criminal psychology-第60部分

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Inasmuch　as　we　can　conceive　only　on　the　basis　of　the　constancy　and　similarity　of　forms；　we　make　these　forms　the　essence　of　experience。　On　the　other　hand；　what　is　constant　and　similar　for　one　individual　is　not　so　for　another；　and　essences　of　experience　vary　with　the　experiencer。

‘‘When　we　behold　a　die　of　which　we　can　see　three　sides　at　a　time；　seven　corners；　and　nine　edges；　we　immediately　induce　the　image　or　schema　of　a　die；　and　we　make　our　further　sense…perception　accord　with　this　schema。　In　this　way　we　get　a　series　of　schemes　which　we　may　substitute　for　one　another''　（Aubert）。　For　the　same　reason　we　associate　in　description　things　unknown　to　the　auditor；　which　we　presuppose　in　him；　and　hence　we　can　make　him　rightly　understand　only　if　we　have　named　some　appropriate　object　in　comparison。　Conversely；　we　have　to　remember　that　everybody　takes　his　comparison　from　his　own　experience；　so　that　we　must　have　had　a　like　experience　if　we　are　to　know　what　is　compared。　It　is　disastrous　to　neglect　the　private　nature　of　this　experience。　Whoever　has　much　to　do　with　peasants；　who　like　to　make　use　of　powerful　comparisons；　must　first　comprehend　their　essential　life；　if　he　is　to　understand　how　to　reduce　their　comparisons　to　correct　meanings。　And　if　he　has　done　so　he　will　find　such　comparisons　and　images　the　most　distinct　and　the　most　intelligible。

Sense…perception　has　a　great　deal　to　do　in　apprehension　and　no　one　can　determine　the　boundary　where　the　sense　activity　ends　and　the　intellectual　begins。　I　do　not　recall　who　has　made　note　of　the　interesting　fact　that　not　one　of　twenty　students　in　an　Egyptian　museum　knew　why　the　hands　of　the　figures　of　Egyptian　was　pictures　gave　the　impression　of　being　incorrectnobody　had　observed　the　fact　that　all　the　figures　had　two　right　hands。

I　once　paid　a　great　deal　of　attention　to　card…sharping　tricks　and　　as　I　acquired　them；　either　of　myself　or　from　practiced　gamblers；　I　demonstrated　them　to　the　young　criminalists。　For　a　long　time　I　refused　to　believe　what　an　old　Greek　told　me：　‘‘The　more　foolish　and　obvious　a　trick　is；　the　more　certain　it　is；　people　never　see　anything。''　The　man　was　right。　When　I　told　my　pupils　expressly；　‘‘Now　I　am　cheating；''　I　was　able　to　make　with　safety　a　false　coup；　a　false　deal；　etc。　Nobody　saw　it。　If　only　one　has　half　a　notion　of　directing　the　eyes　to　some　other　thing；　a　card　may　be　laid　on　the　lap；　thrust　into　the　sleeve；　taken　from　the　pocket；　and　God　knows　what　else。　Now　who　can　say　in　such　a　case　whether　the　sensory　glance　or　the　intellectual　apprehension　was　unskilful　or　unpractised？　According　to　some　authorities　the　chief　source　of　error　is　the　senses；　but　whether　something　must　not　be　attributed　to　that　mysterious；　inexplicable　moment　in　which　sensory　perception　becomes　intellectual　perception；　nobody　can　say。

My　favorite　demonstration　of　how　surprisingly　little　people　perceive　is　quite　simple。　I　set　a　tray　with　a　bottle　of　water　and　several　glasses　on　the　table；　call　express　attention　to　what　is　about　to　occur；　and　pour　a　little　water　from　the　bottle　into　the　glass。　Then　the　stuff　is　taken　away　and　the　astonishing　question　asked　what　have　I　done？　All　the　spectators　reply　immediately：　you　have　poured　water　into　a　glass。　Then　I　ask　further　with　what　hand　did　I　do　it？　How　many　glasses　were　there？　Where　was　the　glass　into　which　I　poured　the　water？　How　much　did　I　pour？　How　much　water　was　there　in　the　glass？　Did　I　really　pour　or　just　pretend　to？　How　full　was　the　bottle？　Was　it　certainly　water　and　not；　perhaps；　wine？　Was　it　not　red　wine？　What　did　I　do　with　my　hand　after　pouring　the　water？　How　did　I　look　when　I　did　it？　Did　you　not　really　see　that　I　shut　my　eyes？　Did　you　not　really　see　that　I　stuck　my　tongue　out？　Was　I　pouring　the　water　while　I　did　it？　Or　before；　or　after？　Did　I　wear　a　ring　on　my　hand？　Was　my　cuff　visible？　What　was　the　position　of　my　fingers　while　I　held　the　glass？　These　questions　may　be　multiplied。　And　it　is　as　astonishing　as　amusing　to　see　how　little　correctness　there　is　in　the　answers；　and　how　people　quarrel　about　the　answers；　and　what　extraordinary　things　they　say。　Yet　what　do　we　require　of　witnesses　who　have　to　describe　much　more　complicated　matters　to　which　their　attention　had　not　been　previously　called；　and　who　have　to　make　their　answers；　not　immediately；　but　much　later；　and　who；　moreover；　may；　in　the　presence　of　the　fact；　have　been　overcome　by　fear；　astonishment；　terror；　etc。！　I　find　that　probing　even　comparatively　trained　wit…　　nesses　is　rather　too　funny；　and　the　conclusions　drawn　from　what　is　so　learned　are　rather　too　conscienceless。＇1＇　Such　introductions　as：　‘‘But　you　will　know；''‘‘Just　recall　this　one；''‘‘You　wouldn't　be　so　stupid　as　not　to　have　observed　whether；''‘‘But　my　dear　woman；　you　have　eyes；''and　whatever　else　may　be　offered　in　this　kindly　fashion；　may　bring　out　an　answer；　but　what　real　worth　can　such　an　answer　have？


＇1＇　Cf。　Borst　u。　Claparde：　Sur　divers　Caractres　du　Temoigna　e。　Archives　des　Sciences　Phys。　et　Nat。　XVII。　Diehl：　zum　Studium　der　Merktahugkeit。　Beitr。　zur　Psych。　der　Aussage；　II；　1903


One　bright　day　I　came　home　from　court　and　saw　a　man　step　out　of　a　cornfield；　remain　a　few　instants　in　my　field　of　vision；　and　then　disappear。　I　felt　at　once　that　the　man　had　done　something　suspicious；　and　immediately　asked　myself　how　he　looked。　I　found　I　knew　nothing　of　his　clothes；　his　dress；　his　beard；　his　size；　in　a　word；　nothing　at　all　about　him。　But　how　I　would　have　punished　a　witness　who　should　have　known　just　as　little。　We　shall　have；　in　the　course　of　this　examination；　frequently　to　mention　the　fact　that　we　do　not　see　an　event　in　spite　of　its　being　in　the　field　of　perception。　I　want　at　this　point　merely　to　call　attention　to　a　single　well…known　case；　recorded　by　Hofmann。＇2＇　At　a　trial　a　circumstantial　and　accurate　attempt　was　made　to　discover　whether　it　was　a　significant　alteration　to　bite　a　man's　ear　off。　The　court；　the　physician；　the　witnesses；　etc。；　dealt　with　the　question　of　altering；　until　finally　the　wounded　man　himself　showed　what　was　meant；　because　his　other　ear　had　been　bitten　off　many　years　before；but　then　nobody　had　noticed　that　mutilated　ear。


＇2＇　Gericht。　Medizin。　Vienna　1898。　p。　447。


In　order　to　know　what　another　person　has　seen　and　apprehended　we　must　first　of　all　know　how　he　thinks；　and　that　is　impossible。　We　frequently　say　of　another　that　he　must　have　thought　this　or　that；　or　have　hit　upon　such　and　such　ideas；　but　what　the　events　in　another　brain　may　be　we　can　never　observe。　As　Bois…Reymond　says　somewhere：　‘‘If　Laplace's　ghost　could　build　a　homunculus　according　to　the　Leibnitzian　theory；　atom　by　atom　and　molecule　by　molecule；　he　might　succeed　in　making　it　think；　but　not　in　knowing　how　it　thinks。''　But　if　we　know；　at　least　approximately；　the　kind　of　mental　process　of　a　person　who　is　as　close　as　possible　to　us　in　sex；　age；　culture；　position；　experience；　etc。；　we　lose　this　knowledge　with　every　step　that　leads　to　differences。　We　know　well　what　great　influence　is　exercised　by　the　multiplicity　of　talents；　superpositions；　knowledge；　and　apprehensions。　When　we　consider　the　qualities　　of　things；　we　discover　that　we　never　apprehend　them　abstractly；　but　always　concretely。　We　do　not　see　color　but　the　colored　object；　we　do　not　see　warmth；　but　something　warm；　not　hardness；　but　something　hard。　The　concept　warm；　as　such；　can　not　be　thought　of　by　anybody；　and　at　the　mention　of　the　word　each　will　think　of　some　particular　warm　object；　one；　of　his　oven　at　home；　another；　of　a　warm　day　in　Italy；　another　of　a　piece　of　hot　iron　which　burnt　him　once。　Then　the　individual　does　not　pay　constant　court　to　the　same　object。　To…day　he　has　in　mind　this　concrete　thing；　to…morrow；　he　uses　different　names　and　makes　different　associations。　But　every　concrete　object　I　think　of　has　considerable　effect　on　the　new　apprehension；　and　my　auditor　does　not　know；　perhaps　even　I　myself　do　not；　what　concrete　object　I　have　already　in　mind。　And　although　Berkeley　has　already　shown　that　color　can　not　be　thought　of　without　space　or　space　without　color；　the　task　of　determining　the　concrete　object　to　which　the　witness　attaches　the　qualities　he　speaks　of；　will　still　be　overlooked　hundreds　of　times。

It　is　further　of　importance　that　everybody　has　learned　to　know　the　object　he　speaks　about　through　repetition；　that　different　relations　have　shown　him　the　matter　in　different　ways。　If　an　object　has　impressed　itself　upon　us；　once　pleasurably　and　once　unpleasantly；　we　can　not　derive　the　history　and　character　of　the　present　impression　from　the　object　alone；　nor　can　we　find　it　merely　in　the　synthetic　memory　sensations　which　are　due　to　the　traces　of　the　former　coalescing　impressions。　We　are　frequently　unable；　because　of　this　coalescing　of　earlier　impressions；　to　keep　them　apart　and　to　study　their　effect　on　present　impressions。　Frequently　we　do　not　even　at　all　know　why　this　or　that　impression　is　so　vivid。　But　if　we　are　ignorant　with　regard　to　what　occurs　in　ourselves；　how　much　can　we　know　about　others？

Exner　calls　attention　to　the　fact　that　it　is　in　this　direction　especially；　that　the　‘‘dark　perceptions''　play　a　great　rle。　‘‘A　great　part　of　our　intelligence　depends　on　the　ability　of　these　‘dark　perceptions'　to　rise　without　requiring　further　attention；　into　the　field　of　consciousness。　There　are　people；　e。　g。；　who　recognize　birds　in　their　flight　without　knowing　clearly　what　the　characteristic　flight　for　any　definite　bird　may　be。　Others；　still　more　intelligent；　know　at　what　intervals　the　flyers　beat　their　wings；　for　they　can　imitate　them　with　their　hands。　And　when　the　intelligence　is　still　greater；　it　makes　possible　a　correct　description　in　words。''

Suppose　that　in　some　important　criminal　case　several　people；　　of　different　degrees　of　education　and　intelligence；　have　made　observations。　We　suppose　that　they　all　want　to　tell　the　truth；　and　we　also　suppose　that　they　have　observed　and　apprehended　their　objects　correctly。　Their　testimonies；　nevertheless；　will　be　very　different。　With　the　degree　of　intelligence　rises　the　degree　of　effect　of　the　‘‘dark　subconscious　perceptions。''　They　give　more　definite　presentation　and　explanation　of　the　testimony；　they　turn　bare　assertions　into　well…ordered　perceptions　and　real　representations。　But　we　generally　make　the