criminal psychology-第74部分

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the　middle　one；　and　O　the　youngest；　I　may　suppose；　in　order　to　help　my　memory；　that　their　births　followed　in　the　same　order　as　their　initials；　M；　N；　O。　Now　suppose　that　at　another　time；　in　another　case　I　observe　the　same　relation　but　find　the　order　of　the　initials　reversed　O　N；　M。　If　now；　in　the　face　of　the　facts；　I　stop　simply　with　this　technique；　I　may　later　on　substitute　the　two　cases　for　each　other。　Hence；　when　a　witness　says　anything　which　appears　to　have　been　difficult　to　remember；　it　is　necessary　to　ask　him　how　he　was　able　to　remember　it。　If　he　assigns　some　aid　to　memory　as　the　reason；　he　must　be　required　to　explain　it；　and　he　must　not　be　believed　unless　it　is　found　reliable。　If　the　witness　in　the　instance　above；　for　example；　says；　‘‘I　never　make　use　of　converse　relations；''　then　his　testimony　will　seem　comparatively　trustworthy。　And　it　is　not　　difficult　to　judge　the　degree　of　reliability　of　any　aid　to　memory　whatever。

Great　liars　are　frequently　characterized　by　their　easy　use　of　the　most　complicated　mnemotechnique。　They　know　how　much　they　need　it。



Topic　7。　THE　WILL。

Section　57。

Of　course；　we　do　not　intend　to　discuss　here　either　the　‘‘will''　of　the　philosopher；　or　the　‘‘malice''　or　‘‘ill…will''　of　criminal　law；　nor　yet　the　‘‘freedom　of　the　will''　of　the　moralist。　We　aim　only　to　consider　a　few　facts　that　may　be　of　significance　to　the　criminal　lawyer。　Hence；　we　intend　by　‘‘will''　only　what　is　currently　and　popularly　meant。　I　take　will　to　be　the　_*inner_　effect　of　the　more　powerful　impulses；　while　action　is　the　_*external_　effect　of　those　impulses。　When　Hartmann　says　that　will　is　the　transposition　of　the　ideal　into　the　real；　he　sounds　foolish；　but　in　one　sense　the　definition　is　excellent。　You　need　only　understand　by　ideal　that　which　does　not　yet　exist；　and　by　real　that　which　is　a　fact　and　actual。　For　when　I　voluntarily　compel　myself　to　think　about　some　subject；　something　has　actually　happened；　but　this　event　is　not　‘‘real''　in　the　ordinary　sense　of　that　word。　We　are　to　bear　in　mind；　however；　that　Locke　warned　us　against　the　contrast　between　intelligence　and　will；　as　real；　spiritual　essences；　one　of　which　gives　orders　and　the　other　of　which　obeys。　From　this　conception　many　fruitless　controversies　and　confusions　have　arisen。　In　this　regard；　we　criminalists　must　always　remember　how　often　the　common　work　of　will　and　intelligence　opposes　us　in　witnesses　and　still　more　so　in　defendants；　causing　us　great　difficulties。　When　the　latter　deny　their　crime　with　iron　fortitude　and　conceal　their　guilt　by　rage；　or　when　for　months　they　act　out　most　difficult　parts　with　wonderful　energy；　we　must　grant　that　they　exhibit　aspects　of　the　will　which　have　not　yet　been　studied。　Indeed；　we　can　make　surprising　observations　of　how　effectively　prisoners　control　the　muscles　of　their　faces；　which　are　least　controllable　by　the　will。　The　influence　the　will　may　have　on　a　witness's　power　even　to　flush　and　grow　pale　is　also　more　extensive　than　may　be　established　scientifically。　This　can　be　learned　from　quite　remote　events。　My　son　happens　to　have　told　me　that　at　one　time　he　found　himself　growing　pale　with　cold；　and　as　under　the　circumstance　he　was　afraid　of　being　accused　of　lacking　courage　to　pursue　his　task；　he　tried　with　all　his　power　to　　suppress　his　pallor；　and　succeeded　perfectly。　Since　then；　at　court；　I　have　seen　a　rising　blush　or　beginning　pallor　suppressed　completely；　yet　this　is　theoretically　impossible。

But　the　will　is　also　significant　in　judging　the　man　as　a　whole。　According　to　Drobisch；＇1＇　the　abiding　qualities　and　ruling　‘‘set''　of　a　man's　volition　constitute　his　character。　Not　only　inclination；　and　habits；　and　guiding　principles　determine　the　character；　but　also　meanings；　prejudices；　convictions；　etc。　of　all　kinds。　Since；　then；　we　can　not　avoid　studying　the　character　of　the　individual；　we　must　trace　his　volitions　and　desires。　This　in　itself　is　not　difficult；　the　idea　of　his　character　develops　spontaneously　when　so　traced。　But　the　will　contains　also　the　characteristic　signs　of　difference　which　are　important　for　our　purposes。　We　are　enabled　to　work　intelligently　and　clearly　only　by　our　capacity　for　distinguishing　indifferent；　from　criminal　and　logically　interpretable　deeds。　Nothing　makes　our　work　so　difficult　as　the　inconceivably　superfluous　mass　of　details。　Not　every　deed　or　activity　is　an　action；　only　those　are　such　which　are　determined　by　will　and　knowledge。　So　Abegg＇2＇　teaches　us；　what　is　determined　by　means　of　the　will　may　be　discovered　by　analysis。

Of　course；　we　must　find　the　proper　approach　to　this　subject　and　not　get　lost　in　the　libertarian…deterministic　quarrel；　which　is　the　turning…point　in　contemporary　criminal　law。　Forty　years　ago　Renan　said　that　the　error　of　the　eighteenth　century　lay　generally　in　assigning　to　the　free　and　self…conscious　will　what　could　be　explained　by　means　of　the　natural　effects　of　human　powers　and　capacities。　That　century　understood　too　little　the　theory　of　instinctive　activity。　Nobody　will　claim　that　in　the　transposition　of　willing　into　the　expression　of　human　capacity；　the　question　of　determinism　is　solved。　The　solution　of　this　question　is　not　our　task。　We　do　get　an　opening　however　through　which　we　can　approach　the　criminal；not　by　having　to　examine　the　elusive　character　of　his　will；　but　by　apprehending　the　intelligible　expression　of　his　capacity。　The　weight　of　our　work　is　set　on　the　application　of　the　concept　of　causality；　and　the　problem　of　free…will　stands　or　falls　with　that。


＇1＇　M。　W。　Drobisch：　Die　moralische　Statistik。　Leipzig　1867。

＇2＇　Neues　Archiv　des　Kriminal…Rechts。　Vol。　14。


Bois…Reymond　in　his　‘‘Limits　of　the　Knowledge　of　Nature''　has　brought　some　clearness　into　this　problem：　‘‘Freedom　may　be　denied；　pain　and　desire　may　not；　the　appetite　which　is　the　stimulus　to　action　necessarily　precedes　sense…perception。　The　problem；　therefore；　is　that　of　sense…perception；　and　not　as　I　had　said　a　minute　　ago；　that　of　the　freedom　of　the　will。　It　is　to　the　former　that　analytic　mechanics　may　be　applied。''　And　the　study　of　sense…perception　is　just　what　we　lawyers　may　be　required　to　undertake。

Of　course；　it　is　insufficient　merely　to　study　the　individual　manifestations　of　human　capacities；　for　these　may　be　accidental　results　or　phenomena；　determined　by　unknown　factors。　Our　task　consists　in　attaining　abstractions　in　accord　with　careful　and　conscientious　perceptions；　and　in　finding　each　determining　occasion　in　its　particular　activities。

According　to　Drobisch；　‘‘maxims　and　the　subjective　principles　of　evolution　are；　as　Kant　calls　them；　laws　of　general　content　required　to　determine　our　own　volitions　and　actions。　Then　again；　they　are　rules　of　our　own　volition　and　action　which　we　ourselves　construct；　and　which　hence　are　subjectively　valid。　When　these　maxims　determine　our　future　volitions　and　actions　they　are　postulates。''　We　may；　therefore；　say　that　we　know　a　man　when　we　know　his　will；　and　that　we　know　his　will　when　we　know　his　maxims。　By　means　of　his　maxims　we　are　able　to　judge　his　actions。

But　we　must　not　reconstruct　his　maxims　theoretically。　We　must　study　everything　that　surrounds；　alters；　and　determines　him；　for　it　is　at　this　point　that　a　man's　environments　and　relationships　most　influence　him。　As　Grohmann　said；　half　a　century　ago；　‘‘If　you　could　find　an　elixir；　which　could　cause　the　vital　organs　to　work　otherwise；　if　you　could　alter　the　somatic　functions　of　the　body；　you　would　be　the　master　of　the　will。''　Therefore　it　is　never　superfluous　to　study　the　individual's　environmental　conditions；　surroundings；　all　his　outer　influences。　That　the　effort　required　in　such　a　study　is　great；　is　of　course　obvious；　but　the　criminal　lawyer　must　make　it　if　he　is　to　perform　his　task　properly。＇1＇



＇1＇　H。　Mnsterberg：　Die　Willeshandlung　and　various　chapters　on　will　in　the　psychologies　of　James；　Titchener；　etc。



Topic　8。　EMOTION。

Section　58。

Little　as　emotion；　as　generally　understood；　may　have　to　do　with　the　criminalist；　it　is；　in　its　intention；　most　important　for　him。　The　motive　of　a　series　of　phenomena　and　events；　both　in　prisoners　and　witnesses；　is　emotion。　In　what　follows；　therefore；　we　shall　attempt　to　show　that　feeling；　in　so　far　as　we　need　to　consider　it；　need　not　be　taken　as　an　especial　function。　This　is　only　so　far　significant　as　to　　make　our　work　easier　by　limiting　it　to　fewer　subjects。　If　we　can　reduce　some　one　psychic　function　to　another　category　we　can　explain　many　a　thing　even　when　we　know　only　the　latter。　In　any　event；　the　study　of　a　single　category　is　simpler　than　that　of　many。＇1＇


＇1＇　A。　Lehman：　Die　Hauptgesetze　des　menschlichen　Gefhlsleben。　Leipzig　1892。


Abstractly；　the　word　emotion　is　the　property　or　capacity　of　the　mind　to　be　influenced　pleasantly　or　unpleasantly　by　sensations；　perceptions；　and　ideas。　Concretely；　it　means　the　conditions　of　desire　or　disgust　which　are　developed　by　the　complex　of　conditions　thereby　aroused。　We　have　first　to　distinguish　between　the　so…called　animal　and　the　higher　emotions。　We　will　assume　that　this　distinction　is　incorrect；　inasmuch　as　between　these　classes　there　is　a　series　of　feelings　which　may　be　counted　as　well　with　one　as　with　the　other；　so　that　the　transition　is　incidental　and　no　strict　differentiation　is　possible。　We　will；　however；　retain　the　distinction；　as　it　is　easier　by　means　of　it　to　pass　from　the　simpler　to　the　more　difficult　emotions。　The　indubitably　animal　passions　we　shall　take　to　be　hunger；　thirst；　cold；　etc。　These　are　first　of　all　purely　physiological　stimuli　which　act　on　our　body。　But　it　is　impossible　to　imagine　one　of　them；　without；　at　the　same　time；　inevitably　bringing　in　the　idea　of　the　defense　against　this　physiological　stimulus。　It　is　impossible　to　think　of　the　feeling　of　hunger　without　sensing　also　the　strain　to　find　relief　from　this　feeling；　for　without　this　sensation　hunger　would　not　appear　as　such。　If　I　am　hungry　I　go　for　food；　if　I　am　cold　I　seek　for　warmth；　if　I　feel　pain　I　try　to　wipe　it　out。　How　to　satisfy　these　desiderative　actions　is　a　problem　for　the　understanding；　whence　it　follows　that　successful　satisfaction；　intelligent　or　unintelligent；　may　vary　in　every　possible　degree。　We　see　that　the　least　intelligentreal　cretinssometimes　are　unable　to　satisfy　their　hunger；　for　when