shorter logic-第50部分

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implies　is　this。　Contingency；　which　is　actuality　in　its　immediacy；　is　the
self…identical；　essentially　only　as　a　supposition　which　is　no　sooner　made　than　it　is
revoked　and　leaves　an　existent　externality。　In　this　way；　the　external　contingency　is
something　pre…supposed；　the　immediate　existence　of　which　is　at　the　same　time　a
possibility；　and　has　the　vocation　to　be　suspended；　to　be　the　possibility　of
something　else。　Now　this　possibility　is　the　Condition。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　146n　
The　Contingent；　as　the　immediate　actuality；　is　at　the　same　time；　the　possibility　of　somewhat　else　…
no　longer　however；　the　abstract　possibility　which　we　had　at　first；　but　the　possibility　which　is。　And
a　possibility　existent　is　a　Condition。　By　the　Condition　of　a　thing　we　mean　first；　an　existence；　in
short　an　immediate；　and　secondly　the　vocation　of　this　immediate　to　be　suspended　and　subserve　the
actualising　of　something　else。　Immediate　actuality　is　in　general　as　such　never　what　it　ought　to　be；　it
is　a　finite　actuality　with　an　inherent　flaw；　and　its　vocation　is　to　be　consumed。　But　the　other　aspect
of　actuality　is　its　essentiality。　This　is　primarily　the　inside　which　as　a　mere　possibility　is　no　less
destined　to　be　suspended。　Possibility　thus　suspended　is　the　issuing　of　a　new　actuality；　of　which　the
first　immediate　actuality　was　the　pre…supposition。　Here　we　see　the　alternation　which　is　involved　in
the　notion　of　a　Condition。　The　Conditions　of　a　thing　seem　at　first　sight　to　involve　no　bias　any　way。
Really　however；　an　immediate　actuality　of　this　kind　includes　in　it　the　germ　of　something　else
altogether。　At　first；　this　something　else　is　only　a　possibility：　but　the　form　of　possibility　is　soon
suspended　and　translated　into　actuality。　This　new　actuality　thus　issuing　is　the　very　inside　of　the
immediate　actuality　which　uses　it　up。　Thus；　there　comes　into　being　quite　another　shape　of　things；
and　yet　it　is　not　an　other：　for　the　first　actuality　is　only　put　as　what　it　in　essence　was。　The　conditions
which　are　sacrificed；　which　feel　to　the　ground　and　are　spent；　only　unite　with　themselves　in　the　other
actuality。　Such　in　general　is　the　nature　of　the　process　of　actuality。　The　actual　is　no　mere　case　of
immediate　Being；　but；　as　essential　Being；　a　suspension　of　its　own　immediacy；　and　thereby
mediating　itself　with　itself。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　147　
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　＇c＇　Real　Possibility

When　this　externality　（of　actuality）　is　thus　developed　into　a　circle　of　the　two
categories　of　possibility　and　immediate　actuality；　showing　the　intermediation　of
the　one　by　the　other；　it　is　what　is　called　Real　Possibility。　Being　such　a　circle；
further；　it　is　the　totality；　and　thus　the　content；　the　actual　fact　or　affair　in　its
all…round　definiteness。　While　in　like　manner；　if　we　look　at　the　distinction　between
the　two　characteristics　in　this　unity；　it　realises　the　concrete　totality　of　the　form；
the　immediate　self…translation　of　inner　into　outer；　and　of　outer　into　inner。　This
self…movement　of　the　form　is　Activity；　carrying　into　effect　the　fact　or　affair　as　a
real　ground　which　is　self…suspended　to　actuality；　and　carrying　into　effect　the
contingent　actuality；　the　conditions；　i。e。　it　is　their　reflection…into…self；　and　their
self…suspension　to　another　actuality　of　the　actual　fact。　If　all　the　conditions　are　at
hand；　the　fact　（event）　must　be　actual；　and　the　fact　itself　is　one　of　the　conditions：
for　being　in　the　first　place　only　inner；　it　is　in　fact　itself　only　pre…supposed。
Developed　actuality；　as　the　coincident　alternation　of　inner　and　outer；　the
alternation　of　their　opposite　motions　combined　into　a　single　motion；　is　Necessity。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Necessity

Necessity　has　been　defined；　and　rightly　so；　as　the　union　of　possibility　and
actuality。　This　mode　of　expression；　however；　gives　a　superficial　and　therefore
unintelligible　description　of　the　very　difficult　notion　of　necessity。　It　is　difficult
because　it　is　the　notion　itself；　only　that　its　stages　or　factors　are　still　as　actualities；
which　are　yet　at　the　same　time　to　be　viewed　as　forms　only；　collapsing　and
transient。　In　the　two　following　paragraphs；　therefore；　an　exposition　of　the　factors
which　constitute　necessity　must　be　given　at　greater　length。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　147n
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Blind　Necessity

When　anything　is　said　to　be　necessary；　the　first　question　we　ask　is：　Why？　Anything　necessary
accordingly　comes　before　us　as　something　due　to　a　supposition；　the　result　of　certain　antecedents。
If　we　go　no　further　than　mere　derivation　from　antecedents；　however；　we　have　not　gained　a
complete　notion　of　what　necessity　means。　What　is　merely　derivative；　is　what　it　is；　not　through　itself；
but　through　something　else：　and　in　this　way；　it　too　is　merely　contingent。　What　is　necessary　on　the
other　hand；　we　would　have　to　be　what　it　is　through　itself：　and　thus；　although　derivative；　it　must　still
contain　the　antecedent　whence　it　is　derived　as　a　vanishing　element　in　itself。　Hence　we　say　of　what
is　necessary；　'It　is'。　We　thus　hold　it　to　be　simple；　self…relation；　in　which　all　dependence　on
something　else　is　removed。　

Necessity　is　often　said　to　be　blind。　If　that　means　that　in　the　process　of　necessity　the　End　or　final
cause　is　not　explicitly　and　overtly　present；　the　statement　is　correct。　The　process　of　necessity　begins
with　the　existence　of　scattered　circumstances　which　appear　to　have　no　interconnection　and　no
concern　one　with　another。　These　circumstances　are　an　immediate　actuality　which　collapses；　and
out　of　this　negation　a　new　actuality　proceeds。　Here　we　have　a　content　which　in　point　of　form　is
doubled；　once　as　content　Of　the　final　realised　fact；　and　once　as　content　of　the　scattered
circumstances　which　appear　as　if　they　were　positive；　and　make　themselves　at　first　felt　in　that
character。　The　latter　content　is　in　itself　nought　and　is　accordingly　inverted　into　its　negative；　thus
becoming　content　of　the　realised　fact。　The　immediate　circumstances　fall　to　the　ground　as
conditions；　but　are　at　the　same　time　retained　as　content　of　the　ultimate　reality。　From　such
circumstances　and　conditions　there　has；　as　we　say；　proceeded　quite　another　thing；　and　it　is　for　that
reason　that　we　call　this　process　of　necessity　blind。　If　on　the　contrary　we　consider　teleological
action；　we　have　in　the　end　of　action　a　content　which　is　already　foreknown。　This　activity　therefore　is
not　blind　but　seeing。　To　say　that　the　world　is　ruled　by　Providence　implies　that　design；　as　what　has
been　absolutely　predetermined；　is　the　active　principle；　so　that　the　issue　corresponds　to　what　has
been　fore…known　and　forewilled。　

The　theory　however　which　regards　the　world　as　determined　through　necessity　and　the　belief　in　a
divine　providence　are　by　no　means　mutually　excluding　points　of　view。　The　intellectual　principle
underlying　the　idea　of　divine　providence　will　hereafter　be　shown　to　be　the　notion。　But　the　notion　is
the　truth　of　necessity；　which　it　contains　in　suspension　in　itself；　just　as；　conversely；　necessity　is　the
notion　implicit。　Necessity　is　blind　only　so　long　as　it　is　not　understood。　There　is　nothing　therefore
more　mistaken　than　the　charge　of　blind　fatalism　made　against　the　Philosophy　of　History；　when　it
takes　for　its　problem　to　understand　the　necessity　of　every　event。　The　philosophy　of　history　rightly
understood　takes　the　rank　of　a　Thedicee；　and　those；　who　fancy　they　honour　Divine　Providence　by
excluding　necessity　from　it；　are　really　degrading　it　by　this　exclusiveness　to　a　blind　and　irrational
caprice。　In　the　simple　language　of　the　religious　mind　which　speaks　of　God's　eternal　and　immutable
decrees；　there　is　implied　an　express　recognition　that　necessity　forms　part　of　the　essence　of　God。　In
his　difference　from　God；　man；　with　his　own　private　opinion　and　will；　follows　the　call　of　caprice　and
arbitrary　humour；　and　thus　often　finds　his　acts　turn　out　something　quite　different　from　what　he　had
meant　and　willed。　But　God　knows　what　he　wills；　is　determined　in　his　eternal　will　neither　by
accident　from　within　nor　from　without；　and　what　he　wills　he　also　accomplishes；　irresistibly。　

Necessity　gives　a　point　of　view　which　has　important　bearings　upon　our　sentiments　and　behaviour。
When　we　look　upon　events　as　necessary；　our　situation　seems　at　first　sight　to　lack　freedom
completely。　In　the　creed　of　the　ancients；　as　we　know；　necessity　figured　as　Destiny。　The　modern
point　of　view；　on　the　contrary；　is　that　of　Consolation。　And　Consolation　means　that；　if　we　renounce
our　aims　and　interests；　we　do　so　only　in　prospect　of　receiving　compensation。　Destiny；　on　the
contrary；　leaves　no　room　for　Consolation。　But　a　close　examination　of　the　ancient　feeling　about
destiny　will　not　by　any　means　reveal　a　sense　of　bondage　to　its　power　Rather　the　reverse。　This　will
clearly　appear；　if　we　remember　that　the　sense　of　bondage　springs　from　inability　to　surmount　the
antithesis；　and　from　looking　at　what　is；　and　what　happens；　as　contradictory　to　what　ought　to　be
and　happen。　In　the　ancient　mind　the　feeling　was　more　of　the　following　kind：　Because　such　a　thing
is；　it　is；　and　as　it　is；　so　ought　it　to　be。　Here　there　is　no　contrast　to　be　seen；　and　therefore　no　sense
of　bondage；　no　pain；　and　no　sorrow。　True；　indeed；　as　already　remarked；　this　attitude　towards
destiny　is　void　of　consolation。　But　then；　on　the　other　hand；　it　is　a　frame　of　mind　which　does　not
need　consolation；　so　long　as　personal　subjectivity　has　not　acquired　its　infinite　significance。　It　is　this
point　on　which　special　stress　should　be　laid　in　comparing　the　ancient　sentiment　with　that　of　the
modern　and　Christian　world。　

By　Subjectivity；　however；　we　may　understand；　in　the　first　place；　only　the　natural　and　finite
subjectivity；　with　its　contingent　and　arbitrary　content　of　private　interests　and　inclinations　—　all；　in
short；　that　we　call　person　as　distinguished　from　thing：　taking　'thing'　in　the　emphatic　sense　of　the
word　（in　which　we　use　the　（correct）　expression　that　it　is　a　question　of　things　and　not　of　persons）。
In　this　sense　of　subjectivity　we　cannot　help　admiring　the　tranquil　resignation　of　the　ancients　to
destiny；　and　feeling　that　it　is　a　much　higher　and　worthier　mood　than　that　of　the　moderns；　who
obstinately　pursue