simple　our　object。　

But　their　complaint　that　philosophy　is　unintelligible　is　as　much　due　to　another
reason；　and　that　is　an　impatient　wish　to　have　before　them　as　a　mental　picture　that
which　is　in　the　mind　as　a　thought　or　notion。　When　people　are　asked　to　apprehend
some　notion；　they　often　complain　that　they　do　not　know　what　they　have　to　think。
But　the　fact　is　that　in　a　notion　there　is　nothing　further　to　be　thought　than　the
notion　itself。　What　the　phrase　reveals　is　a　hankering　after　an　image　with　which　we
are　already　familiar。　The　mind；　denied　the　use　of　its　fa