shorter logic-第42部分

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what　is　grounded　are　one　and　the　same　content：　the　difference　between　the　two　is　the　mere
difference　of　form　which　separates　simple　self…relation；　one　the　one　hand；　from　mediation；　or
derivativeness　on　the　other。　Inquiry　into　the　grounds　of　things　goes　with　the　point　of　view　which；　as
already　noted　（§　112n）；　is　adopted　by　Reflection。　We　wish；　as　it　were；　to　see　the　matter　double；
first　in　its　immediacy；　and　secondly　in　its　ground；　where　it　is　no　longer　immediate。　This　is　the　plain
meaning　of　the　Law　of　Sufficient　Ground　is　that　things　should　essentially　be　viewed　as　mediated。
The　manner　in　which　Formal　Logic　establishes　this　law　sets　a　bad　example　to　other　sciences。
Formal　Logic　asks　these　sciences　not　to　accept　their　subject…matter　as　it　is　immediately　given；　and
yet　herself　lays　down　a　law　of　thought　without　deducing　it　…　in　other　words；　without　exhibiting　its
mediation。　With　the　same　justice　as　the　logician　maintains　our　faculty　of　thought　to　be　so
constituted　that　we　must　ask　for　the　ground　of　everything；　might　the　physicist；　when　asked　why　a
man　who　falls　into　water　is　drowned；　reply　that　man　happens　to　be　so　constituted　that　he　cannot
live　under　water；　or　the　jurist；　when　asked　why　a　criminal　is　punished；　reply　that　civil　society
happens　to　be　so　constituted　that　crimes　cannot　be　left　unpunished。　

Yet　even　if　logic　be　excused　the　duty　of　giving　a　ground　for　the　law　of　sufficient　ground；　it　might　at
least　explain　what　is　to　be　understood　by　a　ground。　The　common　explanation；　which　describes　the
ground　as　what　has　a　consequence；　seems　at　first　glance　more　lucid　and　intelligible　than　the
preceding　definition　in　logical　terms。　If　you　ask　however　what　the　consequence　is；　you　are　told　that
it　is　what　has　a　ground；　and　it　becomes　obvious　that　the　explanation　is　intelligible　only　because　it
assumes　what　in　our　case　has　been　reached　as　the　termination　of　an　antecedent　movement　of
thought。　And　this　is　the　true　business　of　logic：　to　show　that　those　thoughts；　which　as　usually
employed　merely　float　before　consciousness　neither　understood　nor　demonstrated；　are　really
grades　in　the　self…determination　of　thought。　It　is　by　no　means　that　they　are　understood　and
demonstrated。　

In　common　life；　and　it　is　the　same　in　the　finite　sciences；　this　reflective　form　is　often　employed　as　a
key　to　the　secret　of　the　real　condition　of　the　objects　of　investigation。　So　long　as　we　deal　with　what
may　be　termed　the　household　needs　of　knowledge；　nothing　can　be　urged　against　this　method　of
study。　But　it　can　never　afford　definitive　satisfaction；　either　in　theory　or　practice。　And　the　reason
why　it　fails　is　that　the　ground　is　yet　without　a　definite　content　of　its　own；　so　that　to　regard　anything
as　resting　upon　a　ground　merely　gives　the　formal　difference　of　mediation　in　place　of　immediacy。
We　see　an　electrical　phenomenon；　for　example；　and　we　ask　for　its　ground　（or　reason）：　we　are　told
that　electricity　is　the　ground　of　this　phenomenon。　What　is　this　but　the　same　content　as　we　had
immediately　before　us；　only　translated　into　the　form　of　inwardness？　

The　ground　however　is　not　merely　simple　self…identity；　but　also　different：　hence　various　grounds
may　be　alleged　for　the　same　sum　of　fact。　。。。　

A　content　thus　objectively　and　intrinsically　determined；　and　hence　self…acting；　will　hereafter　come
before　us　as　the　notion：　and　it　is　the　notion　which　Leibnitz　had　in　his　eye　when　he　spoke　of
sufficient　ground；　and　urged　the　study　of　things　under　its　point　of　view。　His　remarks　were　originally
directed　against　that　merely　mechanical　method　of　conceiving　things　so　much　in　vogue　even　now；　a
method　which　he　justly　pronounces　insufficient。　We　may　see　an　instance　of　this　mechanical　theory
of　investigation　when　the　organic　process　of　the　circulation　of　the　blood　is　traced　back　merely　to
the　contraction　of　the　heart　。。。　

It　is　unfair　to　Leibnitz　to　suppose　that　he　was　content　with　anything　so　poor　as　this　formal　law　of
the　ground。　The　method　of　investigation　which　he　inaugurated　is　the　very　reverse　of　a　formalism
which　acquiesces　in　mere　grounds；　where　a　full　and　concrete　knowledge　is　sought。　Considerations
to　this　effect　led　Leibnitz　to　contrast　causae　efficientes　and　causae　finales；　and　to　insist　on　the
place　of　final　causes　as　the　conception　to　which　the　efficient　were　to　lead　up　。　If　we　adopt　this
distinction；　light；　heat；　and　moisture　would　be　the　causae　efficientes；　not　causa　finalis　of　the
growth　of　plants；　the　cause　finalis　is　the　notion　of　the　plant　itself。　。。。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Existence
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　122
As　it　first　comes；　the　chief　feature　of　Essence　is　show　in　itself　and　intermediation
in　itself。　But　when　it　has　completed　the　circle　of　intermediation；　its　unity　with
itself　is　explicitly　put　as　the　self…annulling　of　difference；　and　therefore　of
intermediation。　Once　more　then　we　come　back　to　immediacy　or　Being　…　but　Being
in　so　fas　as　it　is　intermediated　by　annulling　the　intermediation。　And　that　Being　is
Existence。　

The　ground　is　not　yet　determined　by　objective　principles　of　its　own；　nor　is　it　an
end　or　final　cause：　hence　it　is　not　active；　not　productive。　An　Existence　only
proceeds　from　the　ground。　The　determinate　ground　is　therefore　a　formal　matter：
that　is　to　say；　any　point　will　do；　so　long　as　it　is　expressly　put　as　self…relation；　as
affirmation；　in　correlation　with　the　immediate　existence　depending　on　it。　If　it　be　a
ground　at　all；　it　is　a　good　ground：　for　the　term　'good'　is　employed　abstractly　as
equivalent　to　affirmative；　and　any　point　（or　feature）　is　good　which　can　in　any　way
be　enunciated　as　confessedly　affirmative。　So　it　happens　that　a　ground　can　be
found　and　adduced　for　everything：　and　a　good　ground　（for　example；　a　good
motive　for　action）　may　effect　something　or　may　not；　it　may　have　a　consequence
or　it　may　not。　It　becomes　a　motive　（Strictly　so　called）　and　effects　something；　e。g。
through　its　reception　into　a　will；　there　and　there　only　it　becomes　active　and　is
made　a　cause。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　（b）　Existence
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　123
Existence　is　the　immediate　unity　of　reflection…into…self　and　reflection…into…other。　It
follows　from　this　that　existence　is　the　indefinite　multitude　of　existents　as
reflected…into…themselves；　which　at　the　same　time　equally　throw　light　upon　one
another　…　which；　in　short；　are　co…relative；　and　form　a　world　of　reciprocal
dependence　and　of　infinite　interconnection　between　grounds　and　consequents。
The　grounds　are　themselves　existences：　and　the　existents　in　like　manner　are　in
many　directions　grounds　as　well　as　consequents。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　123n
The　phrase　'Existence'　（derived　from　existere）　suggests　the　fact　of　having　proceeded　from
something。　Existence　is　Being　which　has　proceeded　from　the　ground；　and　has　reinstated　by
annulling　its　intermediation。　The　Essence；　as　Being　set　aside　and　absorbed；　originally　came　are
identity；　difference　and　ground。　The　last　is　the　unity　of　identity　and　difference；　and　because　it
unifies　them　it　has　at　the　same　time　to　distinguish　itself　from　itself。　But　that　which　is　in　this　way
distinguished　from　the　ground　is　as　little　mere　difference　as　the　ground　itself　is　abstract　sameness。
The　ground　works　its　own　suspension：　and　when　suspended；　the　result　of　its　negation　is　existence。
Having　issued　from　the　ground；　existence　contains　the　ground　in　it；　the　ground　does　not　remain；　as
it　were；　behind　existence；　but　by　its　very　nature　supersedes　itself　and　translates　itself　into　existence。

This　is　exemplified　even　in　our　ordinary　mode　of　thinking　when　we　look　upon　the　ground　of　a
thing；　not　as　something　abstractly　inward；　but　as　itself　also　an　existent。　For　example；　the
lightning…flash　which　has　set　a　house　on　fire　would　be　considered　the　ground　of　the　conflagration；
or　the　manners　of　a　nation　and　the　conditions　of　its　life　would　be　regarded　as　the　ground　of　its
constitution。　Such　indeed　is　the　ordinary　aspect　in　which　the　existence　world　originally　appears　to
reflection　…　。an　indefinite　crowd　of　things　existent；　which　being　simultaneously　reflected　on
themselves　and　on　one　another　are　related　reciprocally　as　ground　and　consequence。　In　this　motley
play　of　the　world；　if　we　may　so　call　the　sum　of　existents；　there　is　nowhere　a　firm　footing　to　be
found：　everything　bears　an　aspect　of　relativity；　conditioned　by　and　conditioning　something　else。
The　reflective　understanding　makes　it　its　business　to　elicit　and　trace　these　connections　running　out
in　every　direction：　but　the　question　touching　an　ultimate　design　is　so　far　left　unanswered；　and
therefore　the　craving　of　the　reason　after　knowledge　passes　with　the　further　development　of　the
logical　Idea　beyond　this　position　of　mere　relativity。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Thing…in…itself
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　124

The　reflection…on…another　of　the　existent　is　however　inseparable　from
reflection…into…self：　the　ground　is　their　unity；　from　which　existence　has　issued。
The　existent　therefore　includes　relativity；　and　has　on　its　own　part　its　multiple
interconnections　with　other　existents：　it　is　reflected　on　itself　as　its　ground。　The
existent　is；　when　so　described；　a　Thing。　

The　'thing…in…itself'　（or　thing　in　the　abstract）；　so　famous　in　the　philosophy　of
Kant；　shows　itself　here　in　its　genesis。　It　is　seen　to　be　the　abstract
reflection…on…self；　which　is　so　clung　to；　to　the　exclusion　of
reflection…into…other…things　and　of　all　predication　of　difference。　

The　thing…in…itself　therefore　is　the　empty　substratum　for　these　predicates　of
relation。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　124n

If　to　know　means　to　comprehend　an　object　in　its　concrete　character；　then　the　thing…in…itself；　which
is　nothing　but　the　quite　abstract　and　indeterminate　thing　in　general；　must　certainly　be　as
unknowable　as　it　is　alleged　to　be。　With　as　much　reason　however　as　we　speak　of　the　thing…in…itself；
we　might　speak　of　quality…by…itself　or　quantity…by…itself；　and　of　any　other　category。　The　expression
would　then　serve　to　signify　that　these　categories　are　taken　in　their　abstract　immediacy；　apart　from
their　development　and　inward　character。　It　is　no　better　than　a　whim　of　the　understanding；
therefore；　if