criminal psychology-第40部分

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res　great　effort；　and　seek　to　bring　the　case　they　are　asking　about　under　the　light　of　their　particular　profession。　So；　however　irrelevant　the　statement　of　a　witness　may　be；　the　merchant　juryman　will　use　it　to　explain　Saldo…Conti；　the　carpenter　juryman　to　explain　carpentry；　the　agriculturist　to　notice　the　farming　of　cattle；　and　then　having　set　the　problem　in　his　own　field　construct　the　most　daring　analogies；　for　use　in　determining　the　guilt　of　the　accused。　And　we　lawyers　are　no　better。　The　more　difficult　and　newer　a　case　is　the　more　are　we　inclined　to　seek　analogies。　We　want　supports；　for　we　do　not　find　firm　natural　laws；　and　in　our　fear　we　reach　out　after　analogies；　not　of　course　in　law；　because　that　is　not　permitted；　but　certainly　in　matters　of　fact。　Witness　X　has　given　difficult　testimony　in　a　certain　case。　We　seek　an　analogy　in　witness　Y　of　an　older　case；　and　we　observe　the　present　issue　thus　analogically；　without　the　least　justification。　We　have　never　yet　seen　drops　of　blood　on　colored　carpets；　yet　we　believe　in　applying　　our　experience　of　blood　stains　on　clothes　and　boots　analogically。　We　have　before　us　a　perfectly　novel　deed　rising　from　perverted　sexual　impulseand　we　presuppose　that　the　accused　is　to　be　treated　altogether　analogously　to　another　in　a　different　case；　although　indeed　the　whole　event　was　different。


＇1＇　Manual　for　Examining　Justices。


Moreover　the　procedure；　where　the　analogy　is　justified；　is　complex。　‘‘With　insight；''　says　Trendelenburg；　‘‘did　the　ancients　regard　analogy　as　important。　The　power　of　analogy　lies　in　the　construction　and　induction　of　a　general　term　which　binds　the　subconcept　with　regard　to　which　a　conclusion　is　desired；　together　with　the　individual　object　which　is　compared　with　the　first；　and　which　is　to　appear　as　a　mediating　concept　but　can　not。　This　new　general　term　is　not；　however；　the　highest　concept　among　the　three　termini　of　the　conclusion；　it　is　the　middle　one　and　is　nothing　else　than　the　terminus　medius　of　the　first　figure。''　This　clear　statement　shows　not　only　how　circumstantial　every　conclusion　from　analogy　is；　but　also　how　little　it　achieves。　There　is　hardly　any　doubt　of　the　well…known　fact　that　science　has　much　to　thank　analogy　for；　since　analogy　is　the　simplest　and　easiest　means　for　progress　in　thought。　If　anything　is　established　in　any　one　direction　but　progress　is　desired　in　another；　then　the　attempt　is　made　to　adapt　what　is　known　to　the　proximate　unknown　and　to　draw　the　possible　inference　by　analogy。　Thousands　upon　thousands　of　analogies　have　been　attempted　and　have　failed；　but　no　matter；　one　successful　one　became　a　hypothesis　and　finally　an　important　natural　law。　In　our　work；　however；　the　case　is　altogether　different；　for　we　are　not　concerned　with　the　construction　of　hypotheses；　we　are　concerned　with　the　discovering　of　truth；　or　with　the　recognition　that　it　cannot　be　discovered。

The　only　place　where　our　problems　permit　of　the　use　of　analogy　is　in　the　making　of　so…called　constructions；　i。　e。；　when　we　aim　to　clarify　or　to　begin　the　explanation　of　a　case　which　is　at　present　unintelligible；　by　making　some　assumption。　The　construction　then　proceeds　in　analogy　to　some　already　well　known　earlier　case。　We　say：　‘‘Suppose　the　case　to　have　been　so　and　so；''　and　then　we　begin　to　test　the　assumption　by　applying　it　to　the　material　before　us；　eliminating　and　constructing　progressively　until　we　get　a　consistent　result。　There　is　no　doubt　that　success　is　frequently　attained　in　this　way　and　that　it　is　often　the　only　way　in　which　a　work　may　be　begun。　At　the　same　time；　it　must　be　recognized　how　dangerous　this　is；　for　in　the　eagerness　of　the　work　it　is　easy　to　forget　that　so　far；　one　is　working　only　according　to　analogy　by　means　of　an　assumption　　still　to　be　proved。　This　assumption　is　in　such　cases　suddenly　considered　as　something　already　proved　and　is　counted　as　such　with　the　consequence　that　the　result　must　be　false。　If　you　add　the　variability　in　value　of　analogy；　a　variability　not　often　immediately　recognized；　the　case　becomes　still　worse。　We　have　never　been　on　the　moon；　have　therefore　apparently　no　right　to　judge　the　conditions　thereand　still　we　knowonly　by　way　of　analogy　that　if　we　jumped　into　the　air　there　we　should　fall　back　to　the　ground。　But　still　further：　we　conclude　again；　by　analogy；　that　there　are　intelligent　beings　on　Mars；　if；　however；　we　were　to　say　how　these　people　might　look；　whether　like　us　or　like　cubes　or　like　threads；　whether　they　are　as　large　as　bees　or　ten　elephants；　we　should　have　to　give　up　because　we　have　not　the　slightest　basis　for　analogy。

In　the　last　analysis；　analogy　depends　upon　the　recurrence　of　similar　conditions。　Therefore　we　tacitly　assume　when　we　judge　by　analogy　that　the　similarity　of　conditions　contains　an　equivalence　of　ultimately　valid　circumstance。　The　certainty　of　analogy　is　as　great　as　the　certainty　of　this　postulate；　and　its　right　as　great　as　the　right　of　this　postulate。

If；　then；　the　postulate　is　little　certain；　we　have　gained　nothing　and　reach　out　into　the　dark；　if　its　certainty　is　great　we　no　longer　have　an　analogy；　we　have　a　natural　law。　Hence；　Whately　uses　the　term　analogy　as　an　expression　for　the　similarity　of　relation；　and　in　this　regard　the　use　of　analogy　for　our　real　work　has　no　special　significance。　Concerning　so…called　false　analogies　and　their　importance　cf。　J。　Schiel's　Die　Methode　der　induktiven　Forschung　（Braunschweig　1868）。


Section　28。　（f）　Probability。

Inasmuch　as　the　work　of　the　criminal　judge　depends　upon　the　proof　of　evidence；　it　is　conceivable　that　the　thing　for　him　most　important　is　that　which　has　evidential　character　or　force。＇1＇　A　sufficient　definition　of　evidence　or　proof　does　not　exist　because　no　bounds　have　been　set　to　the　meaning　of　‘‘Proved。''　All　disciplines　furnish　examples　of　the　fact　that　things　for　a　long　time　had　probable　validity；　later　indubitable　validity；　that　again　some　things　were　considered　proved　and　were　later　shown　to　be　incorrect；　and　that　many　things　at　one　time　wobbly　are　in　various　places；　and　even　among　particular　persons；　supposed　to　be　at　the　limits　of　probability　and　proof。　Es…　　pecially　remarkable　is　the　fact　that　the　concept　of　_*the　proved_　is　very　various　in　various　sciences；　and　it　would　be　absorbing　to　establish　the　difference　between　what　is　called　proved　and　what　only　probable　in　a　number　of　given　examples　by　the　mathematician；　the　physicist；　the　chemist；　the　physician；　the　naturalist；　the　philologist；　the　historian；　the　philosopher；　the　lawyer；　the　theologian；　etc。　But　this　is　no　task　for　us　and　nobody　is　called　upon　to　determine　who　knows　what　‘‘Proved''　means。　It　is　enough　to　observe　that　the　differences　are　great　and　to　understand　why　we　criminalists　have　such　various　answers　to　the　question：　Is　this　proved　or　only　probable？　The　varieties　may　be　easily　divided　into　groups　according　to　the　mathematical；　philosophic；　historical　or　naturalistic　inclinations　of　the　answerer。　Indeed；　if　the　individual　is　known；　what　he　means　by　‘‘proved''　can　be　determined　beforehand。　Only　those　minds　that　have　no　especial　information　remain　confused　in　this　regard；　both　to　others　and　to　themselves。


＇1＇　B。　Petronievics：　Der　Satz　vom　Grunde。　Leipzig　1898。


Sharply　to　define　the　notion　of　‘‘proved''　would　require　at　least　to　establish　its　relation　to　usage　and　to　say：　What　we　desire　leads　us　to　an　_*assumption_；　what　is　possible　gives　us　_*probability_；　what　appears　certain；　we　call　_*proved_。　In　this　regard　the　second　is　always；　in　some　degree；　the　standard　for　the　first　（desires；　e。　g。；　cause　us　to　act；　one　becomes　predominant　and　is　fixed　as　an　assumption　which　later　on　becomes　clothed　with　a　certain　amount　of　reliability　by　means　of　this　fixation）。

The　first　two　fixations；　the　assumption　and　the　probability；　have　in　contrast　to　their　position　among　other　sciences　only　a　heuristic　interest　to　us　criminalists。　Even　assumptions；　when　they　become　hypotheses；　have　in　various　disciplines　a　various　value；　and　the　greatest　lucidity　and　the　best　work　occur　mainly　in　the　quarrel　about　an　acutely　constructed　hypothesis。

_*Probability_　has　a　similar　position　in　the　sciences。　The　scholar　who　has　discovered　a　new　thought；　a　new　order；　explanation　or　solution；　etc。；　will　find　it　indifferent　whether　he　has　made　it　only　highly　probable　or　certain。　He　is　concerned　only　with　the　idea；　and　a　scholar　who　is　dealing　with　the　idea　for　its　own　sake　will　perhaps　prefer　to　bring　it　to　a　great　probability　rather　than　to　indubitable　certainty；　for　where　conclusive　proof　is　presented　there　is　no　longer　much　interest　in　further　research；　while　probability　permits　and　requires　further　study。　But　our　aim　is　certainty　and　proof　only；　and　even　a　high　degree　of　probability　is　no　better　than　untruth　and　can　not　count。　In　passing　judgment　and　for　the　purpose　of　judgment　　a　high　degree　of　probability　can　have　only　corroborative　weight；　and　then　it　is　probability　only　when　taken　in　itself；　and　proof　when　taken　with　regard　to　the　thing　it　corroborates。　If；　for　example；　it　is　most　probable　that　X　was　recognized　at　the　place　of　a　crime；　and　if　at　the　same　time　his　evidence　of　alibi　has　failed；　his　footmarks　are　corroborative；　so　are　the　stolen　goods　which　have　been　seen　in　his　possession；　and　something　he　had　lost　at　the　place　of　the　crime　which　is　recognized　as　his　property；　etc。　ln　short；　when　all　these　indices　are　in　themselves　established　only　as　highly　probable；　they　give　under　certain　circumstances；　when　taken　together；　complete　certainty；　because　the　coincidence　of　so　many　high　probabilities　must　be　declared　impossible　if　X　were　not　the　criminal。

In　all　other　cases；　as　we　have　already　pointed　out；　_*assumption_　and　probability　have　only　a　heuristic　value　for　us　lawyers。　With　the　assumption；　we　must　of　course　count；　many　cases　can　not　be　begun　without　the　assistance　of　assumption。　Every　only　half…　confused　case；　the　process　of　which　is　unknown；　requires　first　of　all　and　as　early　as　possible　the　application　of　some　assumption　to　its　material。　As　soon　as　the　account　is　inconsistent　the　assumption　must　be　abandoned　and　a　fresh　one　and　yet　again　a　fresh　one　assumed；　until　finally　one　holds　its　own　and　may　be　established　as　probable。　It　then　remains　the　center　of　operation；　until　it　becomes　of　itsel