shorter logic-第8部分

快捷操作: 按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页 按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页 按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部! 如果本书没有阅读完，想下次继续接着阅读，可使用上方 "收藏到我的浏览器" 功能 和 "加入书签" 功能！


terms：　and　these　are　the　acme　of　simplicity；　the　ABC　of　everything　else。　They　are
also　what　we　are　best　acquainted　with：　such　as　'is'　and　'is　not'；　quality　and
magnitude；　being　potential　and　being　actual；　one；　many；　and　so　on。　But　such　an
acquaintance　only　adds　to　the　difficulties　of　the　study；　for　while；　on　the　one　hand；
we　naturally　think　it　is　not　worth　our　trouble　to　occupy　ourselves　any　longer　with
things　so　familiar；　on　the　other　hand；　the　problem　is　to　become　acquainted　with
them　in　a　new　way；　quite　opposite　to　that　in　which　we　know　them　already。

The　utility　of　Logic　is　a　matter　which　concerns　its　bearings　upon　the　student；　and
the　training　it　may　give　for　other　purposes。　This　logical　training　consists　in　the
exercise　in　thinking　which　the　student　has　to　go　through　（this　science　is　the
thinking　of　thinking）：　and　in　the　fact　that　he　stores　his　head　with　thoughts；　in　their
native　unalloyed　character。　It　is　true　that　Logic；　being　the　absolute　form　of　truth；
and　another　name　for　the　very　truth　itself；　is　something　more　than　merely　useful。
Yet　if　what　is　noblest；　most　liberal；　and　most　independent　is　also　most　useful；
Logic　has　some　claim　to　the　latter　character。　Its　utility　must　then　be　estimated　at
another　rate　than　exercise　in　thought　for　the　sake　of　the　exercise。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　19n

（1）　The　first　question　is：　What　is　the　object　of　our　science？　The　simplest　and　most　intelligible
answer　to　this　question　is　that　Truth　is　the　object　of　Logic。　Truth　is　a　noble　word；　and　the　thing　is
nobler　still。　So　long　as　man　is　sound　at　heart　and　in　spirit；　the　search　for　truth　must　awake　all　the
enthusiasm　of　his　nature。　But　immediately　there　steps　in　the　objection　…　are　we　able　to　know　truth
？　There　seems　to　be　a　disproportion　between　finite　beings　like　ourselves　and　the　truth　which　is
absolute；　and　doubts　suggest　themselves　whether　there　is　any　bridge　between　the　finite　and　the
infinite。　God　is　truth：　how　shall　we　know　Him　？　Such　an　undertaking　appears　to　stand　in
contradiction　with　the　graces　of　lowliness　and　humility。　Others　who　ask　whether　we　can　know　the
truth　have　a　different　purpose。　They　want　to　justify　themselves　in　living　on　contented　with　their
petty；　finite　aims。　And　humility　of　this　stamp　is　a　poor　thing。

But　the　time　is　past　when　people　asked：　How　shall　I；　a　poor　worm　of　the　dust；　be　able　to　know
the　truth　？　And　in　its　stead　we　find　vanity　and　conceit：　people　claim；　without　any　trouble　on　their
part；　to　breathe　the　very　atmosphere　of　truth。　The　young　have　been　flattered　into　the　belief　that
they　possess　a　natural　birthright　of　moral　and　religious　truth。　And　in　the　same　strain；　those　of　riper
years　are　declared　to　be　sunk；　petrified　ossified　in　falsehood。　Youth；　say　these　teachers；　sees　the
bright　light　of　dawn：　but　the　older　generation　lies　in　the　slough　and　mire　of　the　common　day。　They
admit　that　the　special　sciences　are　something　that　certainly　ought　to　be　cultivated；　but　merely　as　the
means　to　satisfy　the　needs　of　outer　life。　In　all　this　it　is　not　humility　which　holds　back　from　the
knowledge　and　study　of　the　truth；　but　a　conviction　that　we　are　already　in　full　possession　of　it。　And
no　doubt　the　young　carry　with　them　the　hopes　of　their　elder　compeers；　on　them　rests　the　advance
of　the　world　and　science。　But　these　hopes　are　set　upon　the　young；　only　on　the　condition　that；
instead　of　remaining　as　they　are；　they　undertake　the　stern　labour　of　mind。

This　modesty　in　truth…seeking　has　still　another　phase：　and　that　is　the　genteel　indifference　to　truth；　as
we　see　it　in　Pilate's　conversation　with　Christ。　Pilate　asked　'What　is　truth　？'　with　the　air　of　a　man
who　had　settled　accounts　with　everything　long　ago；　and　concluded　that　nothing　particularly　matters
…　he　meant　much　the　same　as　Solomon　when　he　says：　'All　is　vanity'。　When　it　comes　to　this；　nothing
is　left　but　self…conceit。

The　knowledge　of　the　truth　meets　an　additional　obstacle　in　timidity。　A　slothful　mind　finds　it　natural
to　say：　'Don't　let　it　be　supposed　that　we　mean　to　be　in　earnest　with　our　philosophy。　We　shall　be
glad　inter　alia　to　study　Logic：　but　Logic　must　be　sure　to　leave　us　as　we　were　before。'　People　have
a　feeling　that；　if　thinking　passes　the　ordinary　range　of　our　ideas　and　impressions；　it　cannot　but　be
on　the　evil　road。　They　seem　to　be　trusting　themselves　to　a　sea　on　which　they　will　be　tossed　to　and
fro　by　the　waves　of　thought；　till　at　length　they　again　reach　the　sandbank　of　this　temporal　scene；　as
utterly　poor　as　when　they　left　it。　What　comes　of　such　a　view；　we　see　in　the　world。　It　is　possible
within　these　limits　to　gain　varied　information　and　many　accomplishments；　to　become　a　master　of
official　routine；　and　to　be　trained　for　special　purposes。　But　it　is　quite　another　thing　to　educate　the
spirit　for　the　higher　life　and　to　devote　our　energies　to　its　service。　In　our　own　day　it　may　be　hoped　a
longing　for　something　better　has　sprung　up　among　the　young；　so　that　they　will　not　be　contented
with　the　mere　straw　of　outer　knowledge。　

（2）　It　is　universally　agreed　that　thought　is　the　object　of　Logic。　But　of　thought　our　estimate　may　be
very　mean；　or　it　may　be　very　high。　On　one　hand；　people　say：　'It　is　only　a　thought。'　In　their　view
thought　is　subjective；　arbitrary　and　accidental　…　distinguished　from　the　thing　itself；　from　the　true　and
the　real。　On　the　other　hand；　a　very　high　estimate　may　be　formed　of　thought；　when　thought　alone　is
held　adequate　to　attain　the　highest　of　all　things；　the　nature　of　God；　of　which　the　senses　can　tell　us
nothing。　God　is　a　spirit；　it　is　said；　and　must　be　worshipped　in　spirit　and　in　truth。　But　the　merely　felt
and　sensible；　we　admit；　is　not　the　spiritual；　its　heart　of　hearts　is　in　thought；　and　only　spirit　can　know
spirit。　And　though　it　is　true　that　spirit　can　demean　itself　as　feeling　and　sense　…　as　is　the　case　in
religion；　the　mere　feeling；　as　a　mode　of　consciousness；　is　one　thing；　and　its　contents　another。
Feeling；　as　feeling；　is　the　general　form　of　the　sensuous　nature　which　we　have　in　common　with　the
brutes。　This　form；　viz。　feeling；　may　possibly　seize　and　appropriate　the　full　organic　truth：　but　the
form　has　no　real　congruity　with　its　contents。　The　form　of　feeling　is　the　lowest　in　which　spiritual　truth
can　be　expressed。　The　world　of　spiritual　existences；　God　himself；　exists　in　proper　truth；　only　in
thought　and　as　thought。　If　this　be　so；　therefore；　thought；　far　from　being　a　mere　thought；　is　the
highest　and；　in　strict　accuracy；　the　sole　mode　of　apprehending　the　eternal　and　absolute。

As　of　thought；　so　also　of　the　science　of　thought；　a　very　high　or　a　very　low　opinion　may　be　formed。
Any　man；　it　is　supposed；　can　think　without　Logic；　as　he　can　digest　without　studying　physiology。　If
he　have　studied　Logic；　he　thinks　afterwards　as　he　did　before；　perhaps　more　methodically；　but　with
little　alteration。　If　this　were　all；　and　if　Logic　did　no　more　than　make　men　acquainted　with　the　action
of　thought　as　the　faculty　of　comparison　and　classification；　it　would　produce　nothing　which　had　not
been　done　quite　as　well　before。　And　in　point　of　fact　Logic　hitherto　had　no　other　idea　of　its　duty
than　this。　Yet　to　be　well　informed　about　thought；　even　as　a　mere　activity　of　the　subject…mind；　is
honourable　and　interesting　for　man。　It　is　in　knowing　what　he　is　and　what　he　does　that　man　is
distinguished　from　the　brutes。　But　we　may　take　the　higher　estimate　of　thought　…　as　what　alone　can
get　really　in　touch　with　the　supreme　and　true。　In　that　case；　Logic　as　the　science　of　thought
occupies　a　high　ground。　If　the　science　of　Logic　then　considers　thought　in　its　action　and　its
productions　（and　thought　being　no　resultless　energy　produces　thoughts　and　the　particular　thought
required）；　the　theme　of　Logic　is　in　general　the　supersensible　world；　and　to　deal　with　that　theme　is
to　dwell　for　a　while　in　that　world。　Mathematics　is　concerned　with　the　abstractions　of　time　and
space。　But　these　are　still　the　object　of　sense；　although　the　sensible　is　abstract　and　idealised。
Thought　bids　adieu　even　to　this　last　and　abstract　sensible：　it　asserts　its　own　native　independence；
renounces　the　field　of　the　external　and　internal　sense；　and　puts　away　the　interests　and　inclinations
of　the　individual。　When　Logic　takes　this　ground；　it　is　a　higher　science　than　we　are　in　the　habit　of
supposing。

（3）　The　necessity　of　understanding　Logic　in　a　deeper　sense　than　as　the　science　of　the　mere　form　of
thought　is　enforced　by　the　interests　of　religion　and　politics；　of　law　and　morality。　In　earlier　days　men
meant　no　harm　by　thinking：　they　thought　away　freely　and　fearlessly。　They　thought　about　God；
about　Nature；　and　the　State；　and　they　felt　sure　that　a　knowledge　of　the　truth　was　obtainable
through　thought　only；　and　not　through　the　senses　or　any　random　ideas　or　opinions。　But　while　they
so　thought；　the　principal　ordinances　of　life　began　to　be　seriously　affected　by　their　conclusions。
Thought　deprived　existing　institutions　of　their　force。　Constitutions　fell　a　victim　to　thought：　religion
was　assailed　by　thought：　firm　religious　beliefs　which　had　been　always　looked　upon　as　revelations
were　undermined；　and　in　many　minds　the　old　faith　was　upset。　The　Greek　philosophers；　for
example；　became　antagonists　of　the　old　religion；　and　destroyed　its　beliefs。　Philosophers　were
accordingly　banished　or　put　to　death；　as　revolutionists　who　had　subverted　religion　and　the　state；
two　things　which　were　inseparable。　Thought；　in　short；　made　itself　a　power　in　the　real　world；　and
exercised　enormous　influence。　The　matter　ended　by　drawing　attention　to　the　influence　of　thought；
and　its　claims　were　submitted　to　a　more　rigorous　scrutiny；　by　which　the　world　professed　to　find
that　thought　arrogated　too　much　and　was　unable　to　perform　what　it　had　undertaken　It　had　not　…
people　said　…　learned　the　real　being　of　God；　of　Nature　and　Mind。　It　had　not　learned　what　the　truth
was。　What　it　had　done　was　to　overthrow　religion　and　the　state　It　became　urgent　therefore　to
justify　thought；　with　reference　to　the　results　it　had　produced：　and　it　is　this　examination　into　the
nature　of　thought　and　this　justification　which　in　recent　times　has　constituted　one　of　the　main
problems　of　philosophy。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Thought　regarded　as　an　activity