shorter logic-第44部分

快捷操作: 按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页 按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页 按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部! 如果本书没有阅读完，想下次继续接着阅读，可使用上方 "收藏到我的浏览器" 功能 和 "加入书签" 功能！


mineralogist　considers　the　relatively　formless　marble　as　a　special　formation　of　rock；　differing　from
other　equally　special　formations；　such　as　sandstone　or　porphyry。　Therefore　we　say　it　is　an
abstraction　of　the　understanding　which　isolates　matter　into　a　certain　natural　formlessness。　For
properly　speaking　the　thought　of　matter　includes　the　principle　of　form　throughout；　and　no　formless
matter　therefore　appears；　anywhere　even　in　experience　as　existing。　Still　the　conception　of　matter
as　original　and　pre…existent；　and　as　naturally　formless；　is　a　very　ancient　one；　it　meets　us　even
among　the　Greeks；　at　first　in　the　mythical　shape　of　Chaos；　which　is　supposed　to　represent　the
unformed　substratum　of　the　existing　world。　Such　a　conception　must　of　necessity　tend　to　make　God
not　the　Creator　of　the　world；　but　a　mere　world…moulder　or　demiurge。　A　deeper　insight　into　nature
reveals　God　as　creating　the　world　out　of　nothing。　And　that　teaches　two　things。　On　the　one　hand　it
enunciates　that　matter；　as　such；　has　no　independent　subsistence；　and　on　the　other　that　the　form
does　not　supervene　upon　matter　from　without；　but　as　a　totality　involves　the　principle　of　matter　in
itself。　This　free　and　infinite　form　will　hereafter　come　before　us　as　the　notion。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　129

Thus　the　Thing　suffers　a　disruption　into　Matter　and　Form。　Each　of　these　is　the
totality　of　thinghood　and　subsists　for　itself。　But　Matter；　which　is　meant　to　be　the
positive　and　indeterminate　existence；　contains；　as　an　existence；
reflection…on…another；　every　whit　as　much　as　it　contains　self…enclosed　being。
Accordingly　as　uniting　these　characteristics；　it　is　itself　the　totality　of　Form。　But
Form；　being　a　complete　whole　of　characteristics；　ipso　facto　involves
reflection…into…self；　in　other　words；　as　self…relating　Form　it　has　the　very　function
attributed　to　Matter。　Both　are　at　bottom　the　same。　Invest　them　with　this　unity；
and　you　have　the　relation　of　Matter　and　Form；　which　are　also　no　less　distinct。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　The　Theory　of　〃Matters〃
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　130

The　Thing；　being　this　totality；　is　a　contradiction。　On　the　side　of　its　negative　unity
it　is　Form　in　which　Matter　is　determined　and　deposed　to　the　rank　of　properties　（§
125）。　At　the　same　time　it　consists　of　Matters；　which　in　the
reflection…of…the…thing…into…itself　are　as　much　independent　as　they　are　at　the　same
time　negatived。　Thus　the　thing　is　the　essential　existence；　in　such　a　way　as　to　be　an
existence　that　suspends　or　absorbs　itself　in　itself。　In　other　words；　the　thing　is　an
Appearance　or　Phenomenon。　

The　negation　of　the　several　matters；　which　is　insisted　on　in　the　thing　no　less　than
their　independent　existence；　occurs　in　Physics　porosity。　Each　of　the　several
matters　（coloured　matter；　odorific　matter；　and　if　we　believe　some　people；　even
sound…matter　…　not　excluding　caloric；　electric　matter；　etc。）　is　also　negated：　and　in
this　negation　of　theirs；　or　as　interpenetrating　their　pores；　we　find　the　numerous
other　independent　matters；　which；　being　similarly　porous；　make　room　in　turn　for
the　existence　of　the　rest。　Pores　are　not　empirical　facts；　they　are　figments　of　the
understanding；　which　uses　them　to　represent　the　element　of　negation　in
independent　matters。　The　further　working…out　of　the　contradictions　is　concealed
by　the　nebulous　imbroglio　in　which　all　matters　are　independent　and　all　no　less
negated　in　each　other。　If　the　faculties　or　activities　are　similarly　hypostatised　in　the
mind；　their　living　unity　similarly　turns　to　the　imbroglio　of　an　action　of　the　one　on
the　others。　

These　pores　（meaning　thereby　not　the　pores　in　an　organic　body；　such　as　the　pores
of　wood　or　of　the　skin；　but　those　in　the　so…called　'matters'；　such　as　colouring
matter；　caloric；　or　metals；　crystals；　etc。）　cannot　be　verified　by　observation。　In　the
same　way　matter　itself　…　furthermore　form　which　is　separated　from　matter　…
whether　that　be　the　thing　as　consisting　of　matters；　or　the　view　that　the　thing　itself
subsists　and　only　has　proper　ties；　is　all　a　product　of　the　reflective　understanding
which；　while　it　observes　and　professes　to　record　only　what　it　observes；　is　rather
creating　a　metaphysic；　bristling　with　contradictions　of　which　it　is　unconscious。　




ESSENCE：　Second　Subdivision　of　The　Logic；
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　B。　APPEARANCE



　　　　　　　World　of　Appearance　…　Content　&　Form　…　Relation



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§131

The　Essence　must　appear　or　shine　forth。　Its　shining　or　reflection　in　it　is　the
suspension　and　translation　of　it　to　immediacy；　which；　while　as　reflection…into…self
it　is　matter　or　subsistence；　is　also　form；　reflection…on…something…else；　a
subsistence　which　sets　itself　aside。　To　show　or　shine　is　the　characteristic　by　which
essence　is　distinguished　from　Being　…　by　which　it　is　essence；　and　it　is　this　show
which；　when　it　is　developed；　shows　itself；　and　is　Appearance。　Essence
accordingly　is　not　something　beyond　or　behind　appearance；　but　…　just　because　it　is
the　essence　which　exists　…　the　existence　is　Appearance　（Forth…shining）。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　131n
Existence　stated　explicitly　in　its　contradiction　is　Appearance。　But　appearance　（forth…showing）　is
not　to　be　confused　with　a　mere　show　（shining）。　Show　is　the　proximate　truth　of　Being　or
immediacy。　The　immediate；　instead　of　being；　as　we　suppose；　something　independent；　resting　on　its
own　self；　is　a　mere　show；　and　as　such　it　is　packed　or　summed　up　under　the　simplicity　of　the
immanent　essence。　The　essence　is；　in　the　first　place；　the　sum　total　of　the　showing　itself；　shining　in
itself　（inwardly）；　but；　far　from　abiding　in　this　inwardness；　it　comes　as　a　ground　forward　into
existence；　and　this　existence　being　grounded　not　in　itself；　but　on　something　else；　is　just　appearance。
In　our　imagination　we　ordinarily　combine　with　the　term　appearance　or　phenomenon　the　conception
of　an　indefinite　congeries　of　things　existing；　the　being　of　which　is　purely　relative；　and　which
consequently　do　not　rest　on　a　foundation　of　their　own；　but　are　esteemed　only　as　passing　stages。
But　in　this　conception　it　is　no　less　implied　that　essence　dose　not　linger　behind　or　beyond
appearance。　Rather　it　is；　we　may　say；　the　infinite　kindness　which　lets　its　own　show　freely　issue　into
immediacy；　and　graciously　allows　it　the　joy　of　existence。　The　appearance　which　is　thus　created
does　not　stand　on　its　own　feet；　and　has　its　being　not　in　itself　but　in　something　else。　。。。　

Appearance　is　in　every　way　a　very　important　grade　of　the　logical　idea。　It　may　be　said　to　be　the
distinction　of　philosophy　from　ordinary　consciousness　that　it　sees　the　merely　phenomenal　character
of　what　the　latter　supposes　to　have　a　self…subsistent　being。　The　significance　of　appearance
however　must　be　properly　grasped；　or　mistakes　will　arise。　To　say　that　anything　is　mere
appearance　may　be　misinterpreted　to　mean　that；　as　compared　to　what　is　merely　phenomenal；
there　is　greater　truth　in　the　immediate；　in　that　which　is。　Now；　in　strict　fact；　the　case　is　precisely　the
reverse。　

Appearance　is　higher　than　mere　Being　…　a　richer　category　because　it　holds　in　combination　the　two
elements　of　reflection…into…self　and　reflection…into…other：　whereas　Being　（or　immediacy）　is　still
mere　relationlessness；　and　apparently　rests　upon　itself　alone。　Still；　to　say　that　anything　is　only　an
appearance　suggests　a　real　flaw；　which　consists　in　this；　that　Appearance　is　still　divided　against　itself
and　without　intrinsic　stability。　Beyond　and　above　mere　appearance　comes　in　the　first　place
Actuality；　the　third　grade　of　Essence；　of　which　we　shall　afterwards　speak。　

In　the　history　of　Modern　Philosophy；　Kant　has　the　merit　of　first　rehabilitating　this　distinction
between　the　common　and　the　philosophic　modes　of　thought。　He　stopped　half…way；　however；
when　he　attached　to　Appearance　a　subjective　meaning　only；　and　put　the　abstract　essence
immovable　outside　it　as　the　thing…in…itself　beyond　the　reach　of　our　cognition。　

For　it　is　the　very　nature　of　the　world　of　immediate　objects　to　be　appearance　only。　Knowing　it　to
be　so；　we　know　at　the　same　time；　the　essence；　which；　far　from　staying　behind　or　beyond　the
appearance；　rather　manifests　its　own　essentiality　by　deposing　the　world　to　a　mere　appearance。
One　can　hardly　quarrel　with　the　plain　man　who；　in　his　desire　for　totality；　cannot　acquiesce　in　the
doctrine　of　subjective　idealism；　that　we　are　solely　concerned　with　phenomena。　
？
The　plain　man；　however；　in　his　desire　to　save　the　objectivity　of　knowledge；　may　very　naturally
return　to　abstract　immediacy　and　maintain　that　immediacy　to　be　true　and　actual。　In　a　little　work
published　under　the　title　A　Report；　Clear　as　Day；　to　the　Larger　Public　touching　the　Proper
Nature　of　the　Latest　Philosophy：　an　Attempt　to　force　the　Reader　to　understand；　Fichte
examined　the　opposition　between　subjective　idealism　and　immediate　consciousness　in　a　popular
form；　under　the　shape　of　a　dialogue　between　the　author　and　the　reader；　and　tried　hard　to　prove
that　the　subjective　idealist's　view　was　right。　In　this　dialogue　the　reader　complains　to　the　author　that
he　has　completely　failed　to　place　himself　in　the　idealist's　position；　and　is　inconsolable　in　the　thought
that　things　around　him　are　not　real　things　but　mere　appearances。　The　affliction　of　the　reader　can
scarcely　be　blamed　when　he　is　expected　to　consider　himself　hemmed　in　by　an　impervious　circle　of
purely　subjective　conceptions。　Apart　from　this　subjective　view　of　Appearance；　however；　we　have
all　reason　to　rejoice　that　the　things　which　environ　us　are　appearances　and　not　steadfast　and
independent　existences；　since　in　that　case　we　should　soon　perish　of　hunger；　both　bodily　and
mental。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　（a）　The　World　of　Appearances　§132

The　Apparent　or　Phenomenal　exists　in　such　a　way　that　its　subsistence　is　ipso
facto　thrown　into　abeyance　or　suspended　and　is　only　one　stage　in　the　form　itself。
The　form　embraces　in　it　the　matter　or　subsistence　as　one　of　its　characteristics。　In
this　way　the　phenomenal　has　its　ground　in　this　（form）　as　its　essence；　its
reflection…into…self　in　contrast　with　its　immediacy；　but；　in　so　doing；　has　it　only　in
another　aspect　of　the　form。　This　ground　of　its　is　no　less　phenome