criminal psychology-第59部分

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vent。　Many　so…called　scientific　distinctions　have；　under　the　impulse　of　scientific　psychology；　lost　their　status。　Modern　psychology　does　not　see　sharply…drawn　boundaries　between　perception　and　memory；　and　suggests　that　the　proper　solution　of　the　problem　of　perception　is　the　solution　of　the　problem　of　knowledge。＇1＇


＇1＇　The　first　paragraph；　pp。　78…79；　is　omitted　in　the　translation。


With　regard　to　the　relation　of　consciousness　to　perception　we　will　make　the　distinctions　made　by　Fischer。＇2＇　There　are　two　spheres　or　regions　of　consciousness：　the　region　of　sensation；　and　of　external　perception。　The　former　involves　the　inner　structure　of　the　organism；　the　latter　passes　from　the　organism　into　the　objective　world。　Consciousness　has　a　sphere　of　action　in　which　it　deals　with　the　external　world　by　means　of　the　motor　nerves　and　muscles；　and　a　sphere　of　perception　which　is　the　business　of　the　senses。


＇2＇　E。　L。　Fischer：　Theorie　der　Gesichtswahrnehmung。　Mainz　1891。


External　perception　involves　three　principal　functions：　apprehension；　differentiation；　and　combination。　Perception　in　the　narrower　sense　of　the　term　is　the　simple　sensory　conscious　apprehension　of　some　present　object　stimulating　our　eyes。　We　discover　by　means　of　it　what　the　object　is；　its　relation　to　ourselves　and　other　things；　its　distance　from　us；　its　name；　etc。

What　succeeds　this　apprehension　is　the　most　important　thing　for　us　lawyers；　i。　e。　_*recognition_。　Recognition　indicates　only　that　an　object　has　sufficiently　impressed　a　mind　to　keep　it　known　and　identifiable。　It　is　indifferent　what　the　nature　of　the　recognized　object　is。　According　to　Hume　the　object　may　be　an　enduring　thing　（‘‘non…　　interrupted　and　non…dependent　on　mind''）；　or　it　may　be　identical　with　perception　itself。　In　the　latter　case　the　perception　is　considered　as　a　logical　judgment　like　the　judgment：　‘‘It　is　raining；''　or　the　feeling　that　‘‘it　is　raining；''　and　there　recognition　is　only　the　recognition　of　a　perception。　Now　judgments　of　this　sort　are　what　we　get　from　witnesses；　and　what　we　have　to　examine　and　evaluate。　This　must　be　done　from　two　points　of　view。　First；　from　the　point　of　view　of　the　observer　and　collector　of　instances　who　is　seeking　to　discover　the　principle　which　governs　them。　If　this　is　not　done　the　deductions　that　we　make　are　at　least　unreliable；　and　in　most　cases；　false。　As　Mach　says；　‘‘If　once　observation　has　determined　all　the　facts　of　any　natural　science；　a　new　period　begins　for　that　science；　the　period　of　deduction。''　But　how　often　do　we　lawyers　distinguish　these　two　periods　in　our　own　work。＇1＇


＇1＇　A　sentence　is　here　omitted。


The　second　point　of　importance　is　the　presence　of　mistakes　in　the　observations。　The　essential　mistakes　are　classified　by　Schiel　under　two　headings。　Mistakes　in　observation　are　positive　or　negative；　wrong　observation　or　oversight。　The　latter　occurs　largely　through　preconceived　opinions。　The　opponents　of　Copernicus　concluded　that　the　earth　did　not　move　because　otherwise　a　stone　dropped　from　the　top　of　a　tower　would　reach　the　ground　a　little　to　the　west。　If　the　adherents　of　Copernicus　had　made　the　experiment　they　would　have　discovered　that　the　stone　does　fall　as　the　theory　requires。　Similar　oversights　occur　in　the　lawyer's　work　hundreds　of　times。　We　are　impressed　with　exceptions　that　are　made　by　others　or　by　ourselves；　and　give　up　some　already　tried　approach　without　actually　testing　the　truth　of　the　exception　which　challenges　it。　I　have　frequently；　while　at　work；　thought　of　the　story　of　some　one　of　the　Georges；　who　did　not　like　scholars　and　set　the　following　problem　to　a　number　of　philosophers　and　physicists：　‘‘When　I　put　a　ten　pound　stone　into　a　hundred　pound　barrel　of　water　the　whole　weighs　a　hundred　and　ten　pounds；　but　when　I　put　a　live　fish　of　ten　pounds　into　the　barrel　the　whole　still　weighs　only　a　hundred　pounds？''　Each　one　of　the　scholars　had　his　own　convincing　explanation；　until　finally　the　king　asked　one　of　the　foot…men；　who　said　that　he　would　like　to　see　the　experiment　tried　before　he　made　up　his　mind。　I　remember　a　case　in　which　a　peasant　was　accused　of　having　committed　arson　for　the　sake　of　the　insurance。　He　asserted　that　he　had　gone　into　a　room　with　a　candle　and　that　a　long　spider's　web　which　was　hanging　down　　had　caught　fire　from　it　accidentally　and　had　inflamed　the　straw　which　hung　from　the　roof。　So　the　catastrophe　had　occurred。　Only　in　the　second　examination　did　it　occur　to　anybody　to　ask　whether　spider's　web　can　burn　at　all；　and　the　first　experiment　showed　that　that　was　impossible。

Most　experiences　of　this　kind　indicate　that　in　recognizing　events　we　must　proceed　slowly；　without　leaping；　and　that　we　may　construct　our　notions　only　on　the　basis　of　knowledge　we　already　possess。　Saint　Thomas　says；　‘‘Omnes　cognitio　fit　secundum　similitudinem　cogniti　in　cognoscente。''　If　this　bit　of　wisdom　were　kept　in　mind　in　the　examination　of　witnesses　it　would　be　an　easier　and　simpler　task　than　usual。　Only　when　the　unknown　is　connected　with　the　known　is　it　possible　to　understand　the　former。　If　it　is　not　done　the　witness　will　hardly　be　able　to　answer。　He　nowhere　finds　support；　or　he　seeks　one　of　his　own；　and　naturally　finds　the　wrong　one。　So　the　information　that　an　ordinary　traveler　brings　home　is　mainly　identical　with　what　he　carries　away；　for　he　has　ears　and　eyes　only　for　what　he　expects　to　see。　For　how　long　a　time　did　the　negro　believe　that　disease　pales　the　coral　that　he　wears？　Yet　if　he　had　only　watched　it　he　would　have　seen　how　foolish　the　notion　was。　How　long；　since　Adam　Smith；　did　people　believe　that　extravagance　helps　industry；　and　how　much　longer　have　people　called　Copernicus　a　fool　because　they　actually　saw　the　sun　rise　and　set。　So　J。　S。　Mill　puts　his　opinions　on　this　matter。　Benneke＇1＇　adds；　‘‘If　anybody　describes　to　me　an　animal；　a　region；　a　work　of　art；　or　narrates　an　event；　etc。；　I　get　no　notion　through　the　words　I　hear　of　the　appearance　of　the　subject。　I　merely　have　a　problem　set　me　by　means　of　the　words　and　signs；　in　the　conception　of　the　subject；　and　hence　it　depends　for　truth　mainly　upon　the　completeness　of　earlier　conceptions　of　similar　things　or　events；　and　upon　the　material　I　have　imaginatively　at　hand。　These　are　my　perceptual　capital　and　my　power　of　representation。''


＇1＇　E。　Benneke：　Pragmatische　Psychologie。


It　naturally　is　not　necessary　to　ask　whether　a　narrator　has　ever　seen　the　things　he　speaks　of；　nor　to　convince　oneself　in　examination　that　the　person　in　question　knows　accurately　what　he　is　talking　about。　At　the　same　time；　the　examiner　ought　to　be　clear　on　the　matter　and　know　what　attitude　to　take　if　he　is　going　to　deal　intelligibly　with　the　other。　I　might　say　that　all　of　us；　educated　and　uneducated；　have　apprehended　and　remember　definite　and　distinct　images　of　all　things　we　have　seen；　heard；　or　learned　from　descriptions。　　When　we　get　new　information　we　simply　attach　the　new　image　to　the　old；　or　extinguish　a　part　of　the　old　and　put　the　new　in　its　place；　or　we　retain　only　a　more　or　less　vigorous　breath　of　the　old　with　the　new。　Such　images　go　far　back；　even　animals　possess　them。　One　day　my　small　son　came　with　his　exciting　information　that　his　guinea　pig；　well　known　as　a　stupid　beast；　could　count。　He　tried　to　prove　this　by　removing　the　six　young　from　their　mother　and　hiding　them　so　that　she　could　not　see　what　happened　to　them。　Then　he　took　one　of　the　six；　hid　it；　and　brought　the　remaining　five　back　to　the　old　lady。　She　smelled　them　one　after　the　other　and　then　showed　a　good　deal　of　excitement；　as　if　she　missed　something。　Then　she　was　again　removed　and　the　sixth　pig　brought　back；　when　she　was　restored　to　her　brood；　she　sniffed　all　six　and　showed　a　great　deal　of　satisfaction。　‘‘She　could　count　at　least　six。''　Naturally　the　beast　had　only　a　fixed　collective　image　of　her　brood；　and　as　one　was　missing　the　image　was　disturbed　and　incorrect。　At　the　same　time；　the　image　was　such　as　is　created　by　the　combination　of　events　or　circumstances。　It　is　not　far　from　the　images　of　low…browed　humanity　and　differs　only　in　degree　from　those　of　civilized　people。

The　fact　that　a　good　deal　of　what　is　said　is　incorrect　and　yet　not　consciously　untrue；　depends　upon　the　existence　of　these　images　and　their　association　with　the　new　material。　The　speaker　and　the　auditor　have　different　sets　of　images；　the　first　relates　the　new　material　differently　from　a　second；　and　so　of　course　they　can　not　agree。＇1＇　It　is　the　difficult　task　of　the　examiner　so　to　adapt　what　is　said　as　to　make　it　appropriate　to　the　right　images　without　making　it　possible　for　incorrect　interpretations　to　enter。　When　we　have　a　well…known　money…lender　as　witness　concerning　some　unspeakable　deal；　a　street…walker　concerning　some　brawling　in　a　peasant　saloon；　a　clubman　concerning　a　duel；　a　game…warden　concerning　poaching；　the　set　of　images　of　each　one　of　these　persons　will　be　a　bad　foundation　for　new　perceptions。　On　the　other　hand；　it　will　not　be　difficult　to　abstract　from　them　correctly。　But　cases　of　this　sort　are　not　of　constant　occurrence　and　the　great　trouble　consists　in　once　for　all　discovering　what　memory…images　were　present　before　the　witness　perceived　the　event　in　question。　The　former　have　a　great　influence　upon　the　perception　of　the　latter。


＇1＇　Cf。　H。　Gross's　Archiv；　XV；　125。


In　this　connection　it　should　not　be　forgotten　that　the　retention　of　these　images　is　somewhat　pedantic　and　depends　upon　unimportant　things。　In　the　city　hall　of　Graz　there　is　a　secretary　with　thirty…six　　sections　for　the　thirty…six　different　papers。　The　name　of　the　appropriate　journal　was　written　clearly　over　each　section　and　in　spite　of　the　clearness　of　the　script　the　depositing　and　removing　of　the　papers　required　certain　effort；　inasmuch　as　the　script　had　to　be　read　and　could　not　be　apprehended。　Later　the　name　of　the　paper　was　cut　out　of　each　and　pasted　on　the　secretary　instead　of　the　script；　and　then；　in　spite　of　the　various　curly　and　twisted　letters；　the　habitual　images　of　the　titles　were　easily　apprehended　and　their　removal　and　return　became　mechanical。　The　customary　and　identical　things　are　so　habitual　that　they　are　apprehended　with　greater　ease　than　more　distinct　objects。

Inasmuch　as　we　can　conceive　only　on　the　basis　of　the　constancy　and　similarity　of　forms；　we　make　th