shorter logic-第52部分

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the　Monadology　of　Leibnitz。　

From　this　point　we　glance　back　to　the　alleged　atheism　of　Spinoza。　The　charge　will　be　seen　to　be
unfounded　if　we　remember　that　his　system；　instead　of　denying　God；　rather　recognises　that　he　alone
really　is。　Nor　can　it　be　maintained　that　the　God　of　Spinoza；　although　he　is　described　as　alone　true；
is　not　the　true　God；　and　therefore　as　good　as　no　God。　If　that　were　a　just　charge；　it　would　only
prove　that　all　other　systems；　where　speculation　has　not　gone　beyond　a　subordinate　stage　of　the
idea　—　that　the　Jews　and　Mohammedans　who　know　God　only　as　the　Lord　—　and　that　even　the
many　Christians　for　whom　God　is　merely　the　most　high；　unknowable；　and　transcendent　being；　are
as　much　atheists　as　Spinoza。　The　so…called　atheism　of　Spinoza　is　merely　an　exaggeration　of　the
fact　that　he　defrauds　the　principle　of　difference　or　finitude　of　its　due。　Hence　his　system；　as　it　holds
that　there　is　properly　speaking　no　world；　at　any　rate　that　the　world　has　no　positive　being；　should
rather　be　styled　Acosmism。　These　considerations　will　also　show　what　is　to　be　said　of　the　charge　of
Pantheism。　If　Pantheism　means；　as　it　often　does；　the　doctrine　which　takes　finite　things　in　their
finitude　and　in　the　complex　of　them　to　be　God；　we　must　acquit　the　system　of　Spinoza　of　the　crime
of　Pantheism。　For　in　that　system；　finite　things　and　the　world　as　a　whole　are　denied　all　truth。　On　the
other　hand；　the　philosophy　which　is　Acosmism　is　for　that　reason　certainly　pantheistic。　

The　shortcoming　thus　acknowledged　to　attach　to　the　content　turns　out　at　the　same　time　to　be　a
shortcoming　in　respect　of　form。　Spinoza　puts　substance　at　the　head　of　his　system；　and　defines　it　to
be　the　unity　of　thought　and　extension；　without　demonstrating　how　he　gets　to　this　distinction；　or　how
he　traces　it　back　to　the　unity　of　substance。　The　further　treatment　of　the　subject　proceeds　in　what　is
called　the　mathematical　method。　Definitions　and　axioms　are　first　laid　down：　after　them　comes　a
series　of　theorems；　which　are　proved　by　an　analytical　reduction　of　them　to　these　unproved
postulates。　Although　the　system　of　Spinoza；　and　that　even　by　those　who　altogether　reject　its
contents　and　results；　is　praised　for　the　strict　sequence　of　its　method；　such　unqualified　praise　of　the
form　is　as　little　justified　as　an　unqualified　rejection　of　the　content。　The　defect　of　the　content　is　that
the　form　is　not　known　as　immanent　in　it；　and　therefore　only　approaches　it　as　an　outer　and
subjective　form。　As　intuitively　accepted　by　Spinoza　without　a　previous　mediation　by　dialectic；
Substance；　as　the　universal　negative　power；　is　as　it　were　a　dark　shapeless　abyss　which　engulfs　all
definite　content　as　radically　null；　and　produces　from　itself　nothing　that　has　a　positive　subsistence　of
its　own。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　152
At　the　stage　where　substance；　as　absolute　power；　is　the　self…relating　power　（itself
a　merely　inner　possibility）；　which　thus　determines　itself　to　accidentality　—　from
which　power　the　externality　it　thereby　creates　is　distinguished　—　necessity　is　a
correlation　strictly　so　called；　just　as　in　the　first　form　of　necessity　it　is　substance。
This　is　the　correlation　of　Causality。　At　the　stage　where　substance；　as　absolute
power；　is　the　self…relating　power　（itself　a　merely　inner　possibility）；　which　thus
determines　itself　to　be　accidentality　…　from　which　power　the　eternality　it　thereby
creates　is　distinguished　…　necessity　is　a　correlation　strictly　so　called；　just　as　in　the
first　form　of　necessity　it　is　substance。　This　is　the　correlation　of　Causality。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　（b）　The　Relationship　of　Causality
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　153

Substance　is　Cause；　in　so　far　as　substance　reflects　into　self　as　against　its　passage
into　accidentality　and　so　stands　as　the　primary　fact；　but　again　no　less　suspends
this　reflection…into…self　（its　bare　possibility）；　lays　itself　down　as　the　negative　of
itself；　and　thus　produces　an　Effect；　an　actuality；　which；　though　so　far　only
assumed　as　a　sequence；　is　through　the　process　that　effectuates　it　at　the　same　time
necessary。　

As　primary　fact；　the　cause　is　qualified　as　having　absolute　independence；　and　a
subsistence　maintained　in　face　of　the　effect：　but　in　the　necessity；　whose　identity
constitutes　that　primariness　itself；　it　is　wholly　passed　into　the　effect。　So　far　again
as　we　can　speak　of　a　definite　content；　there　is　no　content　that　is　not　in　the　cause。
That　identity　in　fact　is　the　absolute　content　itself：　but　it　is　no　less　also　the
form…characteristic。　The　primariness　of　the　cause　is　suspended　in　the　effect　in
which　the　cause　makes　itself　a　dependent　being。　The　cause　however　does　not　for
that　reason　vanish　and　leave　the　effect　to　be　alone　actual。　For　this　dependency　is
in　like　manner　directly　suspended；　and　is　rather　the　reflection　of　the　cause　in
itself；　its　primariness：　in　short；　it　is　in　the　effect　that　the　cause　first　becomes　actual
and　a　cause。　The　cause　consequently　is　in　its　full　truth　causa　sui。　

。　。　。　。＇re　Jacobi；　omitted＇　

In　the　common　acceptation　of　the　causal　relation　the　cause　is　finite；　to　such　extent
as　its　content　is　so　（as　is　the　case　with　finite　substance）；　and　so　far　as　cause　and
effect　are　conceived　as　two　several　independent　existences：　which　they　are；
however；　only　when　we　leave　the　causal　relation　out　of　sight。　In　the　finite　sphere
we　never　get　over　the　difference　of　the　form…characteristics　in　their　relation：　and
hence　we　turn　the　matter　around　and　define　the　cause　also　as　something
dependent　or　as　an　effect。　This　again　has　another　cause；　and　thus　there　grows　up
a　progress　from　effects　to　causes　ad　infinitum。　There　is　a　descending　progress
too：　the　effect；　looked　at　in　its　identity　with　the　cause；　is　itself　defined　as　a　cause；
and　at　the　same　time　as　another　cause；　which　again　has　other　effects；　and　so　on
for　ever。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　153n
The　way　understanding　bristles　up　against　the　idea　of　substance　is　equalled　by　its　readiness　to　use
the　relation　of　cause　and　effect。　Whenever　it　is　proposed　to　view　any　sum　of　facts　as　necessary；　it
is　especially　the　relation　of　causality　to　which　the　reflective　understanding　makes　a　point　of　tracing
of　it　back。　Now；　although　this　relation　does　undoubtedly　belong　to　necessity；　it　forms　only　one
aspect　in　the　process　of　that　category。　That　process　equally　requires　the　suspension　of　the
mediation　involved　in　causality　and　the　exhibition　of　it　as　simple　self…relation。　If　we　stick　to
causality　as　such；　we　have　it　not　in　its　truth。　Such　a　causality　is　merely　finite；　and　its　finitude　lies　in
retaining　the　distinction　between　cause　and　effect　unassimilated。　But　these　two　terms；　if　they　are
distinct；　are　also　identical。　Even　in　ordinary　consciousness　that　identity　may　be　found。　We　say　that
a　cause　is　a　cause；　only　where　it　has　an　effect；　and　vice　versa。　Both　cause　and　effect　are　thus　one
and　the　same　content：　and　the　distinction　between　them　is　primarily　only　that　the　one　lays　down；
and　the　other　is　laid　down。　This　formal　difference　however　again　suspends　itself；　because　the
cause　is　not　only　a　cause　of　something　else；　but　also　a　cause　of　itself；　while　the　effect　is　not　only　an
effect　of　something　else；　but　also　an　effect　of　itself。　The　finitude　of　things　consists　accordingly　in
this。　While　cause　and　effect　are　in　their　motion　identical；　the　two　forms　present　themselves　severed
so　that；　though　the　cause　is　also　an　effect；　and　the　effect　also　a　cause；　the　cause　is　not　an　effect　in
the　same　connection　as　it　is　an　effect。　This　again　gives　the　infinite　progress；　in　the　shape　of　an
endless　series　of　causes；　which　shows　itself　at　the　same　time　as　an　endless　series　of　effects。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　154
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Action　and　Reaction

The　effect　is　different　from　the　cause。　The　former　as　such　has　a　being　dependent
on　the　latter。　But　such　a　dependence　is　likewise　reflection…into…self　and
immediacy：　and　the　action　of　the　cause；　as　it　constitutes　the　effect；　is　at　the　same
time　the　pre…constitution　of　the　effect；　so　long　as　effect　is　kept　separate　from
cause。　There　is　already　in　existence　another　substance　on　which　the　effect　takes
place。　As　immediate；　this　substance　is　not　a　self…related　negativity　and　active；　but
passive。　Yet　it　is　a　substance；　and　it　is　therefore　active　also：　it　therefore　suspends
the　immediacy　it　was　originally　put　forward　with；　and　the　effect　which　was　put
into　it：　it　reacts；　i。e。　suspends　the　activity　of　the　first　substance。　But　this　first
substance　also　in　the　same　way　sets　aside　its　own　immediacy；　or　the　effect　which
is　put　into　it；　it　thus　suspends　the　activity　of　the　other　substance　and　reacts。　In　this
manner　causality　passes　into　the　relation　of　Action　and　Reaction；　or
Reciprocity。　

In　Reciprocity；　although　causality　is　not　yet　invested　with　its　true　characteristic；
the　rectilinear　movement　out　from　causes　to　effects；　and　from　effects　to　causes；
is　bent　round　and　back　into　Itself；　and　thus　the　progress　ad　infinitum　of　causes
and　effects　is；　as　a　progress；　really　and　truly　suspended。　This　bend；　which
transforms　the　infinite　progression　into　a　self…contained　relationship；　here　as
always　the　plain　reflection　that　in　the　above　meaningless　repetition　there　is　only
one　and　the　same　thing；　viz。　one　cause　and　another；　and　their　connection　with
one　another。　Reciprocity　…　which　is　the　development　of　this　relation　…　itself
however　only　distinguishes　turn　and　turn　about—not　causes；　but　factors　of
causation；　in　each　of　which；　just　because　they　are　inseparable　（on　the　principle　of
the　identity　that　the　cause　is　cause　in　the　effect；　and　vice　versa）；　the　other　factor
is　also　equally　supposed。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　（c）　Reciprocity；　or　Action　&　Reaction
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　155
The　characteristics　which　in　Reciprocal　Action　are　retained　as　distinct　are　＇a＇
potentially　the　same。　The　one　side　is　a　cause；　is　primary；　active；　passive；　etc。；　just
as　the　other　is。　Similarly　the　presupposition　of　another　side　and　the　action　upon　it；
the　immediate　primariness　and　the　dependence　produced　by　the　alternation；　are
one　and　the　same　on　both　sides。　The　cause　assumed　to　be　first　is　on　account　of
its　immediacy　passive；