criminal psychology-第62部分

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images　because　he　knows　their　conditions。　When　we　speak　with　a　witness；　however；　we　rarely　know　the　conditions　under　which　he　has　obtained　his　images；　and　we　learn　them　only　from　him。　Now　it　happens　that　the　description　offered　by　the　witness　adds　another　image；　i。　e。；　our　own　image　of　the　matter；　and　this；　and　that　of　the　witness；　have　to　be　placed　in　specific　relation　to　each　other。　Out　of　the　individual　images　of　all　concerned　an　image　should　be　provided　which　implies　the　image　of　the　represented　event。　Images　can　be　compared　only　with　images；　or　images　are　only　pictures　of　images。＇1＇


＇1＇　Cf。　Windelband：　‘‘Prludien。''


The　difficulty　of　this　transmutation　lies　fundamentally　in　the　nature　of　representation。　Representation　can　never　be　identical　with　its　object。　Helmholtz　has　made　this　most　clear：　‘‘Our　visions　and　representations　are　effects；　objects　seen　and　represented　have　worked　on　our　nervous　system　and　on　our　consciousness。　The　nature　of　each　effect　depends　necessarily　upon　the　nature　of　its　cause；　and　the　nature　of　the　individual　upon　whom　the　cause　was　at　work。　To　demand　an　image　which　should　absolutely　reproduce　its　object　and　therefore　be　absolutely　true；　would　be　to　demand　an　effect　which　should　be　absolutely　independent　of　the　nature　of　that　object　on　which　the　effect　is　caused。　And　this　is　an　obvious　contradiction。''

What　the　difference　between　image　and　object　consists　of；　whether　it　is　merely　formal　or　material；　how　much　it　matters；　has　not　yet　been　scientifically　proved　and　may　never　be　so。　We　have　to　assume　only　that　the　validity　of　this　distinction　is　universally　known；　and　that　everybody　possesses　an　innate　corrective　with　which　he　assigns　proper　place　to　image　and　object；　i。　e。；　he　knows　approximately　the　distinction　between　them。　The　difficulty　lies　in　the　fact　that　not　all　people　possess　an　identical　standard；　and　that　upon　the　creation　of　the　latter　practically　all　human　qualities　exert　an　influence。　This　variety　in　standards；　again；　is　double…edged。　On　the　one　side　it　depends　on　the　essence　of　image　and　of　object；　on　the　other　it　depends　on　the　alteration　which　the　image　undergoes　even　during　perception　as　well　as　during　all　the　ensuing　time。　Everybody　knows　this　distinction。　Whoever　has　seen　anything　under　certain　circumstances；　or　during　a　certain　period　of　his　life；　may　frequently　　produce　an　image　of　it　varying　in　individual　characteristics；　but　in　its　general　character　constant。　If　he　sees　it　later　under　different　conditions；　at　a　different　age；　when　memory　and　imaginative　disposition　have　exercised　their　alterative　influence；　image　and　object　fail　to　correspond　in　various　directions。　The　matter　is　still　worse　with　regard　to　images　of　things　and　events　that　have　never　been　seen。　I　can　imagine　the　siege　of　Troy；　a　dragon；　the　polar　night　and　Alexander　the　Great；　but　how　different　will　the　image　be　from　the　object！

This　is　especially　obvious　when　we　have　perceived　something　which　did　not　appear　to　us　altogether　correct。　We　improve　the　thing；　i。　e。；　we　study　how　it　might　have　been　better；　and　we　remember　it　as　improved；　then　the　more　frequently　this　object　as　imagined　recurs；　the　more　fixed　its　form　becomes；　but　not　its　actual　form；　only　its　altered　form。　We　see　this　with　especial　clearness　in　the　case　of　drawings　that　in　some　way　displease　us。　Suppose　I　do　not　like　the　red　dress　of　a　woman　in　some　picture　and　I　prefer　brown。　If　later　I　recall　the　picture　the　image　will　become　progressively　browner　and　browner；　and　finally　I　see　the　picture　as　brown；　and　when　I　meet　the　real　object　I　wonder　about　the　red　dress。＇1＇


＇1＇　H。　Gross：　Korregierte　Vorstellungen。　In　H。　Gross's　Archiv　X；　109。


We　get　this　situation　in　miniature　each　time　we　hear　of　a　crime；　however　barren　the　news　may　be；no　more　than　a　telegraphic　word。　The　event　must　naturally　have　some　degree　of　importance；　because；　if　I　hear　merely　that　a　silver　watch　has　been　stolen；　I　do　not　try　to　imagine　that　situation。　If；　however；　I　hear　that　near　a　hostelry　in　X；　a　peasant　was　robbed　by　two　traveling　apprentices　I　immediately　get　an　image　which　contains　not　only　the　unknown　region；　but　also　the　event　of　the　robbery；　and　even　perhaps　the　faces　of　those　concerned。　It　does　not　much　matter　that　this　image　is　completely　false　in　practically　every　detail；　because　in　the　greater　number　of　cases　it　is　corrected。　The　real　danger　lies　in　the　fact　that　this　correction　is　frequently　so　bad　and　often　fails　altogether　and　that；　in　consequence；　the　first　image　again　breaks　through　and　remains　the　most　vigorous。＇2＇　The　vigor　is　the　greater　because　we　always　attach　such　imagination　to　something　actual　or　approximately　real；　and　inasmuch　as　the　latter　thing　is　either　really　seen；　or　at　least　energetically　imagined；　the　first　image　acquires　renewed　power　of　coming　up。　According　to　Lipps；　‘‘Reproductive　images　　presuppose　dispositions。　Dispositions　ensue　upon　perceptions　that　they　imply；　still　there　are　reproductive　images　and　imagined　wholes　which　imply　no　preceding　perceptions。　This　contradiction　is　solved　when　dispositions　are　contained　in　other　things　at　the　same　time。　A　finite　number　of　dispositions　may　in　this　way　be　also　infinite。。。。　Dispositions　are　transformed　power　itself；　power　transformed　in　such　a　way　as　to　be　able　to　respond　actively　to　inner　stimulations。''


＇2＇　C。　de　Lagrave：　L'Autosuggestion　Naturelle。　Rev。　d'Hypnot。　1889；　XIV；　257。


The　process　is　similar　in　the　reproduction　of　images　during　speech。　The　fact　that　this　reproduction　is　not　direct　but　depends　on　the　sequence　of　images；　leads　to　the　garrulity　of　children；　old　men；　and　uneducated　people；　who　try　to　present　the　whole　complex　of　relations　belonging　to　any　given　image。　But　such　total　recall　drives　the　judge　to　despair；　not　only　because　he　loses　time；　but　because　of　the　danger　of　having　the　attention　turned　from　important　to　unimportant　things。　The　same　thing　is　perceived　in　judicial　documents　which　often　reveal　the　fact　that　the　dictator　permitted　himself　to　be　led　astray　by　unskilful　witnesses；　or　that　he　had　himself　been　responsible　for　abstruse；　indirect　memories。　The　real　thinker　will　almost　always　be　chary　of　words；　because　he　retains；　from　among　the　numberless　images　which　are　attached　to　his　idea；　only　those　most　closely　related　to　his　immediate　purpose。　Hence　good　protocols　are　almost　always　comparatively　short。　It　is　even　as　instructive　as　amusing　to　examine　certain　protocols；　with　regard　to　what　ought　to　be　omitted；　and　then　with　regard　to　the　direct　representations；　i。　e。；　to　everything　that　appertains　to　the　real　illumination　of　the　question。　It　is　astounding　how　little　of　the　latter　thing　is　indicated；　and　how　often　it　enters　blindly　because　what　was　important　has　been　forgotten　and　lost。

Of　course；　we　must　grant　that　the　essence　of　representation　involves　very　great　difficulties。　By　way　of　example　consider　so　ordinary　a　case　as　the　third　dimension。　We　are　convinced　that　according　to　its　nature　it　is　much　more　complex　than　it　seems　to　be。　We　are　compelled　to　believe　that　distance　is　not　a　matter　of　sensation　and　that　it　requires　to　be　explained。＇1＇


＇1＇　Several　sentences　are　here　omitted。


Psychologists　indicate　that　the　representation　of　the　third　dimension　would　be　tremendously　difficult　without　the　help　of　experience。　But　experience　is　something　relative；　we　do　not　know　how　much　experience　any　man　possesses；　or　its　nature。　Hence；　we　never　can　know　clearly　to　what　degree　a　man's　physical　vision　is　correct　if　　we　do　not　see　other　means　of　verification。　Consider　now　what　is　required　in　the　assumption　of　the　idea　of　the　fourth　dimension。　Since　its　introduction　by　Henry　More；　this　idea　should　quite　have　altered　our　conception　of　space。　But　we　do　not　know　how　many　cling　to　it　unconsciously；　and　we　should　make　no　mistake　if　we　said　that　nobody　has　any　knowledge　of　how　his　neighbor　perceives　space。＇1＇


＇1＇　Cf。　E。　Storch：　ber　des　rumliche　Sehen；　in　Ztschrft。　v。　Ebbinghaus　u。　Nagel　XXIX；　22。


Movement　is　another　thing　difficult　to　represent　or　imagine。　You　can　determine　for　yourself　immediately　whether　you　can　imagine　even　a　slightly　complicated　movement。　I　can　imagine　one　individual　condition　of　a　movement　after　another；　sequentially；　but　I　can　not　imagine　the　sequence。　As　Herbart　says　somewhere；　a　successive　series　of　images　is　not　a　represented　succession。　But　if　we　can　not　imagine　this　latter；　what　do　we　imagine　is　not　what　it　ought　to　be。　According　to　Stricker；＇2＇　the　representation　of　movement　is　a　_quale_　which　can　not　be　given　in　terms　of　any　other　sensory　quality；　and　no　movement　can　be　remembered　without　the　brain's　awakening　a　muscle…movement。　Experience　verifies　this　theory。　The　awakening　of　the　muscular　sense　is　frequently　obvious　whenever　movement　is　thought　of；　and　we　may　then　perceive　how；　in　the　explanation　or　description　of　a　movement；　the　innervation　which　follows　the　image　in　question；　occurs。　This　innervation　is　always　true。　It　agrees　at　least　with　what　the　witness　has　himself　perceived　and　now　tries　to　renew　in　his　story。　When　we　have　him　explain；　for　example；　how　some　man　had　been　choked；　we　may　see　movements　of　his　hands　which；　however　slight　and　obscure；　still　definitely　indicate　that　he　is　trying　to　remember　what　he　has　seen；　and　this　irrelevantly　of　what　he　is　saying。　This　makes　it　possible　to　observe　the　alterations　of　images　in　the　individual　in　question；　an　alteration　which　always　occurs　when　the　images　are　related　to　movements。


＇2＇　S。　Stricker：　Studien　ber　die　Bewegungsvorstellungen。　Tbingen　1868。


It　follows　further　from　the　fact　that　movements　are　difficult　to　represent　that　the　witness　ought　not　to　be　expected　accurately　to　recall　them。　Stricker　says　that　for　a　long　time　he　could　not　image　a　snow…fall；　and　succeeded　only　in　representing　one　single　instant　of　it。　Now　what　is　not　capable　of　representation；　can　not　well　be　recalled；　and　so　we　discover　that　it　merely　causes　trouble　to　ask　the　witness　to　describe　point　by　point　even　a　simple　sequence。　The　witness　has　only　successive　images；　and　even　if　the　particular　images　are　correct；　　he　has　nothing　objective　for　the　succession　itself；　nothing　rooted　in　the　sequence。　He　is　helped；　merely；　by　the　logic　of　events　and